Even having a 5-1 lead over the
737-900 with the A321, Randy Tinseth insist on the 737-900 is here to stay. *Data below suggest a 60% to 40% market split with Airbus and Boeing A321 to 737-900 Max order numbers. It's a winner, having booked about 217 (now 418), 737-900 Max versions over-all. However, Airbus has
booked 1,052 A321NEO. Randy is the chief Boeing instigator for All Things Boeing
in the market place. What Randy knows is projected out in statements like,
"We are very pleased with the 737-900 aircraft, it offers... and so
forth". Footnotes suggest otherwise as the A321NEO to 737-900 Max gap tightens.
So why is
the competitive order nature for Boeing's 737-900 so diminished against the A321? The
Airbus A321 lead of 1,052 to 217 (now 418) is the largest reason for its having a 4,500 to 3072
lead over Boeing when calculating the Max vs NEO total headcount.
Boeing
stays with the 737-Max-900, because of other reasons than just "we are
pleased".
·Something "bigger" is coming from Boeing??
·Airbus
line-cut with the A321NEO.
·Market
starvation for a new single aisle solution reaches a heightened condition at the NEO
announcement.
·Boeing
was caught giant killing wide bodies during the Single Aisle revamp window.
·Boeing
cannot pivot on the MAX until after its delivery starts.
·Timing is
everything in the aviation Market and Boeing lost that window before 2013.
A <<Better aircraft comparison>>is
the 737 MAX over the A321NEO! After linking above with the comparison you will understand
Mr. Tinseth position in full.
Boeing
really lost the A321 market in 2013 when it came late to the order window for
single aisle renovations. It was about 15 months late of the Airbus theft of
the single aisle market. It could never recoup the Airbus lead when announcing
the MAX so late when the window was opened. The Airbus single aisle margin
happens to equal the A321NEO backlog lead over the 737-900 backlog. The 737-900
Max is the better aircraft, but it languishes behind the market out of its lateness
coming to the order opportunity. Fifteen months is the difference as Boeing had
its hands tied,slaying those wide body giants. Footnotes: Pdxlight Data
Good news for Boeing lies in the
option counts where it leads Airbus by 1,121 B-options to 1074 A-options at
this snapshot moment. The numbers have grown since this chart was last updated
where Airbus now stands at 4471 for all A320NEO types having 1094 A321NEO
ordered with 125, options.
The Max
900 appears to have about 418 of its type ordered (per wikidata) narrowing the
A321 gap over the 737-900 Max.
Boeing Data with far right column data from
Wikipedia
Wiki Data: NG Tally for the 737.
Final Chart: NG Queue
As of February 27, 2016: Subject to change upon new orders and completed deliveries. Note: 737-900 began in 1997 with orders while the A321 started in 1993. The A321 had a four year lead over the 737-900 when it announced in 1997. The Airbus A321NEO was announced in 2012 causing a 19 year churning for older models and ordering for the latest A321NEO in numbers. A strong consideration for Boeing's catch-up challenge when it announced the 737-900-MAX later during 2013. It is no wonder why the A320-321NEO order gap exists over the Max. The A321 was ready for fleet renewal in Airbus' fleet offering to its customers. Boeing only has an eight years of aging inventory churning up for its recently offered 737-900 Max.
Taking all things considered, Boeing will build the next great project. It's not a rejuvenation project as
found with the 737 MAX and 777X. But it becomes the sum of all Boeing's
innovations. The Max is a highly advanced derivative of the 737 NG. The 777X is
another highly advanced derivative of the 777-300ER. Boeing has yet to build an
all new replacement for the 757. Many times Winging It has proposed the notion
for a 757 replacement filling a gaping hole in its lineup of aircraft.
This time
Boeing will lay all its cards on the table with a composition of innovations
from all things learned during the last decade and perfected in this current
decade. The "next" will be built in the next decade starting in 2020
moving forward. Boeing has better technology than Airbus can even develop in
the next 10 years. While Airbus' main selling point is building more space for passengers in which to inhabit than Boeing has done by only inches. Airbus turns those inches into
sounding like feet that have been added for the passenger.
Boeing
has collected an astounding number of proprietary innovations of which Airbus
could not touch or replicate. Though most innovations seem to cater towards an
airline customer's operations, many of its innovations surround the passenger
experience. The lessons from these advancements can build the next all-new
aircraft type.
Having
787 technology on all Boeing types is the payback going forward. The $28.5
billion deferred cost bucket will pay forward and spread throughout the Boeing
family. The 787 brought forward an all-electric core technology which most have
forgotten about in the world of travel. The 787 technology has brought to the
market better air for the passengers. It gave a relative flight altitude of
6,000 feet for its passengers while sitting in the cabin flying at 41,000 feet.
People
can't stop talking about those windows and its shades. In fact the shade
technology has improved as expected from the beginning, by completely darkening
the horizon as black during the brightest sunlight days. Not all 787's will
have the latest shade technology windows installed as it is just emerging from
the lab. However, during the next five years as time and costs will allow an
airline, the opportunity for window shade treatment enhancements is available.
Say goodbye to pull down window slates.
The cabin
lights are an advanced use for LED lighting mated with computer programming which
can give you sunsets and mood changes during a flight. Even though competitors
can affect a change for lighting Boeing lead the way effecting a passenger's
flight experience.
Boeing
once proposed a 787-300. It was to be the gap filler for the 757 which the
market wasn't ready to accept as mid-wide-bodies was a bigger gap. The wide
body market had to fill the airspace first before demand for a "gap
filler" would make a wave. Airbus saw an opportunity as Boeing resources
were committed to the wide body effort. Then came forward with an A321 NEO,
built on Airbus' lagging technology. An old adage is "Not so fast my
friend" is where Boeing is today. There is a distinct gap to be filled or
Boeing ends up with having an underdeveloped market. Boeing will clean up its
march to market supremacy by taking the sum of its innovations, and cashing in
those development cost it had won during its proprietary renaissance of the
first decade of the 21st century.
The
paragon cost $28.5 billion and it will push the next great Boeing
aircraft.
The 787 has a long history of
costs, development setbacks and glitching. Those principal contributors have
been set into one big pot called deferred costs. The pot is the scraps on the
production floor which account for about $28 Billion not yet paid for in the
program. The good news is Boeing has turned the long sought for corner where
each 787 delivered starts paying for the $28 Billion scrap heap of program
expenses.
Seeking
Alpha Quote:"The biggest thing that Boeing has going for it is its technical superiority over Airbus (OTCPK:EADSY) that was developed on the 787 and will be used on future aircraft. The 787 plane is opening new direct point to point routes each month with the latest being Dubai to Panama city in 17:35 hours." An important statement coming from financial heads concerning aviation. Boeing is turning on the 787 production engine of surplus cash. Each 787 forward from December 2015 contributes to the reduction of deferred costs from the program. In accounting its called a "Contribution Margin"(CM). The CM is used in breakeven formulation. Accounting heads look at variable cost, fixed cost and Contribution margins in order to find when the next unit produced will finally make a profit. The CM is used to pay down the 787 deferred cost of $28.5 Billion. The next question comes from determining how many units are needed from this point forward in order to reach a profit. Some have affixed 1300 787 are needed for that to occur. If true then Boeing needs to deliver another 1,000 787s. The have about 771 in backlog. However, going forward to be built would require another 300 gross numbers or so of 787 orders in order to make a profit based on price book numbers. The good news is they have about five years to get it done! The order book will increase by 300 in about five years assuring the 787 program will be profitable. This indicates a stock buy from this point until large orders may occur. Any large orders place will make a Boeing stock more valuable in the future, and for Stock investors it is worthy to monitor the order book in light of the booked orders measured against a unit break-even point. Making the deferred cost no longer an item of concern.
SpiceJet has a quandary. It
needs builder's delivery slots on its time and it can't wait in line. The suitors banging
at its door have a problem. One has already promised 4,500 NEO's the other is up
to its eyebrows with 3,000 Max. The manufacturer can promise almost anything, but on SpiceJet's time, it's a false patronization from the suitor's.
Late to
the party is how late SpiceJet must consider in its own demise. An important
decision, indeed. What manufacturer best suits SpiceJet's latest interest in a
build date is the problem? Will a SpiceJet dither will cause its Spice to wither
while in waiting. How big a deal is the tease for either manufacturer, its $11
Billion big, and coming with bragging rights? It is not a matter who has the
best Single Aisle, more than it's a matter for SpiceJet’s operational needs.
It needs Single Aisle to arrive on-time. They are waiting for build slots for
its own time before choosing.
An
interesting conundrum for the framers. Is SpiceJet using the leverage of time
of delivery for the deal making instead of a low ball price factor? The answer
is not so simple as usual. Time and price are ranked one and two in the
sequence of priorities. SpiceJet’s identified need for its growth is running
up against a due date of delivery. It maybe, has identified a lull in ordering
for both makers which will only last at most for sixty days. Every two months
something happens with one or the other framers for adding more orders. The
longer SpiceJet waits, the further opportunity pushes back for its fleet
renovation and expansion. If SpiceJet had the financial chops pushing forward
its expansion, SpiceJet might worry the framers into going lowball and promise
a delivery moon, when it can't deliver an exact time for all its prior 7,500
collective orders.
It seems like
SpiceJet is causing its own dilemma in this matter and may lose a window of
opportunity before deciding on committing to an $11 Billion order for Single
Aisle. Having a point number three, not mentioned earlier is the customer,
after-all customers are kind of pointless in India. I almost forgot: With whom will win the order with SpiceJet's need? That answer comes from who has the most slots available for SpiceJet. A guess naturally comes from the 3,000 backlog of Boeing's Max. Reference Article: Airbus or Boeing: $11 Billion Dollar Deal Rests On Timeliness
The A321 and the A320 have two
new engine concepts. The Pratt & Whitney geared version and theCFMoffering. It delivered the
P&W geared version first with some engine hiccups causing a late delivery
for theNEO'smuch
vaunted arrival. The A320NEO delivered with diminished Airbus fanfare. It
wasn't an auspicious occasion for any Airbus delivery.
Now it is
moving theCFMversion
to the forefront of testing and delivery schedules as the PW steeps longer in
testing. Even though the PW version has some entry into service engine issues,
the indication from operations is for theCFMbeing
pushed forward sooner rather than later.
TheCFMBoeing
version stole the 737 Max First Flight Show! Airbus then announces theCFMis coming forward in itsNEOprogression. This is an interesting
development coming from Airbus.
Many
interpretations come into view with this change:
·The PW
has more engine reliability and performance issues in front of it.
·The
Boeing/CFMdemonstration has captured Market
interest
·The PW
problems are bigger than what has been reported
·The MAX
test flight was an outstanding result coming forward from Aviation Intelligence
·TheNEOprogram is more vulnerable than what
has been reported
If this
is all wishful thinking on my part, then Airbus is pleased with everything and
is allowing PW more time becoming a happy thought, andCFMis a good neighbor on the project.
Airbus hedged its bet having a dual engine offering. Boeing has four decades of
experience with theCFMengine
and trusts its maker. The rumor is theCFMLeap
1-B is a great engine surpassing the Airbus Leap 1-A.
Why this
could be true is from the design aspect of the 737 MAX. More power is confined
in a smaller space offering greater challenges for Boeing's version.CFMhad to rely upon its 40 year old
partnership with Boeing to get it right. The ceramic fan blades on the Leap 1-B
is not on the Leap 1-A. The ceramic engine infusion is proprietary. The Boeing design
team had to fit the Leap 1-B on its wing for optimal effect. Since the smaller
diameter provided less efficiency, it needed to make up the inefficiency
factors with betteraerodesign
surrounding the engine placement.
The synergy comes from both Boeing andCFM. The
Max had to be built for one engine and one engine only, in a concert of
optimization from body and engine maker.
The Airbus offering went with a basic
airframe design able to accept two different engine versions. It could not have
two different body enhancements for optimization for different engine makers.
Airbus
had to have a vanilla approach because of two different engine options offering customers a variety of engine choices. One airplane design does not always fit all engine
types.
Boeing
was all-in with theCFMwhen
it was drawing up its MAX design. They worked withCFMsculpting and moving power around here
and there for optimal performance. Wing trim was added to play off theCFMengine. Body design was for maximizing
the 68" diameter and its "hotter" engine.
The Max
was built for theCFMoffering
andCFMworked
with Boeing to get it right. After-all every 737 airplane today flies with aCFMand this company knew its future hinged
on working with Boeing for getting it right.
Therein lies the problem with Airbus' dual engine option. They, the engine makers, are
not all-in with theNEOdesign,
when Airbus has contracted two makers for powering theNEO. It has not demonstrated its commitment to either maker by switching engine
production after P&W is slow coming off the production, and has
"some" issues to iron out as Airbus calls forward the Leap-A for
the big dance.
Airbus
has just blinked as it straps on another engine to the same Airbus Body, which
is already powered by P&W geared turbine. Bring on theCFM for Airbus, the MAX has just flown the coop. It was marvelous.
How is this different for the 787
with two engine options and the 777 with one engine option? A good question in
light of what has been stated above.
The answer is fairly simple,
Boeing was going for a moon-shot with the 787 and it fully did not have its
arms around the 787. It needed both world leading engine makers for this
moon-shot. The 787 design was not going to change just to fit an engine. The engine had to fit the frame coming from the engine maker. It
needed to fly as is within the new design constructs when Boeing did not
know how it would perform. The caveat is Boeing could not change an
experimental airframe design and materials until it knew what it had. Now both
GE and Rolls Royce fly the 787 family.
The 777 family of aircraft was
built to be powered by the GE-90 as a joint venture. Boeing knew its aircraft family has a propensity for a one engine per model philosophy. The exception was
the all-new 787. Boeing needed an engine for competition with a new concept and for
its customers preference.
The Airbus NEO is not a moon-shot,
yet it hasn’t found its engine yet. The MAX already knows what works extremely well
for Boeing and it will continue forward as the Airbus nuts fall not far from the tree. CFM and the MAX is the Boeing product offering for forty plus years.
The 777X wing production is not your uncle’s wing plant found in
Japan. This is a home brewed concoction which is reminiscent of your grand-pa's
innovative acumen found during the industrial age from the early 20th century.
Automation meets high powered computers with finally tooled machining from
Mukilteo, Wa. How American is that?
Dominic gates presents: The 777X Wing in just one piece, I am
referring to the article itself, but one piece is an apply considered statement
for the Star Wars version of "The Attack of The Machines", via
Everett, Washington Wing plant as part of the 777X production facility. Boeing
looks to tug 777X wings over several hundred feet between buildings entering the 777X production floor starting by year's end.
Important: Use the "Red Headline link”
above in order to watch the amazing video and original article.
To fabricate the
composite parts of the giant wings of Boeing’s 777X, Mukilteo-based engineering
firm Electroimpact has designed and built a new generation of robotic machines
that haven’t been previously shown to outsiders.
Inside a new building
just west of Paine Field in Everett, a team of young engineers recently gave
outsiders the first glimpse at a technological advance critical to the future
of airplane making in the Puget Sound region.
Robotic heads zipped
along at great speed, whirling and repositioning at the end of each run, as
their business end — which glowed like a line of fire — laid down thin strips
of carbon fiber infused with epoxy resin.
The manufacturing
machines giving this dazzling performance, designed and built by Mukilteo-based
Electroimpact, will be used to fabricate the giant composite wings of Boeing’s
next jet, the 777X.
Electroimpact:
What it makes: State-of-the-art
automation used by aerospace manufacturers to fabricate parts and assemble
aircraft.
Founded: By
Peter Zieve in 1986
Headquarters: Mukilteo
Employees: About
650 in the U.S., with 125 more in the U.K. and a small presence in China,
Brazil and Australia
2015 revenue: Approximately
$250 million
Think of these machines
as 30-foot-tall, 3-D printers, each costing tens of millions of dollars.
Machines have been making
composite parts for several years, Electroimpact project manager Todd Rudberg
said his team’s machines take the technology’s speed, scale and precision to
whole new levels.
“ And we have data to
back that up,” he said with clear delight. “I have two of the world’s best
machines running at the same time in my building. This is awesome.”
Precisely placing layer
upon layer of carbon-fiber strips infused with epoxy resin, one of these
so-called Automated Fiber Placement (AFP) machines builds up the 777X’s
composite wing skin, producing a single piece 110 feet long and 20 feet across
at the widest end near the fuselage.
The second AFP machine
does something more complex: It lays the carbon-fiber strips down on a surface
that has two 90-degree angles to make a U-shaped structural beam for the wing,
called a spar, again in a single piece.
The precise contouring
made possible by this composite manufacturing technology is what allows Boeing’s
engineers to design newly slender and aerodynamically perfect wings.
Electroimpact has already
delivered the first AFP spar machine to Boeing’s new composite-wing center,
which is nearing completion just across Paine Field.
Thanks to Electroimpact’s
location, the machine was loaded onto an oversize trailer and had to travel
only a couple hundred yards of public road to reach the airfield.
Next summer, Boeing will
start using the machines to manufacture wing skins and spars for 777X
development and production.
Making the skins and
spars of such a giant wing in single full-length pieces is new. It should
reduce the cost of manufacturing and save some weight because there are no
joins.
Using a wholly different
method, the composite wing spar of the 787 is made in three sections by
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan.
In the U.K., Airbus
supplier GKN uses AFP machines to fabricate the spars of the A350 wing, also in
three sections.
To protect Boeing’s
competitive advantage with the new equipment, Electroimpact has assigned the
proprietary intellectual property on the 777X machine heads to the jet maker.
So though Electroimpact
will certainly sell future AFP machines to rival plane makers, the key
technology in these machines will be exclusive to Boeing.
For initial, low-rate
production, Boeing will need just two of each machine. But at peak production
sometime in the 2020s, there could be half a dozen or more of each lined up
inside the vast 777X wing facility.
1 of 6 Engineers Cameron Gillespie, left, and Andy Stulc examine the head of an Automated Fiber Placement machine made by Electroimpact. (Mike Siegel/The Seattle Times)
As often as mentioned about the Middle of the Market aircraft,
Boeing's answer is founded in the A321's market success. Leaving one to wonder
if Boeing made a big mistake by not edging into the middle of the market with a
revamped 757 follow-on to the Max. Arguments remain on both sides of the board
room table. Flightglobal has come out with its own interpretation on this
matter with:
Flightglobal quotes Randy Tinseth, VP of Boeing
Marketing, and pursues the notion Boeing is dropping the Middle of the
market suppositions. The counter for its evidence and argument for dropping
a 757 replacement from one side of the boardroom comes another argument.
The
757 (MOM) replacement will fit into Boeing's new approach of doing business in the
world's market. Any Boeing suppositions has rules in which to follow.
Rule One: Eliminate heady announcements and wait until after an advance of actual start of a new program.
Rule Two: Announce a new program only when current program disruptions are minimal or have minimal impacts with Corporate Financial performance.
Rule Three: Identify probable customers and ultimate Market potential.
"Boeing chief financial officer Greg Smith on 3 February drew
an even darker veil around the company’s plans for a new product aimed at
addressing a gap between the 737 Max 9 and the 787-8."
Therefore, the rules have been implemented for the 757-MOM project.
Three rules are a maximum for better point making
even though there are probably ten rules in play from following biblical guidance.
Boeing has not closed enough programs nor has it amassed enough
capital adding a new program on its strained resources. It wouldn't be
appropriate for Boeing announcing an elliptical MOM at this time. In fact money
for such a project has been identified nor have customers committed to such an
Idea. Boeing does not have an anchor order up its sleeve for the MOM. If it did
then rule three was achieved.
Rule two: has two programs in the crux of the "Air wars",
MAX and the 777X, thus disqualifying the MOM from the boardroom discussion.
Rule one: The MOM is not a moonshot, but comes from using what
Boeing hath wrought. All new sketches are permissible, however resources are
engaged with concurrent programs of the Max and 777X. Once the Max is launched
(delivered), then a consideration for the "MOM" will be forthcoming.
A new program remains a lady in waiting, and will move forward once rules two
and three can be sustained, at which time the all-important 777X has progressed
into flight testing.
The Mom should be announced in 2018, as it will have a significant amount of paper development already accomplished, and all the resources identified for full implementation of the project without having any setbacks for slowing its announced arrival.
The Max is coming no doubt, but can Boeing sustain a high rate of
NG delivery in the meantime? The article linked below opens multiple questions
about the progress on the 737 Max program chugging forward. The Airbus A320
counterpart took 14 months to reach delivery fruition. Many variables are still
in play, are more NG orders added before the Max can rollout? All things considered, and everything staying the same, the below article makes a salient
point:
The Winging It take: About finding the center spot somewhere
between one extreme from the other extreme. Flight Global has gone logical on
this topic, and it makes it much more difficult to be contrarian to its
assessment. An introduction of more orders finds reasonable middle ground
whether if, Boeing can fill the gap for a continuous stream of 737 NG's until
the Max arrives is at hand.
The NG has the year 2016 remaining for solving this problem of not having a continuous
production flow and having no gaps. It is the same problem in the 777-300ER vs 777X
problem. It saves Boeing on production costs if it can keep 777ER production going until
the 777X is ready.
Boeing will offer an attractive price for its 737 NG during 2016,
as it attempts to close this obvious gap. It will only take about a couple hundred more
NG orders during 2016 for achieving a production balance with both the 737 NG and
then a 737 Max during 2017.
Market Airplane manufacturing/economics, are played by supply and
demand factors from changing fleet requirements. The euro market is a
good example. Ryanair, Norwegian Air and a few others have pushed forward
successful operating models containing Boeing aircraft. Lufthansa-Germanwings
partnership may be forced to unload a plethora of Airbus used equipment as it
spirals downward, since last year's catastrophic hull loss of its A320 type
aircraft. This airways pond ripple effect is not completed. Today's comment is for the cause and effect of inventory change affecting the market.
As Ryanair and Norwegian Air aspirations arise with its Boeing
configurations, the Lufthansa and Germanwings consortium contemplates dumping
used single aisle Airbus into the market place. This will have effect as
airlines may buy the used aircraft instead of buying new Airbus Single aisle
models. The cause of all this could be tied to the horrific deaths of its
customers from a mentally unstable pilot flying the Germanwings aircraft Last
Year.
The video of this horrible event shows the delicacy of staying in
Business and bumping along in the market. No humor is implied, but the cause
and the effect of this event does relate to having a business model surviving 4
$billion in claims on an airline, as it may require dumping its inventory and
begin a-new someplace else.
Marketplace inventory is the crux of this matter, as Ryanair and
Norwegian fortunes rise in Europe and as passengers flee an unknown risk, just as
Pan Am 747 had experienced during its catastrophe fall at Lockerbie Scotland. The
market did change from that result, Pan Am died! Whether a deranged pilot or deranged
terrorist, the result affects the marketplace in the long term. The Germanwings
horrendous event highlights a change in the market. Boeing is falling into its
vacuum coming out of Northern Europe with its customers such as Ryanair.
As a result Europeans will get to know Boeing aircraft and may
gain reassurance that flying is a safe proposition. The market braced after the
777-300ER Malaysia flight #370 disappears, and then again after Germanwings
flight #9525. The marketplace adjusts after each event. Now a possible Germanwings market surge for available used single aisle, looms up against its maker producing new aircraft.