Boeing Backed To The Max

A group of professionals, albeit a smaller group of people says, "the 737 Max program produced a flawed product". Boeing took risks to push through its single-aisle offering in a more rapid manner, ignoring the usual new airframe vetting process because the assumption it was built on the prior and successful 737 NG lessons learned would not come into play. However, there were a few new tricks built into the new Max which did not have an appropriate vetting process because of its own imposition of short time constraints for getting the Max into the market. The just good enough strain of thought took over the program. The second questions were not asked regarding it MCAS process or possibly other systems not exposed because a 737 Max has not fallen out of the sky yet from those other under-examined processes. The "What-ifs" on the 737 Max outnumber the "It-does". Flying the Max like an NG isn't a critical improvement.  It became a critical issue for those passengers who went down with the respective Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes on a 737 Max 8 when the MCAS system failed and overwhelmed unsuspecting pilots.

Boeing's dismissiveness for pilot training for something as small as an MCAS upgrade is a shocking response for protecting stockholders more than the passenger. The current condition for Boeing and its Max product has become an "all hands on deck" moment, as it now realizes this is a failed element in Boeing's own fiber. "We're just good enough and on the cheap" kills corporate aspirations. What comes out of all this is a face-saving new single-aisle model restoring confidence with its passenger and airline base. Of course, the course correction will be completed by 2030. That will be a clean sheet design rivaling the 787 or 777X progress Boeing will offer the 797 in this lineage changing operation with Embraer 100-130 passenger capacity, 737 140-200 seat capacity and a transitional 797 dual aisle 220-270 seat capacity. Boeing has lost its market punch over its sloppiness. It can only immediately get back in the game if its chief competitor has a meltdown both in the air and on the ground.

The biggest takeaway from this Max debacle is a safer airplane development process for the passenger and not the stockholder profit portfolio. Boeing forgot who it was building its aircraft for, the passenger or the stockholder. The top of the Boeing heap should have new faces once those golden parachutes are fitted for outgoing heads of the company. Once mentioned before, this is a necessary step for the healing process. There are no do-overs for those in charge when corporate philosophy produces a problematic Max for the sake of company profitability when pushing out a remake on the cheap. Yes, it costs billions to produce and make the Max 8, but it would have cost more if it went with a clean sheet effort for a new single-aisle. Now Boeing finds itself losing billions on the stock value it could have had even as the value climbs and then it will need to spend more billions with a clean sheet to right its ship in thus current aviation storm. 

Expect a new Boeing attitude out of these corporate mishaps. Moving too slowly after letting the 757 productions ceased was a big mistake. But pushing out a flawed-designed Max is a bigger mistake.