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Monday, January 16, 2017

Single Aisle Wars Charted

The single aisle airplane war in numbers between Airbus and Boeing show a status quo relationship with year over year orders, has become a dog fight. The lower flat lines in the graphs below demonstrate the year to year dual in figure 2.

Figure 1 is a blow by blow count of orders taken since Airbus order announcements during 2010. Boeing started its order announcements in 2011.

Fig. 1

The top two graph lines (in Fig. 2) below depict the market share growth between the NEO and the Max. A gradual widening between Airbus and Boeing continues for single aisle NEO/Max units ordered, even though the orders made for both are in a dead heat for orders taken during 2016. The bottom two lines below show a market dogfight.

Fig. 2

Market share percentages found in fig.3 below maintains about a sixty-forty split with Airbus having the lead. If taking the A-321 out of the data it would be a fifty-fifty market in the single aisle division. Boeing has failed to stem the A-321 market with its 737-Max-900 offering.

Fig. 3



Fig. 4


Sunday, January 15, 2017

Sunday Morning Boeing Read

Occasionally, Winging It stumbles upon something interesting in the written press worthy of separate attention. Today an article has reached that thought provoking standard coming clear from London England's, "The Telegraph".


Photo from Seattle Times
Image result for Boeing Airbus Line

'It doesn't matter who is flying higher out of Airbus and Boeing – as long as they are both healthy'  by  Alan Tovey  15 JANUARY 2017 • 8:44PM

The link above proposes what is the best position whether to book orders at some enormously discounted price or build said airplane at some enormously costly venture?

World's largest airline builder becomes lost in the numbers. Are "we" big because we sell more discounted airplanes or our "we" big because we deliver a greater volume of aircraft? The two edge market sword is discussed by the Telegraph. An investor should not look at the size matters equation like its an A-380 double-deck, but should look at the over -all proposition for its airplane health.

As a tease here is one of the article quotes for your reading motivation:

"Airbus reported last week it had taken 731 orders worth $104.9bn in 2016, slightly ahead of Boeing’s 668 orders worth $94bn. (These are list prices: manufacturers offer hefty discounts to secure sales)."



Thursday, January 12, 2017

Boeing's Financial Backlog Shrinkage

A little publicized topic in the financial press world is how much has the built value shrunk or increased? In Boeing's case it’s on a slide using the Book to Bill measures for determining the future health of its backlog versus the production pace. Billing or the delivered aircraft is the economic engine driving long range aspiration for any company.

The booking factor is the level of fuel in its tank for the journey. Currently Boeing delivered 115 billion in aircraft during 2016 and booked about 92-94 billion at list prices. Thus sinking the backlog by another 11 billion dollars at list prices for both orders and delivery.

Fortunately for investors the airplane industry is known for cyclic surges for booking and billings where deliveries are more constant than orders. When Boeing maintains a production and delivery pace of about 748 aircraft it must sell about 748 aircraft for backlog replacement in both number and value. This year it shrunk numerically the backlog by 80 units’ over-all. It can be a healthy numerical reduction but it could also indicate it has a thin margin for production goals from having too small of a backlog. The question is, what is the optimal backlog for an industry for assuring financial success?

At this time, Airbus has increased its single aisle backlog beyond a reasonable production capability for its division. It also has a finite duo aisle production future having a static wide bodied order book. Boeing on the other hand is rapidly reducing its backlog while generating cash from its production surge. In time Boeing will need big ticket orders in number and value recovering its lost backlog. The Boeing strategy is two-fold. Give the customer’s timely deliveries and they will order more. Secondly, inflow the cash for building an array of new aircraft for which the customer will again order more. Once again orders are the fuel for the delivery engine and Boeing is running at half tank. 

Airbus has a full tank and sluggish A350 delivery engine. It becomes complicated sorting out whose correct in this situation. Having too little or too much backlog. A smaller backlog reduces production and reduces cash inflows. An over abundant backlog becomes a customer concentric inefficiency and indicates lost financial opportunity for Airbus. 

Somewhere in the middle of all this is the optimal position for any manufacturer’s backlog and production capability. Boeing has run its backlog to optimal without having a strong forecast for orders but this can all change with orders from one airshow.

This is an opinion and does not suggest investment advice for either mega builder of aircraft. The main thing is that both builders find themselves wrestling with different problems before reaching a condition of having the perfect backlog stream of inflows and outflows in a very inconsistent booking market.  The only thing certain is the capability for delivering aircraft at a constant rate. Airbus is struggling but recovering with its production rates as its backlog grows beyond a customer's liking.


Wednesday, January 11, 2017

World's largest Airplane Builder Is....?

Boeing once again is the World's largest airplane maker and here is the Winging It data from the both framers, Airbus and Boeing: More comment to follow on another post. List prices used as basis.

Data wars below shows Boeing having more units and value at list delivered than  Airbus.



Fig. 1


Fig. 2: Sales Using Best Information becomes an estimate only as both framers keep actual dollar values internal to its accounting.

The F-35 May Undergo Adjunct F-18 Therapy

Everyone who follows military things knows the F-35 costs are too high and the F-18 may lack F-35's multiple attributes. That isn't a bad thing. The F-35 in military parlance, needs a "Wing Man". The F-18 is auditioning for that position. A "wing man covers another aircraft's blinds spots. In this case its money and development failures over the last years. Some think the F-18 is a mission missile that will bring down the F-35.

President elect Trump is swinging his pre-inaugural power using the F-18 as a tactic to bring down cost by suggesting a competition between the two. This is a brilliant idea where a test of the best on best settles why America should spend so much money on the F-35. The outcome of the tests should put naysayers back on the road out of D.C.

The F-18 makes a brilliant wing man. The fourth generation fighter is needed to mitigate the risk of spending so much on something unproven in its whole of concept. It can defeat all known adversaries, not withstanding any new stuff Russia and China are musing with at this time. The F-18 is a force multiplier of the F-35. The F-35 Multi Costs Fighter enhances all fourth generation fighters found in the US arsenal by making them into Multi Role Fighters. The US should not diminish the F-18 capabilities by canceling the F-35 program. President elect should know this and if he doesn't, he is missing the point.

The US will build a better F-18 by partnering with the F-35 in airspace. Most of future conflicts can be won with the F-18 on its own and it will only win all conflicts as an F-35 Wing Man. Both are needed as layers upon layers of defense are needed. The F-18 is needed to transition the US from dogfight conditions to the F-35's battle space capability while it becomes a command and control monster. The day will come where the F-35 is capable of all it has promised, but it needs a bridge getting there using a fourth generation knife during a fifth generation gun battle.

The Iconic 747 Gave Us How Many Seats?

The 747 was an over built giant that determined how many seats is needed for almost every route it flew and sometimes on routes it shouldn't fly. Its 400 seat range on four engines, sometimes didn't fill up the cabin for the fuel that was loaded, and then airlines wanted something better by going with less than 400 seats on just two engines. Then came the wide bodies. The 777 and 787 were more fitted for having less than capacity of tickets on routes that sometimes would become awkward to the financial bottom line. By having twin engine mid-bodies, the empty seat risk on having a four engine 747 was averted. First the 777 XWB and then the 787 came to the rescue, and now United Airlines will retire its 747's in 2017.

Image result for United 747 flight line

The two engine vs four engine and the 250 vs 450 seat strategy is settled. Some like it cold and some like it hot. There is a time and place for the right size and a seat number on every route, and every situation while not cramming 550 in an Airbus A-380 with so many is not the answer, and was a bad business decision because the 747 already answered how many seats is needed.

Boeing as an irritation and a stumbling block for the A-380, introduced the 747-8 on the cheap since it wasn't a clean sheet design and didn't experiment with new technology, but used the already proven and "paid for" 787 technology. The A-380 though, was a clean sheet design trying to beat a 1960's Boeing Idea, the 747.

Boeing had long researched out how many seats for a given route is best for a customer and came up with... well what they came up with was a twin engine wide body. Then United Airlines just announced its retirement of the venerable 747 during 2017. Perhaps this is the customers answer to Boeing's decision of faking out Airbus and then it stumbles into Boeing's trick of playing off the Euro's arrogance when it builds the world’s largest at something. 

Billions invested in the behemoth and so few on backlog. In fact there are more A-380 cancellations than orders over the last few years.  So many Airbus orders lost is an unintended consequence played out when introducing the 777X and the 787. Maybe Boeing research was right when planning only 250 seats taking off twice a day giving passengers a choice of when to depart and having so many choices of where to fly. The common sense of it all beats getting-on only once a day during rush hour at unprepared terminals.

The seat spot was not consulted with when conceiving the A-380 own conventional wisdom. The 747 already had explored the seat potential and then encouraged Airbus to keep up the good work when announcing once again, its 747-8i. At that moment, the A-380 was doomed as Boeing mopped up all its leftovers the Airbus clan had hoped to capture. It lost the freight concept to the 747-8F. It lost out to Boeing customers who would rather not have a double Airbus on the side. It just lost out when pushing forward with some sort of mental momentum, and now this, United retires its 747's!!!. The B team, "loves it when a plan comes together". The newly renamed A-380 relishes in its moniker, "The White Elephant". The soon to be renamed concept, "night-mare liner" reaches the Airbus bottom line as it can't complete its current backlog. 

Most books count 319 A-380's ordered and it has delivered 200 of its type. The backlog stands at 119 by most books tracking this disaster in the "making". The 747 smiles on, "Been there, seen it, and done that". It’s so 1970's, Airbus you rascal. Perhaps Airbus is a quick study since they came out with Rolex (Rolodex) knock-offs called the A-350 800, 900, 1000,1100, 2000, "getting the picture of what it looks like to grasp at straws". An American Indian customer named, "Tonto", would not trade for plastic cutlery like the A-350, kemosabe.

Wikipedia:

"Ke-mo sah-bee (/ˌkiːmoʊˈsɑːbiː/; often spelled kemo sabe or kemosabe) is the term of endearment and inventive catchphrase used by the fictional American Indian sidekick Tonto, in the American television program The Lone Ranger. ... In the 2013 film The Lone Ranger, Tonto states that it means "wrong brother" in Comanche." 

Airbus has underestimated Boeing at every turn with its own air of incompetence. Meanwhile back at the Boeing ranch, United Airlines will receive more 787-9's this year and the 747 makes room on the flight line by retiring. Having your seats in a row before you build something, is more important than just being big.  


Monday, January 9, 2017

"Winging IT" Scrapbook Redux

Going back almost four years is an exciting adventure. The Earth Wind and Fire edition is poetic and so seventies, it has become a classic assembly of metaphors put to music coming from a Chicago theme.


Redux: May 13, 2013



Sunday, January 8, 2017

Who Let The Bears In The 787 Room??

Perspective is the operational word for 2017. A point of view is for the coming of a wide bodied order downturn. This perspective have sent the 787 bulls to pasture. Forbes reports that the 787 market may enter a diminished order season going forward. They are correct on several fronts.


Image result for 787 Bearish
By Hassan Ali on Apr 20, 2016 at 12:54 pm EST

·      Elongated time for low fuel prices.
·      Scarcity of long range routes
·      Making other under preforming financial investments within the micro markets

The fuel price commodity has troubled the immense expansion for buying wide-bodied aircraft when a customer can purchase and refurbish the last generation aircraft such as the 767 or the A-330 instead of buying the 787. Those older frames have life and can make money before they must land or before falling out of the sky from aging. The airlines can fly the cheaper way consuming low fuel prices without using an immense capital outlay for its fleet. The debt servicing is considerably less for older and prior generation aircraft than a 787. Secondly having its largest operational cost reduced, coming from low fuel prices, is an opportunity for airlines to mop up profits during this cheap fuel period. How long the low fuel cost remain is how long the wide bodied bear market will last.

Airlines who rushed to fill long range legacy routes and newly created routes because of the aircraft's extended range capabilities, are now in thin company with having few remaining opportunities. After Boeing has delivered 500 of its 787's, the long range route availability disappeared shrinking opportunities. As exampled by "Etihad", who has already gathered up the Gold nuggets laying on the ground found in the market place. It still has a huge backlog of undelivered wide bodied aircraft and is considering deferrals when managing its impending inventory. The collective mindset from prognosticators, "the market is slowing but will come to stop by 2020". 

The reality of that position is very apparent, but does not take into consideration other innovative decision making from the airlines. One condition exists from the above paragraph's comment. The age of the newly renovated prior generation aircraft will have to retire close to the time the time fuel prices begin to rise, and demand will then return with a full force for hundreds of wide-body orders.

Forbes Quote: "Etihad has 61 outstanding 787 orders, the highest total for any carrier. Etihad has been investing heavily in other airlines, which have continued to lost money.  “We hear the ‘D-word’ (deferral) surfacing with Etihad’s order for 787s,” 

Hamilton writes:
"The second and third biggest customers are Aeroflot with 22 orders and Norwegian with 19. Hamilton says Aeroflot raises questions and Norwegian is engaged in very rapid expansion Some other customers are from troubled areas of the world."

Some airlines have taken aggressive investment schemes when buying out weaker performing airlines or ancillary businesses in hopes of expanding its market share. At this time that strategy is back firing in the current slowing of the market. This condition is sopping up hundreds of millions of investment dollars and weakens any airline's financial ability for making new aircraft acquisitions. Once again, "Etihad is a good example as it has mopped up investments for its "other" ventures costing millions where it has not produced the desired outcome of profitability coming from those types of investments.  The "micro market" with this definition, is a market composed of different airlines who is a customer of the giant manufacturers such as Boeing or Airbus. The macro market is a Boeing Manufacturer who represents a worldwide supplier for all airlines.      

Many airlines are now taking a more cautious approach towards buying wide bodies at this time due to low fuel pricing, opportunity, and financial resources. The trend line for both Boeing and Airbus "wide bodies" is going flat and will recover after 2020 which is a little more optimistic than the Forbes article. The premise coming from that opinion is the wide bodied market stalls in 2020. 

Winging It is looking at other aspects in play, where older equipment which is being worked during this fuel price down-turn period will begin to be retired by 2020, and the lack of availability of prior generation aircraft will cause the purchase prices on that class of aircraft to increase. A market condition will exist forcing airlines to change its business strategy where the 787 comes back into prominence. The market pressures causes a different business model which would include buying new 787 types of aircraft after 2020 and beyond.

Over the next three years Boeing will too have market pressures coming to them in a macro sort of way. The will (must) address the MOM issue once for all and the sooner the better. Boeing needs a complete family of aircraft it has divorced from so long ago when it dropped the 757 and the 787-300.

Having a MOM model line in place will fill the demand for the next ten years regardless of the micro market antics. It will become a replacement aircraft for all those aging and renovated prior generation aircraft after 2020. 

Finally, Boeing needs to react during 2017 as if the fuel prices "never" increase or financial cycles will swing as often as recessions occur. The routes found in the middle of the market are so numerous it would be near impossible to keep up and fill them all even during a soft economy. The wide-body segment has a very sensitive risk exposure going forward where the slightest change in that market can immediately affect it for some time going forward. The MOM position is more risk adverse than the Wide Bodied class. Take a few market risks (enumerated by the above bullet points) off the table and then a robust buying spree begins again for the wide bodied aircraft segment after 2020.


Saturday, January 7, 2017

Boeing 787 2016 Numbers With January Update

Boeing has posted its numbers for all of its commercial types and this “Winging It” segment features summary 787 score card with Boeing data. Earlier on January 1, 2017 a similar post charted a pre Boeing 787 summary as a guess on what the 787 book would look like, however with Boeing's reveal of 2016 here is the updated summary for the 787 program starting in 2017 and closing 2016.

Fig. 1



Friday, January 6, 2017

Pay As You Go F-35

Ever wonder how many F-35's are delivered in total? "Winging It" has and it has come down to a very convoluted and confused process. The military would rather not have everyone know how many F-35's are flying at any one time but there is a back door going through appropriations or contract signings in which an interested party could surmise the flying count and mark the progress of the F-35 program as a whole. 

Below is the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contracts and count basis by the year, where assumption makes the case for flying copies of the F-35 (A,B,C versions).


Winging It Table from various sources:

Fig. 1



The notation comes with several assumptions applied to the end count of 2016. One assumption asserts Lockheed continues building the F-35 without ever stopping for contract approvals. This is done with stop gap payments from the government to Lockheed for the reason of maintaining an efficient program where a stoppage would cost the government billions more to restart the program. With the Government own cost estimations imposed on Lockheed. LRIP 9 was a force on the contract by the US Government. It is difficult to actually know the 2016 production count with LRIP contract uncertainty in play.

However, when LRIP 9 was signed the table assumes that those units proposed have been built and delivered. LRIP 10, is another story and is the biggest LRIP bundle to date having 90 coming from all types. It is certain Lockheed has not as of yet delivered any of those LRIP 10's. It should be the last LRIP contract before high rate production begins for the F-35.


Waiting on Airbus Before Commenting On Its Use of Whiteout

Boeing unleashed a barrage of numbers today. The key numbers are the order book value and the Delivery Book Values. Before mentioning those numbers it is important to note...

Winging It calculations*:
668 net orders (92B)
748 Deliveries (116B)

*List prices are used where actual prices for each purchase in not available at this time. Typically the actual price can be up to 50% of list prices and is used by both Boeing and Airbus. Using list prices for calculation makes it an apple to apple comparison.

The billions in deliveries concern stockholders today and the orders today concern stock holders of the future.


Winging It is working out those numbers with a grand chart of both categories using Airbus as a comparison.

The net delivery billions and units numbers will determine the world's largest manufacturer of aircraft and once again it seems to be Boeing all the way.

Not withstanding a generous application of white out Airbus can hope to breach the Boeing bragging rights.

Fox news tends to cipher a $98B billion delivery total.
Winging It came up with 116B using available List Prices".

The order in dollars totals are also a guesstimate and Winging IT will provide its usual list price "estimation". The main thing is that estimations are in play until final exclusive income statements are revealed by both giants. "White out" will follow soon after each will compare to one another. Numbers will change according to promotional information needs of each other. A whole staff meeting will occur making out how one loses and the other wins in the game of World's largest. Boeing has Airbus in the bragging jail house at this time as it cannot and will not come close to Boeing's delivery quantity of 748 units. 

Boeing delivered enough of its high priced wide bodies to bury Airbus in the 2016 round of value. Both had respectable and close single aisle numbers, but the wide body arena is where Airbus lags and will continue to lag for some time into the future.  Airbus will not breach fifty A-350's during 2016. Boeing exceeds with 137 units of its 787's during 2016.  That number gives Boeing an almost 22 billion dollar advantage over Airbus' paltry $10 billion delivery of its A350 during 2016. That extra 22 incremental billion Boeing has over Airbus will show up somewhere in the book-keeping department. The big question can Boeing keep this up for the next five years?

If orders continue to trickle forth from Boeing customers it will drain the Airbus back-log before the A350- delivers its first five hundred A-350's. Airbus has a dismal wide body order book in the last three years coming after the initial order surge when the A-350 was first announced.

The Boeing four corner offense from basketwork fame in the past century was dominate as the single aisle competition can only manage a tit for tat game going forward. The wide bodied market place is slowing and it will hurt future aspirations for both Airbus and Boeing has going forward. Boeing can and will milk the clock until fuel prices rise.


Thursday, January 5, 2017

The Era Of Airline Expansion Is Drawing Nigh Replacement is The Future

What has Airbus and Boeing wrought? An era is closing before this decade ends. The era of "expansion" in the airline market place. The last ten years has seen the airline industry eagerly purchase wide bodies in great numbers, expanding the business reach not over continents but around the world. 

The advent of the Boeing 787, 777X and the A-350 is going into a pausing purchase phase as airlines are currently seeking renovated air frames from the millennial era of the 2000's. The low oil prices, higher new technology costs, and its filled world routes converge causing a slower demand for those types. Most used aircraft which can fill legacy markets such as European and North America passenger service begins afresh with a certain intensity for renovation.

One case in point is the Emirates condition. Tim Clark, Emirates CEO, ordered a preponderance of A-380's during the last dozen years and it has a substantial wide bodied high tech aircraft yet to be delivered with few route options available. Near term new orders from Emirates will be a one-for one aircraft exchange. For every wide body aircraft retired, a new generation aircraft will replace it as it tries to seek new routes for its inventory. 

Emirates has few options to expand and has relative few older aircraft needing a renovation or retirement. Additionally, Emirates is the Poster Child for the future of market place conditions for most all airlines operating successfully today. Currently Emirates has a massive wide bodied order pending between choosing Airbus or Boeing. The trigger for the order is a higher fuel price status at this time. It is rumored before 2017 closes, Emirates will make a long term order to the delivery cycle with Boeing.



Fig. 1 Emirates Wikipedia reference



As one can observe in the above figure, Emirates has firmly landed into the fleet replacement mode as it still remains to receive 224 wide bodies with too few routes for which to place those already ordered aircraft. Higher fuel prices would cancel any notion of renovating what is in place with fleets having older models and only if the lower fuel prices continue for another three years. 

Emirates is not the type of company for flying older renovated equipment. It will just slow orders and deliveries of its already placed order backlog. Emirates is the "Gold Standard" for Airline expansion.

By 2020 a projected fuel price increase will shake-up the slump of wide body orders across the board as airlines will once again dump inefficient inventory, and then opt for new aircraft replacement and fleet expansion.


Wednesday, January 4, 2017

On December 11,2012 Winging It said, Watch Ethiopian Airlines For The Money!!!


"After reading this old Winging It link on LiftnDrag blog, the article goes on to state watch Ethiopian Airlines, because they are best positioned to take advantage of the 787 on its long legged routes. Little did I know, they would have one 787 catch on fire at London Heathrow, and benched it indefinitely until a resolution is found, or did I know they would increase its profitability by 178%, and recognize the 787 directly affecting the bottom line by so much! Even with its older aircraft inventory in play every day. If it sounds like crowing, then so be it, its crowing a little. I can't help but get a little excited on a long shot Airlines on a winning horse, The 787.

Article Quote: December 11, 2012

" Another look is for Ethiopian Airlines in what the 787 does for its bottom line.  They will be a good case study, since they own such a smaller number of aircraft and fly long routes. The 787 will have an immediate impact from its operations, where you will see how it drives the bottom line at the end of next fiscal year.  This is a manageable study of its business plan and bottom line. You may gain a distinct appreciation for the 787's financial impact on Ethiopian  Airlines."

Today the news announces four years later this snippet.


“2016 has been an exceptionally challenging year for the African Aviation industry. Commodity exporting countries in general and oil-exporting African countries in particular have been hit hard by the global decline in commodity prices. As a result, demand for air travel has been suppressed and the shortage of foreign exchange has severely affected the financial performance of airlines in the continent. Yet, at Ethiopian, we are very proud of the new heights Ethiopian has flown in the year: we celebrated our 70th anniversary, inaugurated the largest and the finest Aviation Academy in Africa and a state-of-the-art In-flight Catering facility which is the largest in the continent of Africa... ”

The 787-8 Make-over Is Needed

Having Delta eliminate its 787-8 legacy order held over from the Northwest Airlines merger, signals a great need for Boeing to reinvent the model, or just let it tumble into obscurity. It only has about ninety 787-8's remaining to be delivered, even if all of its customers have the resources currently in place for a purchase. The problem still remains that none is ordering the 787-8 except a few customers here and there that have placed an order like Tanzania Airlines last December. At best, the analyst will remark, "Tanzania is in trouble and could cancel orders when the time comes to deliver the 787-8".

  • There lies the problem beneath the order numbers. Boeing has reached the back side of its 787-8 order book and it needs rejuvenation of new orders at a steady pace. Therefore, it needs something outstanding coming from the 787 program that is not yet tapped for potential customers.

  • Another problem is financial resources spent on a model without knowing whether it will make a difference in the market place. The upgrades need to be transferable to the 787-9 or 787-10. When any upgrade would not interfere with motivations for buying its family of aircraft. The answer for the 787-8 sales quandary is found with several customers and how they use its 787-8's. 

Jetstar and American Airlines have immensely invested in the 787-8's and should be consulted on how it will be moved to further buy the 787-8. Boeing is working on that answer already. Jetstar ordered 11 and it now has 11 in its inventory. American ordered 20 and has received 17 with only three more to go. The key with these exampled customers is they are both a continental based 787-8 customer and knowing what would move to ordering more 787-8's is important.

  • Another query is a further investigation coming from the 787-300 data before it was canceled. Boeing had long prepared this statistical data and it knows the market response for the 787-300 when it was still under consideration. 

The 787-800 appears to have painted itself into a corner with a dying interest with its market fit. There are no life lines on the horizon. The 787-8 has become a tap hole going into a new model and technology. This brings me to the last bullet point.

  • The time has come to build the tween-er not from a 787-300 platform but from the 787-8 platform. There would be two classes of 787-8's in play having the same body and similar passenger capacity. The passenger capacity would not exceed 240 on the Continental (C Class) and about 250 with a Long Range Class (LR).

Boeing is keen on using what it has already paid for at this time. They could sell five hundred C models spanning one continent limited to 5,000 miles. The upgrades come from cabin enhancements. An eight across 30 row seat map would give the passenger room. Additionally Boeing should sell another two hundred 787-8LR's seating up to, but not ever exceeding 290 passengers. The renewal must vitalize the 787-8 model concept with minimal investment and more importantly not change a “build process” costing billions. The other problem is finding a launch customer buying two variations for its fleet, and that point at this time is what is stopping Boeing. The Orient is an obvious customer region for having a launch customer.

The "Build it and they will come", axiom does not apply in this case. Boeing must reignite market heat offering a 787-8 combination and find a new Middle of the Market A-321-NEO killer at the same time. They must find customers who will launch it!

If Boeing doesn't find customers for the concept enhancements then it will retire the 787-8 by the end of this decade from starved out sales. 


Monday, January 2, 2017

The 787 2016 Before Boeing Numbers Recap

The Pre Boeing 787-2016 Numbers Analysis is a daunting task when not knowing what cards Boeing may hold, since it has not announced anything but the Delta cancellation of 18  Dreamliners during the last month. Those were 787-8's and it hurt the backlog and order book. However, they is plenty of good new on the horizon for the order category. There are several large 787 orders hanging in the market place one of which may come from Emirates and Tim Clark. That announcement should come in the year 2017. There are some additional orders from the Chinese market which have yet to be confirm but are hanging on with MOU's.

The chart below (Fig. 1) main thing is the strong production year of 137 Dreamliners for 2016. Looking at the 694 in backlog illustrates a twofold impact. If a customer orders a Boeing wide body it could receive it before an Airbus placed order. Secondly, Boeing demonstrates a resiliency in the market place outpacing Airbus over the last several years over Airbus. Airbus since the beginning of 2013 has booked only a net of 162 A-350's. Boeing has booked a net 382 of its 787 family of aircraft.

This represent a greater than 2-1 booking pace over Airbus even long after it had announced selling its wide body.  




Fig. 1


Fig. 2, represents net numbers starting in 2012, marking the beginning of the delivery cycle for the 787 aircraft. Noting the order to delivery comparison over this time period shows almost a 1-1 book to bill rate. Five hundred 787's are billed and 427 are booked, returning a .85 book to bill rate. Ideal is a ratio of 1 after the backlog has been established. When first entering the market, the desirable rate should be well above the number 1 as production has not yet started until years later. In Boeing's case the .85 ratio is a measure at full production while having a healthy backlog. Boeing with a few great years could maintain a 1-1 ratio is it takes on another 150 ordered 787's in the next several years. That would be a Boeing sales goal.

Fig. 2

The ninety day moving average is a production efficiency number. Guidance was established in the first quarter of 2016 at 12 per month. The month of January 2016 only delivered seven 787's and it reached 12 a month by March 2016. However, fourth quarter 2016 only delivered 11 a month during this time period. Boeing also exceeded 12 a month pace during the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2016.

Fig. 3


The Year Over year chart below demonstrates a steady growth of the program with predictable changes in both delivery and order dynamics. The latter being typically inconsistent.


Fig. 4


Fig. 5

Fig. 6


Fig. 7


Sunday, January 1, 2017

Mach 1.6 Is Possibly The Sweet Spot

Have you ever wondered about modern fighter jet speed? An assumption by many, "is the faster a fighter jet goes the more dominant it becomes as a fighter". In some cases that may be true but in other cases it may be a useless feature because the battle energy required comes from a slower speed in close quarters.

Image result for Afterburner F-35

The F-35 development has startled many observer of having a top speed of only Mach 1.6 which falls below the faster breed of fighter going Mach 1.8 and higher with 2+. The answer may come from battle space efficiency, stealth and performance. What the F-35 gives up from being Mach 1.6 it will add on from being a far more efficient and invisible aircraft. In other words going fast would delimit the F-35's capabilities for which it was designed.

There may be a different assumption in play having the F-22 combined with having a F-35 commonality. The F-22 is the muscle where the F-35 is the brains when flying in formation. A flying formation of two F-22's combined with four F-35, communicates a need for further F-22's on order to complete with intense and purpose of total aerial combat.

The congress is looking to upload another 200 F-22's when money is found. If completed, then the F-35 becomes more deadly than its first take would suggest. It won't need to go Mach 1.8 as the F-22 goes Mach 2.0+ with stealth capabilities. The F-35 computers hook-up with the F-22 systems and sends it into combat with an autonomous pilot at the controls. Both the F-35 and F-22 become a greater force.

Image result for Afterburner F-35

I would suggest that is the military thinking of synergism of both systems with each other. The F-35 is in its sweet spot at Mach 1.6 where its stealth makes it stay within its optimal capabilities of design and it can now operate from its most capable position given its multi functions. In other words, the balance between brains and muscle makes the F-35 a formidable and untouchable aircraft. Having the F-22 as its wing man makes the F-35 unreachable. No other nation has this type of one-two punch in its own formations. The F-35 is the screw driver and the F-22 is the hammer.


Thursday, December 29, 2016

Thinking About The Grinch Visit At Delta For Christmas

Yes, Delta canceled 18 787-8's from its decade old order from Boeing. Does it hurt? The answer is what this contribution for discussion is about. The pomp and ceremony of a 1200 wide body order book has a smear on it. Delta had no intention long ago of completing this order. It was just a place holder for something in case Airbus could not do with its wide body, an A350. In fact Delta was set up for the Airbus A330-NEO class more than the 787-8. Then Airbus came out with the A350 and successfully moved it to the market.

Long had Delta switched its efforts towards obtaining an Airbus platform. It was as simple as becoming a single operating system company loaded with iPhones instead of having an Android based phones for its operation. Why does Delta prefer Airbus? The simple answer is because the mission and vision of Delta had a subtle change from the top. Some new people came "on board" over the years and joined the clamor of a one fleet world for various and seemingly important reasons. 

Having two fleet types containing both Boeing and Airbus is a theme Delta departed from when inserting its team of new leaders since the year 2005. The leadership analysis demonstrates a startling reveal on the ages of position holders and the respective start date for each in that position. The average age of top leadership is 58.7 years as of today and the average start date of an officer is 2013.

Note: The top tier execs for which almost all are highlighted in yellow averages 53 years of age. The advisory board members average age is 67.


Reuters has provided an Organization listing:  Winging It Analysis Added:



The column with yellow highlights illustrates an age range of 40-60 years suggesting personnel having a new and non -legacy attitude. 

The top of the executive organization has an average age of 53 years. Chairman of the Board is not included with the in-house leadership as that order begins below the Chairman of the Board.

What does all this mean? The new blood has taken the competitive route infusing commonality of inventory for all its aircraft. The one-off example, is the Boeing 737-900 with a total order standing for 120 of its type. This suggests an independent rule is applied for its single aisle segment within its inventory. 

However, Boeing is still vulnerable to Delta's mission and vision going forward. As the 737-900 fleet ages and after that order is completed or cancelled, Delta may opt to go A321-NEO completing its obvious mission/vision one fleet view. The new exec team has chosen to drink the "cool-aid" from the previous boards since 2005 at a time when Northwest's 787-8 order was first placed and as a pre-merger condition for which Delta absorbed.

For all intent and purpose, the 2005 Delta board was hedging its bet when merging with Northwest's 787-8 order and waited until Airbus got its act together on the wide-body segment. The 18-787-8 order merged with Delta was sketchy at best since 2005 pre-merger status with Northwest Airlines. The dropping of Delta's 787-8 order will adjust Boeing's order book by 1.5 percent, and as a further example, the Qatar order for its 787-9's during 2016 has increased the order book by 2.5 % at that moment in time. 

All-in-all there are changes causing a continuous flux from the commercial airplane market. Boeing has had about a half-a dozen years available for addressing the Delta reduction in orders for which it has already done so when booking more orders this year than expected.

Delta Vision/Mission Statement:

"We—Delta's employees, customers, and community partners together form a force for positive local and global change, dedicated to bettering standards of living and the environment where we and our customers live and work."

After analyzing the Delta Mission they missed the corporate version and painted in the employee version as its leading view for the company. It has the heft of a salad shooter.

Slogan:

"Delta Air Lines. We love to fly. And it shows."


Winging It Version: "Delta Air Lines, We love to Fly Airbus and it shows"


Tuesday, December 27, 2016

Competition Starts With Cement Slabs at Boeing

All the fixtures are bolted down on cement slabs. Fixtures are measured in tons and tons and need a lot of cement on which to sit upon. The 777 factory in Everett has major challenges as the order was given "continue 777-300-ER production while building a 777X and yeah it's in the same place". The problem is not so much a continuous flow from the 777-300-ER and back to the 777X in the same gigantic space, but having divergent technologies colliding on the factory floor.

Image result for Everett 777 production plant

A plastic wing assembled on a 777X is completely different than an aluminum wing attached to the 777-300ER. These are no small potatoes rolling through the assembly hall. The problem is so complex it will take a team of planners, engineers and mechanics in order to solve the gigantic puzzle. The final solution is years in the making going forward. The 777-300ER will be built for an additional ten years or longer, as the 777X becomes the new standard. In fact the 777-300ER may never be out of favor for some of Boeing's customers, as found with its 767. Freight 767's for FedEx and the KC-46's for the military both having recent orders is proving the modular space flexibility of building different purpose built types on the same line/space as a goal.

The production dance requires a little drop in productivity in the near term. A timely introduction with a new and different type of aircraft (777X) massive assembly is required. This "change" is from using CFRP wings and other components inserted on the 777X and then Boeing flips back to building a 777-300ER all in the same space at the same time. The Boeing dance is mapped out with use of "modular space" and the production floor changes after each milestone is reached for which changes the process flow. 

A definition of modular space: "is a space having an open architecture area flexible enough for installation of new processes and equipment designated for that process. Change within space is complimentary of change within the process occupying that space."  

Here's the plant's team feedback, "Get-er-done"


Example:

In an office building, a company may renovated 3,000 square feet at a time. However, Boeing will make and then close production bays as needed having the heft of 150,000 square per bay. Imagine an area the size of a Super Costco and then one can imagine the temporary space that each stage needs. Each inserting its footprint or closing a production bay as maturity of production process requires. The 777 production is so complicated it must transition towards a bi-production process of building different but similar aircraft each having different technologies all on the same line.

Boeing will leap frog production space as it transitions towards having the 777X model inserted into the Everett facility. Boeing must build every modular space with the capability of supporting immense manufacturing weights. Hence, a six foot thick cement slab is poured into a factory floor in order to take on any task the space may face in the next fifty years. 

Currently Boeing engineers are digging dirt that supported the 747 process back in 1968. A sense of flexibility for change on a massive scale is felt as if Boeing was tasked to move a cement Dam every 50 years while a river changes direction. The 777X impact is that river, and Boeing is digging deep before the year 2020 comes when the ramping up for the 777X process merges with the 777-300ER process. Both model must seamlessly keep the production flow going forward without any conflicting manufacturing impedance.

Boeing is challenging Airbus at the always improving state of mind.