The F-35 Sustainment In Question

There are about 250 F-35's in use at this time and one operational component for the F-35 is sustainment. The aircraft not unlike an automobile needs parts after so many hours of operation but it is not as simple as oil, spark plugs and a new starter. Things break while under operational flying. The aircraft is grounded until parts arrive. The DoD has estimated 22% of the 250 flying copies are grounded while awaiting maintenance supplies such as a new part or scheduled maintenance service.



The problem will increase as the F-35 fleet increases and Lockheed is about to expand production by at least two fold. Expect the F-35 fleet to double when Lockheed goes to full rate production. In two years Lockheed could deliver another 250 F-35's before a request for proposal bid for spare parts can even be issued, let alone having parts made and delivered to the arm forces. 

A prime problem are for aircraft going to sea. All support parts must be carried on the vessel when deployed at sea or otherwise the F-35B or F-35C is parked in the hanger deck awaiting maintenance parts and supplies until after a ship returns from deployment. Not a good outlook for the F-35 in combat.

Maybe, a 22 % grounding of aircraft is a typical expectation in an over-all fleet of aircraft. The US hopes to rotate a significant number of F-35's as needed when one becomes inoperable due to maintenance headaches. However, not having a reserve fleet of aircraft complicates the early delivery of F-35's in the deployment front as so few F-35's are available and are flyable. There is no reserve as the F-35 goes over seas and it has no readily available parts all the time. It becomes a hit and miss condition for supporting combat ready F-35's.

It could be said, that a 40% grounding makes a combat crises when depending on its front line fighter capability. It takes years for the bureaucracy to field parts sufficiently for a full operational F-35 capability.  

The problem arises for all new aircraft types as it is deployed. The military does not know what to plan for until a history of wear and tear is established under its routine of full operation. The forecast for maintenance is just being established as years of testing is showing what breaks and what wears out on the F-35's first. The Full Operational Capability (FOC) can only be evaluated after the F-35 has been in the field for multiple years. It takes another multiple of years to schedule maintenance parts and supplies for the level of FOC it will achieve. There is a gap in the feeding chain for full F-35 maintenance sustainment.

Planners saw this coming a long time ago but where helpless to do anything about it until the US Congress will fund the maintenance portion as it awaits the aircraft deployment to its missions and then it could identify costs. This is another rough patch for the F-35 for what it will encounter over the next five years as it establishes its maintenance requirements from broken or used up parts during the course of its FOC.

So Far Boeing Nets 47 Orders In October

Boeing just booked 30 737 Max and 10 777's from an unidentified customer. The month of October  in a pre Dubai Airshow position had a robust order month. In all there were 5-787's, 30-737-8's and 10-777's. The icing on the cake were two more C-40 Clippers totaling 47 aircraft. Additionally, there was a transfer of orders from 16 737-8  NG's to 16 737 Max 8's. The dollar value of orders list price totals $8.5 billion. 

The price value adjustment relates to 16 737 NG 8's converted to 16 Max 8's. The net value change is $.23 Billion. This calculation is in the fifth column going right. A monthly recap only indicates the active purchase results for October and no purchase projections can be assumed or inferred.

However, it is an assumption when the month prior to the Dubai Airshow where Boeing has such a robust order book; it should expect a solid order book for November and  expect more orders during December when Boeing wraps-up its many order intents (LOI/MOU) as it can.

Boeing Order Update 10-26

Boeing reached 538 net orders for its YTD numbers. The gross order count stands at 621 units. The Singapore WB order is included in this count. An addition of 40 unidentified orders were booked including 30 737's and 10 777's. Boeing continues to outpace Airbus this year for orders booked for all types of airplanes. An end of October the subtotal for both Airplane builders should reveal how much Boeing orders are ahead of Airbus with only two months remaining in 2017.

The NMA May Come From The 767-400 Configuration (added information)

Boeing is refusing to commit for building a new NMA 797. However, it does own the 767 where it could borrow from that program with many features. Below is  767-400 seating options in pictures which falls into a 250 seat range and could be used as a base line for the 797 proposal.

767-400 program sketches 

The problem with the 767-400 is its maximum take-off weight (401,000) and its prior generation engines hung on the wings. It is not as efficient as the A-330-900 NEO. The 797 would solve that problem immediately with a carbon fiber body, wings and new GE 787 like engines hung on its wings. This is what Boeing could be waiting for is a breakthrough development for a NMA engine.

The maximum take-off weight for a NMA may come in significantly lighter for its dimension when compared with the 767-400, but the lighter weight would allow for more fuel for an extended range rendition of the NMA proposal. Boeing would stick with a 5,500 mile aircraft but it then could have a 6,500 miles extended range version. 

The technology is ripe for a complete 767 passenger replacement(797), leaving the commercial freighter and military tanker versions keeping the 767's original design features for metal aircraft.

MRO Quote: 

"The experience gleaned from the Boeing 777 spotlights the durability leap that composites offer. The 777’s composite vertical fin requires about 35% fewer scheduled maintenance hours than the 767’s aluminum fin, despite being 25% larger. This leap is why 787 air frame maintenance costs are projected to be about 45% lower than those of the 767-300ER, Boeing’s calculations show."

The whole of the MRO article frequently uses the 767 as the backdrop for the 777X improvements. Boeing maybe doing another "mini" moonshot with a 797 using all things learned from these three programs. The programs would include, 737 Max, 787, and 777X. 

The NMA market could be larger than reported for Boeing, since it would fill an exclusive slot in the proverbial "Gap" found in the commercial aviation market place. Boeing reported about a 5,000 aircraft demand in the NMA "Gap". Not all would be future Boeing orders but it could capture 70%of the market if it gets it right at first delivery. This number using 70% comprises 3,500 aircraft sales from Boeing's estimate of a 5,000 segment potential. 

A sliding percentage potential indicates risk would be low for a new start-up model before the competitors catch on to this concept for a NMA type.

• 100% market share for the NMA is 5,000 units
• 90% market share for the NMA is 4,500 units
• 80% market share for the NMA is 4,000 units
• 70% market share for the NMA is 3,500 units
• 60% market share for the NMA is 3,000 units
• 50% market share for the NMA is 2,500 units

Boeing could prosper with a 2,500 unit market for a new start-up aircraft type and its sunk costs over the next 20 years.

The 767-400 Specifications

  

A NMA would beat all the key performance indices of the 767-400 easily once it uses new wings, body, and engines. It could also be eligible for Laminar Flow Technology which is missing on the metal single aisle aircraft and the 787-8. All the lessons learned and paid for would make this an exceptional aircraft.

The complete book of proven innovations would be included on any NMA beating the current 767 models in service. The NMA would borrow the 15'+ across in the passenger area noted by the 767 air frame.

The market appeal should abandon any reference to the 767 model, since it represents old technology and the 797 remains as the primary available number for a new model type. 

However, the point here, is making a recommendation for a replacement for both the 757 and 767 class of travel at the same time. Boeing should introduce a 797-8 replacing the 757 and a 797-9 replacing the 767-300-ER . It has the configuration formula needed from the 767 program and the efficiency technology from the 787 program. 

The Singapore Airline Deal Is Much More Than Just A 39 Wide Body Backlog

Singapore Airlines made a ceremonial signing for 20 777-9X's and 19 787-10's. The long held Boeing customer reaffirmed its relationship as a important Boeing customer. This order, long anticipated, and is an already booked Boeing order last summer changed the aviation world as the balance of aviation power shifted towards Boeing. The mega airplane builder needed a symbolic order that established it as the premier maker in the industry. The "other guy" wasn't even close in this particular order battle. Airbus shallow depth of models exposed itself in the order competition.

Boeing and Airbus gave it its all during the order process. Both knowing the winner of this competition would take home the airplane of the year trophy. Before the 787-10 is even delivered the pundits have recognized it to be the most efficient airplane at every level of operation when comparing seat/mile cost with everything else. The only show item missing is its distance doesn't fly around the world or at least half way round the world. The 787-10 wasn't designed for extra long distance routes. It was designed for serving the most passengers going to the most places in the world at the lowest costs for the airline. If an airplane can serve 90% of the world's origin-destinations pairings, then it has a bright future. The 787-10 is more than a star in this segment. It is an undaunted example of scaling up success.

The customer, Singapore has now booked 49 examples of the 787-10. A quick look at the globe and Singapore's position on the world indicates the Airline desires dominance in a 6,000 mile circle from its home base.

Airbus was competing with Boeing on this order since it already had a substantial  part of Singapore's fleet. It has 22 A-330, 18 A-350 and 19 A-380's in its fleet. The back order for Singapore stands at 49 A350-900's and 5 A-380's. The A-380 order is teetering, as it has already returned some of its leased A-380 aircraft.  The airbus fleet count of 59 with an order count suggests the 22 A-330 will be retired leaving the Singapore fleet with just A-350's and its A-380's varying in numbers and having the back-order of 49 A350-900's replacing the fleet as needed.

Boeing has 52 wide bodies in the fleet. Twenty-five of the 777-200's will be retired by the A350-900's. Boeing also has 27 777-300-ER's. Therefore it can be assumed they will stay and will be rotated out over time going forward. The order combination of 20 777-9X and 49 787-10's will give Singapore  Airlines 69 wide bodies coming in while replacing its Boeing and Airbus aircraft already aging in the fleet.

An expectation is that the 20 777-9X will replace the A380 as they age in the next ten years. The 49 787-10's will replace the balance of the Boeing 777-300-ER fleet as it also retires. Bottom line, what was once a 50/50 fleet from two makers suggests Boeing in the next ten years will dominate Singapore Airlines fleet. There could be an additional follow on order within 5 years depending how the 777-9X works out while in service.  The 777-9X will outperform the Airbus fleet and the 787-10's will fit better with Singapore's routes than the A350-900 since the 787 will be more efficient per seat/mile under 6,500 miles. The A350-900 has too much distance performance for a majority of Singapore Airline needs. 

How Far Has The 797 Gone Depends On The 777X Program

The much talked about 797 is a lady in waiting as Boeing refines its newly installed 777X manufacturing and assembly center in Everett, Wa. Last summer was a glimpse of Boeing's vision when it hinted about the 797 program but it had unfinished business to attend to, the 777X program. It is clear Boeing is learning lessons on the 777X program and that will shape the 797 program for a NMA airplane.

Boeing is making giant carbon wings in its massive Everett location. It is automating the build process eliminating the mechanics rule of thumb on installation of fasteners and various processes. The bugs it encounters are legend. The reward is a change in how humanity builds massive things. The things from Sci-Fi is becoming a reality at this juncture. Boeing has a to-do list before announcing its next venture. The 777X program has already sunk billions into its life form as its a massive replacement of the 777-300-ER. The importance of the production transformation envisions a 777-300-ER in one position and a 777-9X directly behind it coming through the process.

All that needs to done on the factory floor is switch the software for its assembly machines for the types of 777 coming through its process. At this time it was reported that Boeing had over 12,000 corrections needing fixing within the processes. The schedule it attempts has managements full attention and full confidence it will meet the challenge. The 777X is on course for a 2020 deadline.

However, another step remaining for the emergence of the 797 is the completion of 777X process. The 797 is awaiting validation for processes it will use during its build. It will be built differently, but will be built on lessons learned from all its current programs combined. It will have a remarkable wing coming from the lessons on both the 787 and 777X wings manufacture. 

The body pieces will have a new process for formation and assembly but it will also borrow from the 777X process and suggests the 797 may become a mix process in assembly with some other type of Boeing aircraft. The 777-300 and 777X is going to be a mixed process in the same factory space. The 797 could share space in Charleston, SC,  or where the 787-9 is built in Everett.

The known attributes for the 797: it has is duo aisle, 5,500 mile range and up to 270 passengers. That suggest it will be closer to a 787 size than a Max size. The 797 may not have carbon fiber barrels flown around the world or will the wings come from Japan. The 797 may be built and supplied at home locations. IT could be a rail option or a barge option in play. A large single part barrel could float or rail IT to the assembly location or all Carbon Fiber body part could be made onsite of the assembly location. 

Charleston comes to mind for that kind of flexibility where a 797 could be made and assembled on location without using dream lifters. That kind of out of the box thinking would require Charleston to build only the 787-10 and the 797 as the same time. This would leave Everett to its 787-9 and 777-9X programs.

Boeing will produce a clean sheet small airplane design after the 797 would enter service in five plus years from now. The year 2030 is ripe for such an announcement for having a new single aisle for 2035. If Boeing can reduce costs on all its processes then a carbon fiber single aisle is logical in 2035.

The hardest decision is coming up for a Boeing numbering convention since the 797 exhausts the sequence. Boeing may have to go back to the 757 number and add NSA to the number meaning New Single Aisle. Boeing asked Airbus if NSA was already taken.

Boeing's Old News: Now Becomes Singapore's New "News"

The heads of state sat in and participated on the signing of 20 777-9X and 19 787-10's thus bolstering Boeing's order book and was signed into a Singapore Airline order recognition. Boeing can identify a previous order "intent" from Singapore for these wide body during the signing. 



The real news is why Boeing booked this "unidentified" order before today's ceremony at the White House in the USA. Boeing's book now stands unchanged from yesterday's documentation except 39 orders previously recorded as unidentified earlier this year are now identified as a Singapore order. The average aviation follower who does a cursory scan of aviation articles may be confused but this is an attempt to untangle how following big transactions are crazy.

Going back to Paris Airshow 2017, a reader following the events comes up with a hundred different scenarios reported by the press. First there was 200 737-10 Max announced, then there was  361 737 Max-10's having LOI's, MOU's and firm purchases for its press release. Another take said there were conversion's from the Max 8 into the Max 10's. Trying to make sense out of it all is an idiots pursuit. What really did happen at Paris?

Now comes just one simple order for 20 777-9X and 19 787-10's from Singapore Airlines. It was long ago announced in the press Singapore ordered 39 wide bodied aircraft in a major deal which shifted the battle away from Airbus and gave victory to Boeing. It was reported as an order win for the 777-9X program. Boeing had a big 777X order dry spell for a long time and Singapore shifted the paradigm for wide body aircraft towards Boeing. 

However, a funny thing happened on the order book. Boeing reported it as 39 unidentified wide body orders. Singapore today signed with the President of The United States completing 39 firm orders of wide body aircraft. Boeing updates its order book by changing 39 unidentified order units into Singapore Airlines. The bottom line; order count does not change at this point in time as Boeing still show's 177 787-10's and  326 777X's, the same number for each type at the end of September 2017. 

Did Boeing violate its own policy of not announcing a deal until the deal is done and when the customer wants it announced? Did the customer announce a transaction twice in the same year while wanting to remain unannounced? This is a very difficult situation for any airplane counter to deal with and report about. That is why Winging IT charts and graphs from Boeing's own un-audited report updates from its website before trying to say something accurate about what has happened. On another note, the Paris Airshow numbers have been a nightmare to track when trying to reconcile press reports to Boeing's own order book it publishes.

What is known is that Singapore Airlines and its Prime Minister, in a ceremony with the President of the United States, signed some documents saying they are buying 39 wide body aircraft with six options for each type of aircraft ordered. 

This already "done deal" is now officially becomes a "done deal" and Boeing can now change its unidentified orders that "hadn't happened until today" by 20 777-9X and 19 787-10 over to the Singapore Air account. The order book gross number for both those programs does not change only the word "unidentified" changes over to "Singapore Airlines", but you already knew that since Boeing and the press reported it a long time ago.

Erratic Airbus Behavior Fuels Its Flat Spin

Just last week Airbus bought the Bombardier C series for a Canadian Buck. On the surface it seemed like made a Boeing 737 backdoor stopper but it also caused disarray in Toulouse. Its ill selling A-319 has a plan B and its a Bombardier's C series take-over.



Disarray is a symptom of a faltering leadership paradigm at Airbus. Top end program manager types at Airbus wonder what's next. John Leahy, the Airbus sales wizard, is leaving without an announced replacement in sight. Leahy is busy picking out the color of his Airbus retirement parachute and not coping with a C Series invasion. Optimistically, Airbus positions its customers with broad and expansive statements. There is a 6,000 unit market for the 100-150 seat where Airbus says it will get 50% of that market. 

Boeing is taking a "what the huh" position and wonders where those sales will come from after that statement. Its own 150 seat 737-Max 7 and it has tepid sales at this time and the 100 seat market is a special interurban footprint in most markets. Embraer will continue its wedged in position with its 75-130 seat configuration. Airbus has some dogged issues with the A-319, no orders since 2012, even with the NEO stamp on its side. The question becomes how can Airbus be so dismissive of the C series in 2016 and then turn around and buy the company in 2017? Unless it knows something no one else knows about its own airplane program strategy. This last statement is shadowed by the Airbus disarray at home.

Bombardier is taking a "what the eh" position as it feels relieved Airbus will now take responsibility for the C Series introduction into the market place. When Boeing knows it can sell 10,000 narrow bodies in 20 years, Bombardier thinks it can sell 2,000 narrower bodies in 20 years, while Embraer will do the same or more in that segment of the market. 

If Boeing's single aisle bottom eventually becomes the 737 Max 8 it means the Max 7 is no longer making Boeing money. It too will go the way of the 300-400-500 and so forth. Bombardier can have the very thin 737 Max 7 market slot of about 30 units a year delivered. The flexibility of the Max 8 can dip down to hauling 130 passengers on each flight easily and it can expand its passenger traffic upward to 180 seats. 

The C series can't do that even if it could hold 150 passengers. Airbus is in disarray making this decision unless it has a grander scheme in mind. This is definitely a grasping at straws move going forward and Bombardier got caught up in the Airbus grandeur scheme.

The Airline and The Jockey

The airline configures its seats for horse racing's Jockey because "Economy" is the ultimate space allowed for 300 paying passengers. The airline starts its business case for how much it costs to fly one mile which could be the distance around a horse racing track. This all starts with selling the most number of tickets for lowest price in order to drive this aviation horse across the sky. 

An airline assumes every passenger is a Jockey, fitting into a 30" x 17" x 48" cube. An airline can haul 340 dormitory sized refrigerators on every flight in that space, because that is number of tickets it needs to sell while sucking up the average passenger's expense account. The passenger can't complain because the flight is so expensive and they are so "average". 

Aviation builds a wide body aircraft for eight across seating, but airlines need nine across seating for its own purposes. A proposed airplane is built for ten across seating but the airlines push back wanting eleven across seating. The airplane maker comes up with a blended wing body for 20 across seating but the airline insists 17.2" inches across is needed for each seat. 

The airplane maker goes 300 feet long and the airlines insists it needs 10 more rows of additional length for its needs. Passengers are heavier and taller than the average Jockey. It becomes the passenger's problem they were born an average human.

The airline does a study and the findings are astonishing from Wikipedia:

"Jockeys must be light to ride at the weights which are assigned to their mounts. There are horse carrying weight limits, that are set by racing authorities. The Kentucky Derby, for example, has a weight limit of 126 lb (57 kg) including the jockey's equipment. The weight of a jockey usually ranges from 108 to 118 lb (49 to 54 kg).^[3] Despite their light weight, they must be able to control a horse that is moving at 40 mph (64 km/h) and weighs 1,200 lb (540 kg).^{[citation needed]} Though there is no height limit for jockeys, they are usually fairly short due to the weight limits. Jockeys typically stand around 4 ft 10 in (147 cm) to 5 ft 6 in (168 cm).^[3]"

Airlines dig deeper and find that Jockeys make up only .000001 (340 Jockeys is the answer) of the traveling public's US population and prefer 1st class when they travel. 

1st class has a 80" pitch by 24 inches wide across the seat. The cabin ceiling is a full 10" inches higher in first class. The seat cost $1,200 compared with $199 in economy. The pizza eating economy passengers loves its Jockey sized seat as they fold-in at the shoulders making room for another pizza eating football fan going to Pittsburgh, PA.

The airline makes room for 16 Jockeys in first class just in case, while increasing the number of seats in economy by making each economy row with only a 30" pitch and thus it adds two more rows. The airline could carry 290 passengers after-all while having a first class for Jockeys only.

A second study comes out and reveals wealth is not correlated to the human size. In fact economy passengers eat more calories than first class passengers. The airlines business team insist on 30.5" pitch recognizing this study has a valid point and is doing everything it can for the profit/loss team at the airline. 

The new airline commercial features an excited high school age female cheer-leader type sipping on a sippy cup in economy featuring a big smile. There are no 200 pound plus people in the scene. The actors guild only sent Jockeys and family members for the photo shoot.

The viewing public response was "immense". The commercial earned a "CLIO" (caps off) at the annual show. The airline promptly filled 240 economy seats and 16 first class seats for the aspiring ATM models or Average Types with Money.

The engineers at the airline said the airplane was tail heavy and couldn't take-off! An airline board meeting was quickly called and they reconfigured first class to the tail area and economy over the wing. The front of the airplane was delegated for its sippy cup storage. 

Airline Cost Of Goods Purchased (COGP)

Price + Efficiency+ Cost Of Change = Deal

A long time ago  an accounting office far far away there was Cost Of Goods Sold (COGS). The COGS book was fat with definitions, calculations, and documentation for transactions going out the doors from a business. But what about goods coming in the door, what is its costs?

The COGS model had variable and fixed costs, break-even points and a vast sundry of accounting adjustments to arrive at what it cost when a product is sold. The balance purchase price of a product sold minis the COGS can be summarized as raw profit. The profit at this point is just a starting number for all other accounting manipulations from that profit dollar.

This story is not about Cost of Goods Sold but about airline fleet building and its operational success. There are two manufacturers pursuing an airline for business. Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B from this point forward noted as MA and MB. The customer is a dual fleet operator for 80% of its fleet comprising its larger aircraft. The airline customer also ties up 95% of its resources servicing, buying, and operating the larger aircraftfor its own flying customer base.

The marketing team of both manufacturers have set its bottom line price for its sales team. Bottom line price includes service support and added value product offerings. Some airline customers operate a dual brand fleet strategy buying both MA and MB aircraft in an effort for leveraging the manufacturer into lower prices on future purchases. However, dual fleets have a cost added to its operation when separate resources are required for having MA and MB in its fleet. The most efficient airlines often seek a strategy of one using manufacturer only for its fleet, reducing operational redundancies found in a two fleet scheme.

Therefore, an airline must make up those inefficiencies found in dual fleet operation from leveraging a low ball purchase price from each competing manufacturer. The low purchase price would support having a dual fleet brand inefficiency. Costs are found when hiring dual trained employees and  carrying two parts bins for its fleet of aircraft. It get messy doing two fleet types under the best of conditions and requires manufacturer involvement to keep the airline's ball rolling. Price and operational efficiency must balance one another. Being a more efficient airplane than the competing maker is sometimes not enough of a reason for buying product "MA" or "MB"

The cost of change can be illustrated by the degree of change management required when making its fleet either into a dual manufacturer fleet or going to a one manufacturer fleet. The selling manufacturer wanting an exclusive take-over of a dual manufacturer airline must make a deal "the airline can't refuse", and then it must assist that airline during its phase of gaining expertise with the aircraft for a period of time, Otherwise the cost of change becomes too expensive and risky for the airline customer.

The final balance from a COGP is the deal, as the deal must address each of the the above categories of price, efficiency and change. The cost of passenger retention is a big issue for an airline whether it can keep its own paying customers happy with a newly delivered aircraft. Both manufacturers have to attack the Passenger Quotient (PQ is a passenger preference for travel) of this problem differently in order to overcome airplane preference. There are those who love MA and then there are those who love MB.  It must sell to the airline how its Passenger Quotient is better than the other.

Sometimes Price, Efficiency and Change outweigh any PQ considerations. The airline can fill airplanes with the locations it can go to rather than having 30" of pitch vs. 31" of pitch. Passengers will go where the airline can take them and the price of added inches is too expensive for the average passenger seeking a $199 ticket.   

An airline has a lot to think about before buying its next great airplane.