Desparates Times Call For Desparate Measures, The Airbus Decision

Airbus has gone to the Boeing play book. Taking older and formidable models and attempting to make it fly with customers. The 737 MAX and 777X are both Boeing examples of that play book.  The A350 is a dysfunctional family where only the A350-900 has gained general public acceptance and the A350-1000 has muted curiosity in the market place. The A350-800 is a no start at this time making an aborted take-off.

Dr. Leo Marvin on "What About Bob", movie, is quoted as saying, "Its a disaster Fay", screaming a quip to his wife during the airplane quality movie, making the passengers on board Laugh-Out-Load (lol first class)!


The answer is the 20 year old A330 NEO. Yes, another NEO. How many engine option does Airbus have to build its company on when you drop GE as a customer for the A330-NEO using only Rolls Royce. Perhaps the 787 should call itself the the 787-HO- HO! (Heavenly- Options, Happy Operations). It sounds like something out of Jeep is "Trail Rated 4x4". Then NEO or everything Airbus can cut an GE engine option out of the picture. Desperation is a odd motivational tool. Anything goes and hope something sticks. Airbus forgot one (several) major items in this nonsensical admission of 787 envy, and a A350 family counseling session, tt does not have the 787 tool box for its family chops of selling airplanes.

The Airbus has not achieved the technological  bench marks that Boeing has gained from 10 years or more of technological advancements that Boeing had gained. Boeing is currently parlaying those same gains into the 777X and 737 Max. What is Airbus proud of from the A350  erh (787) project?

• Core electrical technology-No
• Computer flight bag- haven't heard
• Dynamic 787 like wings-no
• Engines -yes spinning from 787 engine standards (sans GE as non option)
• All Plastic body- Not going on anything NEO
• Big windows-No
• Plethora of customized seats, yes

Where is Airbus stumbling towards? Seriously the A350 family dysfunctionals is far worse than I could write about,  judging from this "Crazy Ivan" turn of Airbus direction. The A330-NEO proves the A350-Family as a whole is a hopeless failure. This is a face saving maneuver taken by Airbus to appease its customer base and attract growing upstart airlines who will make do with an A330-NEO. Airbus needs about another ten years to catch Boeing as it too continuously surges forward with the 787 core technology for all it family types such as the 737, 777, and 747. Where family members such as 8,9 and 10's will prosper further after the A330 NEO hype settles down somewhere near reality in the natural order of the market.

Airbus was quoted as saying, (paraphrased quote) The A330 NEO would compete favorably on most Trans Atlantic Routes. I turn on the parse-omatic machine and it tells me that the A330 could compete within the mega hub system of travel. This bodes well for upstarts airlines and hub centric airlines such as a Delta Airlines.

The 787 is a hub buster as exampled by Tui from England. By not flying directly from a dependent Heathrow departure, it goes directly to Can-Cun Mexico on a twin aisle 787 from Lanchaster, England. A far different business plan than a bread and butter commuter routes within an already established hub system, that was built upon specifications of older metal aircraft complying with range and flight duration specifications. The A330 NEO would be good lower cost replacement of equipment. As in itreplaces any airlines older equipment currently flying within the Hub's domain. The 737 Max is also a Hub server. The 777X is a hub jumper or hub server with greater range and passenger capacity. The A330 NEO fits in there somewhere, but is not revolutionary in its proposed nature. The 787 will stretch out its purpose beyond the A330. More passengers with A330 is a Hub server. More passenger on the 787-10 is a hub jumper. Direct service within the world without going through a major hub is the "New Airline Black", you know it as the bottom line. The new black for upstarts and hub reliant routes is for the A330 NEO. Hub busting airlines buy the 787 because of Geographic need, New Zealand, Jet Star and Arab States (and Japan). The older equipment fell short in its day, hence the new technology 787. Now Airbus proposes the A330 NEO from its A350 Failures. Not a good technology spin-off. The 787 will not just fly most Atlantic routes effectively, but fly all Transatlantic routes efficiently and effectively. The A330 NEo is an Admission of an A350 failure to launch.

The Engine Of 787 Profitability Synergies

There are considerable contributors for Boeing to make the 787 profitable and retire cost associated from its inception and production.  This, the goal of every venture, is the business of passing  break-even investment with its new product. At some point the financial unit of Boeing will continuously seek out its cost accountants for the summation of sunk cost into a project, and production cost for each unit comparing receipts of money from customers for each sold unit. The marketing arm of Boeing must sell enough units of the 787 to over-come all cost associated with R&D and production of the 787.  Currently, it is estimated, Boeing loses $49 million dollars for each 787 delivered. Out of a per unit loss is a number that it pays out, entertaining a split ratio for production sunk cost of building per unit, and its contribution  towards retiring the R&D expended on creating the 787 in the first place. Some of these R&D expenditures are ongoing even after the first 787 was delivered.

Those current R&D hits come from continuos recoding of computer systems, improving production methods, and changing 787 items within the airplane, which improve all current delivered and future airplane to be built. That would be a financial anchor towards break-even, where the delivered 787 would contribute a net profit for each unit delivered.

Here is the conundrum for Boeing, will the change management on the 787 and early production cost cause Boeing to not reach a Break-even point on this aircraft in the next five years or after its 1031st 787 is delivered? The answer is a four fold event.

• Production cost drop and production efficiency increases.
• Boeing has sold 1031 Aircraft which 159 have been delivered.
• The 787-10 has not travelled out of the R&D hole in the pre-production state.
• Supplier chain cost continue to shrink to a lower percentage of the 787 cost.

These four  items are very important for Boeing to report during 2015 in strong numbers. 

First up is the production cost and efficiency Delta (change). Boeing is quickly moving towards making Charleston a reliable participant with Everett. The corporate instinct is that if Boeing keeps going towards 14  a month goal by 2020, then that number indicates it will have succeeded in optimization of  both productions floors. It will make the 787 for the lowest cost it can from both those floors.  Since increasing deliveries rapidly, will create greater inflow of revenue receipts, it still needs to refine the cost of process to open up more sales to its customers with lower manfacturing cost of airplanes. 

This will be a bulleted item above that it can control towards shrinking the "under" Break-even amount towards profitability.

The second item listed is the long order book. But is it long enough that 1031 orders give it strength to reach profitability, then all is well? However, the 787-10 has not been built and is part of that order book strength. Customers, then become the team that will pull Boeing out of the "loss" ditch at this time. In comes from an unlikely term from the thesaurus, synergy. Boeing needs the synergy of its product and customers to pull it into Break-even and profitability. To explain this concept, the existence of two different participants combine to make a greater affective action than it could separatly, is called synergy. Bringing the force of a flying customers and over preforming 787's, synergises the  20% better fuel economy each time it does fly. Enriching the bottom line of customers, and is admired by other airlines that have 787 envy. Where it also buys more 787's in order to compete. Hence the synergy from a well built production unit, synergizes the sales arm to go beyond 1031 ordered to date. The synergy of placing 159-787's, during the last two and a half years, also synergizes and incentivize its customers to add on more orders as airlines buildits own business model, before its envious neighbor airline also react and order. All this synergy will realize in 2015. Production, sales and customers will meet in the perfect profit storm. 

A 787-10 anchor is coming where more R&D money will be spent getting this aircraft into customer production and delivery. This problem has been mitigated greatly by the 787-9 program that has perfected its roll-out to production with no stoppers, as it seamlessly flew its test period. The bar has been set high for the 787-10 and there no reason to expect anything but a flawless repeat for the 787-10 as the 787-9 performed in tests. The 787 genies have been put back into the bottle with a cemented cork.

The last underpinning supporting the cost margins are its 787 suppliers. Boeing has wrangled in the supply chain as customers have received lucrative cash flows with balanced rejections of under preforming parts. The Boeing supply chain is tightening and squeezing down cost in a methodical manner. Technological design change for more efficient parts contribute to part's costs reductions. Supply partners are very competitive for Boeing contracts, as they too want to build its own company through the Boeing relationship. The bullet points listed above do feed each others for more efficiency as the 787 gains consistency and reliability. The Boeing 787 will make a profit sooner rather than later through these competing synergistic forces. 

Things That Are More Than A Whimsical $100.

The Wall Street Journal has an Excellent feature on the Cost of Boeing Airplane product. The Blog would like to use this space for cross linking the articles for your reference and reading pleasure. Next time look out an 777-300 ER window, its like riding on an expensive space shot. Enjoy every second of your ride as it could be arching over the Ocean or the North Pole! What goes into your Walter Mitty like slumber is a great quantity of Airline Dollars. Below will be a series of links transferring you, what goes on behind the scenes when an airline plinks down several hundred million dollars for purchasing one unit of 777 aircraft for your very own transition from here to there.

All cost are list prices for any Airline bold enough to buy just one. A $300 million dollar investment would build a 60 story high rise in most cities that would keep standing for 100 years, as a city Icon. An Airplane only has about 25 years to earn its keep in the ever changing market, and airlines must negotiate through those years in order to survive.


Below Wall Street Journal links: for your reading experience:

Why a Boeing 777-300ER Costs $320 Million

Why a Boeing 787-9 Costs $250 Million

Why a Boeing 737 Costs up to $110 Million

All Airlines don't necessarily pay those list prices, as discounts are taken from quantity, preferred status, or configuration considerations.  Some may pay considerably less as other contractual issues are added to a signed bottom line. However the capitalisation of just a single airplane order is immense. Its way more than a Holly-Wood mansion. When ANA ordered its 787, it represented the whole company had put its future behind that one untested Airplane. When Ryan Air ordered the 737NG  for a 176 units,  it "bet-the-farm", on its strategic plan. Now we are talking billions. One Boeing Airline Customer, Emirates comes to mind, is willing to pay 100 Billion on 777X and 777-300 ER's aircraft. This is more than what General Motors hopes to profit in 25 years by selling  millions and millions of cars. The numbers are astounding when considering what it represents in Blue collar terms. However, executives lose all fear of the number billion, when considering purchasing more aircraft. The emotional attachment for money is lost on purchases. The Board of Director's plot out a scheme with a monetary impact. The hand goes up in room asking, "Do we have access to capital resources to do this deal?" 

"Ah hummm, yes we do, let me show you", is coming from the end of the boardroom table. These 100 billions worth of aircraft will be delivered during the next generation in years. Let's commit to Boeing in 12 months where we can draw out of cash. Maybe, 10 or so billion to sign for the order. During the next ten years, after its first successful delivery, UAE, could manage multiple lump sums in advances for each block of 777X's,  in order for fleet absorption of 10 or more Aircraft a year until the order is filled. That is about 6 billion minimum and 10 Billion maximum, yearly, pacing from the balance sheet, from its liquid assets. That is not what you call Blue collar speak, but is just a number with very little emotion behind it. It does have the Emotional Intelligence (EQ) of self awareness, leadership, and inclusion of other board members. Ticket sales will drive the Boeing product as the 787 continues flying, next the Max, and then the 777X. Its where the billions come from except from a few oil wells pumping the cash flow out for an airline with a plan.

Three Month Moving Average Bears Its Fruit.

The lumpiness of monthly delivery where one month, 6 are delivered, and then 8 does not represent the pent up energy for deliveries. The flight-line gets crowed and then emptied on a periodic basis. The investor can lose track or become confused to what Boeing tells the stock holders. So a three month average is more soothing to the nerves than a month to month expression of fear. What does Boeing deliver during a three month period is more indicative than a Monthly count and average. Hence the quarterly report is on its cusp, as we all approach the end of June. The three month Moving Average for delivery will tell a lot at quarters end. It is the summation of all effort, trails and tribulations. I hope to answer one primary question does Boeing reach its 10 a month rate to its customers?

Goal +/-                          04/2014    05/2014          Projecting      June (actual)  Delta 

Month Deliveries               8               10              10              15                     5
3 M-M-avg                         7.33            8.33           9.33          11.                  +2.67

Production Goal               10               10.             10               10                    0
Delivery Trend (+/- )       -2.67            -1.67                   -.67             +1. /Target     >                

                                       *PM-Start      **M.A.P.                                   PM-End
*Progression Month
**Moving Average Progression

The quarter ending push has three more ready for delivery on the books and they should deliver.

This is a preliminary statistic before the end of the Month allowing the three remaining "ready to be delivered" aircraft counted since the Air new Zealand 787-9 will be delivered in June and the two other 787-8's that are ready, will be delivered by  Month end. The above chart will be updated, if delivery is not made by June 30th on those 3 projected June deliveries.

What does a 11 moving average means to anyone watching. 

• There were 33 787's delivered in the quarter.
• Boeing exceeds its promise of 10 a month during the 2nd Quarter
• Things are not as bad as the press would have it for Boeing.
• Every glitch expected or unexpected is solved in a continuous flow.
• Factory wrenches are accounted for each day.
• South Carolina or Charleston is a significant player.
• Boeing commitment to Charleston is paying off.

Invest forward is the common theme.

Is This A Misquote or am I missing Something?

Parsed out Quote from article:

"The group will add 100 Boeing 787 to its fleet at the end of 2015 and the first Airbus A350 in 2018. The aircraft will be equipped with completely new cabins."

The group is Air France/KLM group. Mary Kirby or somebody should help me on this one. AirFrance/KLM only have 25 787-9 on order at this time not a 100. Was this a Fruedian slip?

Here is the Link:

Air France Rolls Out Cabin Upgrades; Will Continue Across Partner Airlines

Something is coming from this massive investment in aircraft upgrades on all its massive fleets including 747's, 777, and 787's however many they will order, unless the 100 787's may have mentioned is in error. The article side slips to Delta shortly after the 100 787's mentioned.

"Delta President Ed Bastian said that the partnership with Air France is the most important collaboration Delta has. “Not only are we successful financially, but we're successful from a customer perspective,” he said, noting recent high rankings for the airline in Business Travel News."

Where Delta only has 18 787's ordered, which doesn't make it a hundred when combining 25 + 18 only =43, so what the article may reveal is something more important for the Air France/KLM group is something hanging on Boeing's order book is 75 more 787's yet to be ordered. I think its worth checking out. Freudian slip or mis-quote?  

The Emerging 757, Coming To The Dance ?

The long cancelled 757, a svelte and charming Boeing aircraft stopped production in 2005. There is a 757 market out there that would like new engines, navigation deck and maybe some plastic wings. Air Astana would like one or more copies and it plans on it too.

Boeing Advancing on Successor to 757 Jet, Air Astana Says

What is Boeing capable of since ten years ago?

Take the old plans, dimensions and systems.
Bring on Boeing's off-the-self 787 stuff, and replace the old design

with:

• New Fuel Efficient Engines, already done on-the -shelf per Boeing
• New flight controls format already done on-the-shelf per Boeing
• New wings, lets see what the wing people can do!
• New light weight aluminum body. Apply!
• Advanced systems technology, done and on-the-self Per Boeing
• New passenger amenities ( new seat types 787 interiors) creates more space

A Hot Rods Final Delivery

The Max project would enhance the 757 project with roll-over technology to the 757 restart. What the 757 should keep is its main constructs with new and vastly improved stuff. The 757 was popular in its day, but did not have a make -over in its time, because there were not items yet on-the-shelf that could be applied to the aircraft. It would be too expensive then, to single out the 757 with an all-on effort, when Boeing needed to stem-out  any resurgent A330 NEO or A321 Neo line. Boeing had to take its steps on all new technology and beat Airbus. The dividend from that effort could be an all new 757 from the inside out. New wings would add to performance as much as new engines. A lighter weight 757 aircraft would kill the A321 Neo threat, applying its new lighter systems from the leasons learned Boeing cupboard. 

The next question is how fast could they build this newly designed 757? That could be done as a twin project with the Max, borrowing features that are installed on the Max and cross pollinating with the 757 re-emergence design. Under five years from today.

Would it be different than the Max? Yes, it would be different in its design features as a longer range single aisle aircraft, with a further bump to its flight technologies for extending range. It would look and feel different as it matches its purpose. So different it would require a name change,. My own suggestion, is a 757-GTX (Great Technology Expressed). That captures the mission and want from its customers. Bringing back this stiletto aircraft is a grand effort, fusing the old with the new where the fuel economy would be remarkable for under 200 passengers. An exclusive ride in a sports plane taking off. Its not a luxury blob in the skies, but a sleek and fashionable experience that is similar when riding in a Corvette on the ground. A Comfort centric ride going coast to coast with all others staring at its lines as it passes by from its power driven take-offs.

Boeing should make this an easily recognizable type that generates enthusiasm from the Concorde days, as it meshes body and wings in a statement of beauty. 

Emirates Cancels Airbus and Then Reconsiders Within the Month.

Emirates said to mull u-turn on $16bn Airbus A350 order 

Emirates is becoming the players player. They first canceled 70, A350 orders, and then a few weeks later it considers a new A350 order with Airbus. Its a recapitalisation move and an opportunity for Boeing to be invited back into the match. Emirates has a plan and its not by the Markus of Queens-bury rules. They would like to milk the best offer from either Airbus or Boeing. Emirates remains ambivalent to both players in this round. Either the cost per plane or sweeteners over-all are going to be offered. The stressful part, will other airlines fallow suit and come back by dropping orders just to renegotiate a better deal.

Recently, I blogged an opportunity for Boeing after this Airbus order cancellation with this snarky post per usual:

The Airbus Stopped At Emirates and Boeing Gets ON

Something wicked this way comes for both framers from duo aisle, and duo engine, builders of plastic airplanes. After these points, the commonalities stop between airplane framers. Note: Qatar has way more A350's on order than 787's. Its a 70 to 30 ratio in its mixed fleet order book, where Qatar has already received 13 of its 30 787. The desert kingdoms are are competing with each other based on the sames schemes, fly anywhere in the world from its kingdom. They also are ambivalent towards who supplies them, just so they meet a superior standard at a "special price". The special price is the catch, as Emirates cancels and then seeks a special price, so they may compete with its neighbors, like Qatar. The door opened back up for Boeing, but who will win the bidding war with price and/or sweeteners?

The answer is stressful, since both air framers are invested way too deep to give away 787's or A350's. If Boeing offers some sweeteners with its Edge or fleet training support, it may tip the point towards the 787. However what could Airbus do for Emirates coming back for a round two of salesmanship that did not appear in the first round? You may know it as Emirates buying 70 copies of the A350. Desperation is a strange bedfellow. The Airbus contingent will throw a lower capitalization price which buys a lot of fuel in the scheme of things for awhile. The depreciation of lower pricing will drive Airbus' A350 break-even point to the brink as new orders have softened for both Boeing and Airbus. If they (both) undercut its customers by selling to Emirates at lower prices on the next big order, it may start a pricing war nobody will win.

Emirates , stated it has informed Boeing at the same time it informed Airbus. With an intent of listening to both parties presentations, on its offers for selling airplanes. That is a key point, since they may have shut out Boeing on the original Airbus order that was just canceled, which in hindsight, Emirates could have made in haste with Airbus  when Emirates originally ordered the 70. Now that the Boeing mishaps and problems are settling down, this has become a do-over round for an Emirates order book. The thing to note on this opportunity, is when a 787 or A350 might be delivered becomes a sweetener. That is another plus that Airbus could play well with, since Airbus could maintain its Emirates production slots that it had just given up from its recent order cancellation. What could Boeing offer since it is in the 800's with unfilled 787 orders? I haven't heard of any Airbus money refunded back to Emirates with regard to its original cancelled order. The Emirates team will be looking at the following points when considering a winner on the next reorder.

• Price (?)
• Product Sweeteners (?)
• Quantity (?)
• Delivery Slots Timing (?)
• Lastly, performance (Boeing 787 wins that one)

The reorder will be a significant battle which will point towards future battles within the region where you have many Arab based airlines vying for the high ground due to Arab states location in the world, money and opportunity. The motive is the central theme, making more money.

Here is what passengers pay attention to, and what both makers do the same and what customer think of when buying a ticket.

Boeing                                                   Airbus
Amenities*(windows,air,lights)       Amenities
Quite Ride* Quieter than A350         Quite Ride
Engineered Amenities*                      Engineered Amenities
Window Dressing                                Window Dressing* (Airbus Make-up)
Room                                                       Room

* represents it leads the industry in passenger impact
Both having not having a  * is a push.

The Perfect Storm II, Who's Control is The 777 Under-During Final Approach In SF, CA? Asiana or Boeing

The Asiana Airlines Dropped into San Francisco last year, as it flipped onshore, like a just hooked fish. I am truly sorry for those passengers and its three fatalities, as it could have been avoided. Every time we walk, drive or ride in a conveyance, it is a risk. It is difficult for anyone to accept blame, because a huge price tag looms on the NSTB decision hanging above the heads of booth Asiana and Boeing. The airplane maker has more money, hence, the great escape from blame lays before the one with the most money to be taken. Below is the decision:

The wreckage of Asiana Flight 214 lies on the ground after it crashed at the San Francisco International Airport, in San Francisco.

IMAGE: MARCIO JOSE SANCHEZ, FILE/ASSOCIATED PRESS Through mashable Link further below:

Bloomberg Report link Below:

Pilot Confusion Said Main Cause of Asiana Airlines Crash 

Pilot Fatigue

The pilots mismanaged their approach to the airport, failed to notice the deteriorating speed and lights near the runway showing they were too low, and then didn’t abort the touchdown, which they were trained to do, according to the NTSB.

Pilot fatigue on the Seoul-to-San Francisco flight also played a role. The crew on the South Korean airline was landing in San Francisco at 3:30 a.m. Korea time, which probably hurt their performance, the NTSB said.

Pilots whose performance was hindered by fatigue made a series of “cascading errors” that began miles away from the airport, Roger Cox, an NTSB investigator, said at the hearing.

An underlying reason for the accident was that Captain Lee Kang Kuk, a veteran of the airline who was being trained on the Boeing 777 wide-body, didn’t realize he had disabled the jetliner’s automatic speed protection system as he was trying to descend, according to the NTSB.

Lee told investigators after the crash he thought “the auto-throttle should have come out of the idle position to prevent the airplane going below the minimum speed” for landing, the NTSB said.

‘More Widespread’

Another Asiana captain, Lee Jung Min, an instructor, was seated in the co-pilot’s seat.

NTSB board member Robert Sumwalt, a former airline pilot, said he spoke to a senior airline training pilot after the accident to determine whether average flight crews understood how the 777’s speed protection worked.

“He said to be honest with you, ‘I don’t think it was widely known at all.’” Sumwalt said. “I think that the problem was a lot more widespread than we may have thought.”

At the same time, the cockpit display showed that the plane’s air-speed protections had been disabled and the pilots should have seen that, Cox said.

“There are plenty of cues in front of you telling you what you have done, but you have to look at them,” he said.

Boeing Controls

Boeing wasn’t absolved in the investigation. The disconnection of the plane’s speed-protection system was listed as one of the causes of the crash. Complexities of that system, which was “inadequately” described to the flight crew, contributed to the accident, the NTSB found.

Chicago-based Boeing has maintained that crew actions caused the accident.

“The airplane and all airplane systems were functioning as expected prior to impact and did not contribute to the accident,” Boeing said in a March submission to the NTSB on the accident.

The 777, the largest twin-engine jetliner, began commercial service in 1995 and has one of the industry’s best safety records, according to Boeing’s annual aircraft accident summary.

While Seoul-based Asiana said in its submission the pilots were at fault, it urged the NTSB to find that issues with the plane’s automation were also to blame.

Incidents with an almost identical auto-throttle issue arose in certification of the Boeing 787, NTSB documents show.

The FAA required Boeing to add a note to the then-new 787’s documentation warning pilots they could lose speed protection under the same circumstances, according to the documents. An FAA test pilot flying the 787 in 2010 said he was surprised to learn that the plane’s speed protection could be lost in some cases. The changes weren’t required for the 777.

To contact the reporter on this story: Alan Levin in Washington at alevin24@bloomberg.net

However, a hearing judge rules today following a slippery slope down to Asiana pilots and Boeing. In this slippery slope, the Boeing 777 falls onto a runway sea wall. Crew exhaustion, unfamiliarity of flight systems behavior under certain conditions, and confusion. Those stated reasons make this 777-200 fly into a stall on approach. The aircraft hits the sea wall flips and ends upright off the runway where it then burns. Asiana would like Boeing take the blame with a faulty auto throttle system under certain or special conditions with the autopilot. Boeing suggest a properly trained crew would know how to fly the 777 in any condition. An Asiana Air training pilot is on board this flight said, he was not aware of any special conditions existing in the flight and throttle system, nor has ever heard of such condition. Boeing says the 777-200 takes another skill level for pilots coming from former aircraft and Asiana lacks that knowledge. So forth goes the logic in the hearing.

The final decree from the NTSB comes from them as they reel off all the counter arguments in a systematic order. A tired crew, unfamiliar with flight characteristic of 777 auto-throttle and auto-pilot habits, where they did not have enough cognizant recognition (tired) to do the correct landing procedure after a long flight. They lack understanding for these conditions, and it falls upon either Asiana or Boeing through training updates or training procedures. The Asiana instructor on board didn't have recognition for this vulnerability as he stated he had never heard of these conditions from other pilots during his career. Boeing did not broadcast this venerability of a solution in case it happen. The time frame for this occurrence was in seconds, as it caused confusion for an unsuspecting or under trained and tired crew. Who claimed, even if fully trained, they would not have been trained on this condition, since they were not aware of in the first place. Are you confused yet? I am. Boeing transfers back at Asiana that intuitively they should be aware of its flight anomalies from experience and understanding of the aircraft. In other words, it takes a master pilot to fly the 777 with full competence.

NTSB summarizes, Asiana fell short in its comprehension of the 777, they were tired and became confused in seconds and Boeing did not do its due diligence in making sure its customers were aware of, or trained-up for its systems under all conditions. The passengers lawyers wonder who pays. After-all that is what is at stake at this point in time.

Boeing will change its 777 presentation back at the plant, for its customers. They will make systems work intuitively together in a logical manner preventing a disassociation from auto pilot from auto throttle. Pilots across the board will have additional training, and bulletins for this condition. Nothing broke or failed on this 777-200. The crew was confused as often is the case in a "Perfect Storm". Unaware, tired, and untrained is that perfect storm. Everybody shares in this mishap equally, including the governing agency's that approved the aircraft in the first place, since they too failed to detect this vulnerability in the first place.

Very Good Information found on Mashable Link:

"NTSB investigators say the flight crew aboard an Asiana Airlines flight that crashed into a seawall at San Francisco International Airport the morning of July 6, 2013, were to blame for the incident that killed three and left more than 180 injured.

"Automation has unquestionably made aviation safer and more efficient. But the more complex automation becomes, the more challenging it is to ensure that the pilots adequately understand it," NTSB acting chair Christopher Hart said in his opening remarks. "In this instance, the flight crew over-relied on automated systems that they did not fully understand. As a result, they flew the aircraft too low and too slow and collided with the seawall at the end of the runway," he said.

SEE ALSO: Here's Every NTSB Tweet Since the Asiana Flight 214 Crash

The pilot, Operations Group Chairman Roger Cox later added, simply "lacked critical manual flying skills. NTSB investigators announced their findings at a publichearing Tuesday morning, nearly one year after the incident, where they sought to answer the primary question: Why did this airplane crash while landing at SFO on a clear day?

Throughout the hearing NTSB investigators repeatedly returned to the pilot's understanding of automated systems on board the aircraft, with one board member saying the incident wasn't caused by pilot incompetency, but an expectation that the auto-throttle system on board the Boeing 777 “would do something for them that the aircraft was not designed to do.

”The Asiana crash, which occurred on a crystal clear day with light winds, showed that advances in flight deck automation can inadvertently bring down a perfectly healthy airplane. The crash therefore calls into question the layers of automation that are being put into modern aircraft, such as the Boeing 787 and forthcoming Airbus A350 series.

The NTSB found that the pilots had "misconceptions" about the plane's autopilot systems, specifically what the autothrottle would do in the event that the plane's airspeed got too low.

In the setting that the autopilot was in at the time of the accident, the autothrottles that are used to maintain specific airspeeds, much like cruise control in a car, were not programmed to wake up and intervene by adding power if the plane got too slow. The pilots believed otherwise, in part because in other autopilot modes on the Boeing 777, the autothrottles would in fact do this.

The airplane, investigators said, was too high approximately five miles out, and the pilots didn’t effectively monitor its airspeed once the plane dipped below 500 feet on its final approach. Pilots then failed to follow go-around procedure, investigators said, until it was too late — less than four seconds before the plane hit the sea wall.

Despite that rough landing, which was captured on surveillance video as seen above, 99% of the occupants on board the aircraft survived, 98% of the passengers were able to evacuate the airplane and 83% of occupants sustained minor or no injuries, the NTSB said. The plane's frame and seats absorbed the majority of the impact.

Two of those killed were not wearing seat belts and were ejected from the aircraft. One of those ejected, passenger 41E, was run over by fire rigs that had responded to the scene, an incident that "never should have happened," investigators said. Fire fighters initially left that passenger lying on the tarmac believing she was dead — but the NTSB says there was a window of opportunity to perform triage on the passenger.

The NTSB credited the aircraft’s flight attendants for initiating the evacuation, overriding the pilot’s orders to wait. Senior climate reporter Andrew Freedman contributed to this story.

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U.S. Navy’s largest destroyer arrives on time, on budget; named for late admiral

"Off-The Wall ", is Winging-it, isn't It? So today is Destroyer Day. Its about a ship that is destroying the Littoral Combat Ships before it leaves the harbor. The Zumwalt class and first named ship of its class is coming out to play and is turning heads like a mini- skirted model on a windy Port Sided Day.

The first-in-class Zumwalt, the largest U.S. Navy destroyer ever built, is seen at Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, Oct. 8, 2013. (Robert F. Bukaty/AP)

The Virginia CCS circa 1863



Engineering and Tecnology reinvents the destroyer as a anti-submarine, anti coastal embatlements, and  fortifications. Its a deep water and coastal swarm-maker built for durability. and fleet support. It moves for floatilla protection and is a fast hunter striker. Bath Iron Works, announces goooal!!! In strict FIFA fashion. Please read below the Kudos attributed to a new class of floating ships.

The first-in-class Zumwalt, the largest U.S. Navy destroyer ever built, is seen at Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, Oct. 8, 2013. (Robert F. Bukaty/AP)

The Washington Post

BY DAVID SHARP October 20, 2013

BATH, Maine — After embarrassing troubles with its latest class of surface warships, the Navy is hoping for a winner from a new destroyer that’s ready to go into the water.

Construction of the first-in-class Zumwalt, the largest U.S. Navy destroyer ever built, is on time and on budget, something that’s a rarity in new defense programs, officials said. And the Navy believes that the ship’s big gun, stealthy silhouette and advanced features will make it a formidable package.

The christening of the ship bearing the name of the late Adm. Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt Jr. was canceled a week ago because of the federal government shutdown. Without fanfare, the big ship will be moved to dry dock and floated in the coming days.

The public ceremony featuring Zumwalt’s two daughters will be rescheduled for the spring.

Zumwalt served in destroyers during World War II and was awarded a Bronze Star for valor at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. As the nation’s youngest chief of naval operations — appointed at 49 by President Richard M. Nixon — he fought to end racial discrimination and allowed women to serve on ships for the first time.

Like its namesake, the ship is innovative.

It is so big that Bath Iron Works, a General Dynamics subsidiary, built a 106-foot-tall, $40 million “Ultra Hall” to accommodate its large hull segments. The ship is 100 feet longer than the existing class of destroyers.

It features an unusual wave-piercing hull, electric-drive propulsion, advanced sonar and guided missiles and a gun that fires rocket-propelled warheads as far as 100 miles. Unlike warships with towering radar-and-antenna-laden superstructures, the Zumwalt will ride low to the water to minimize its radar signature, making it stealthier than other warships. The ship was envisioned for shore bombardment, but its size and a power plant that can produce 78 megawatts of electricity — enough to power 78,000 homes — make it a potential platform for futuristic weapons such as the electromagnetic rail gun, which uses a magnetic field and electric current to fire a projectile at seven times the speed of sound.

With so many computers and so much automation, it will need fewer sailors, operating with a crew of 158 — nearly half the complement aboard the current generation of destroyers.

“The concept of the Zumwalt is sort of a bridge between the traditions of the past and the new world of networked warfare and precision-guided munitions,” said Lor­en Thompson, defense analyst at the Lexington Institute. “It’s not so much a radical concept as it is an attempt to pull off a full range of missions with a ship that has one foot in the present and one foot in the future.”

The Navy envisioned building more than 20 of the ships. But the Zumwalt has so many sophisticated features, and its cost grew so high, that senior Navy officials tried to kill the program. Instead, it was truncated to just three ships, the first being Zumwalt.

The Zumwalt will cost more than $3.5 billion — about three times the price of current destroyers — but the program has not been beset by big cost overruns or delays, officials said.

The fact that construction has gone smoothly is a relief for the Navy, which has dealt with embarrassing troubles on its new class of speedy warship, dubbed the “littoral combat ship.”

“That ship is a total disaster,” said Norman Polmar, a naval historian, analyst and author.Those smaller ships, designed to operate close to shore in intertidal waters, have been plagued by escalating costs, production delays and mechanical problems. Mission modules that give them the flexibility to perform roles including anti-submarine warfare and minesweeping are not ready, even though the first ships have been commissioned.

Against that backdrop, shipbuilders at Bath Iron Works have been toiling away on the Zumwalt, the first entirely new ship built on the banks of the Kennebec River since the original Arleigh Burke was christened more than 20 years ago.

Dan Dowling, president of Local S6, which represents 3,200 shipbuilders, said it’s been a challenging project with a new hull design, composite materials and new technology.

“It is a radical departure from what we’ve known. Whether the Navy is satisfied with the design of the ship is up to them. We can only build what they asked for,” he said, adding, “I hope they’ll be pleased with it. We’d like to build as many of them as we can.”

— Associated Press

The Boston Connection

Boston is the new Black for airline profitability. Hainan, Jal, and others are rerouting to Bean Town. No I didn't use the Tea Party metphor for this blog (already used in poltics). The Boston Connection is more entertaining than the French version. Where else can you go on the East coast for Lobster, American engineering and computer code. Nowhere like Boston. People, Chinese, need want and aspire for these commodities. China, a place far away, is addicted to this connection. Hainan Airline had a devious scheme many years ago is some back room in China, that Boston is the untapped American Connection that does not have a wait in line opportunity on its top billing. It is an "Emerging American Hub" for the Orient, who knew? The Boston Connection has been noticed and many people are considering this discovery like a gold strike. The slow motion rush is on. Paper work, applications and agreements rush is on. JAL started with a bang (fire) several years back with the enabling 787.

The "Enabler" (Dreamliner) is the most effective mechanism today for opening new routes such as Boston to all of China. It was reported that Boston area has over 400,000 people who will travel to and from (Boston- China) annnually. Hainan, when no one knew what a Hainan was, ordered some 787. Today everybody else is talking about flying to Boston to go to China. Making others second tier from the crowded traditional super ports like New York, Chicago and DC. Take an express flight to Boston and then go directly to China, or basically on a 787 anywhere flight from Boston that traverses the North Pole. You could say the 787 is remaking Boston and its economy as a world trade center. Its the new gold, "The Boston Connection". Other Airlines are secrectly deciding epuipment purchases along with route acquistions in symphony. United Airlines is attacking the Orient from the West. The route grabbing rush is on, only its not happening in Oklahoma like it did in the 19th century during the great land grab. Its happening in under utilized markets with an abundance of people needed for travel, bringing its intellectual capital into a economic destination such as China. The 787 is the perfect freighter for world intellect going to and from China. Boston is to be the center for world intellectual capital. The connection is that pipe line for transporting this valued commodity, people and its talent.