Boeing Flunks Accounting 110

Accounting is a confusing subject but not a difficult one, once a student can determine the rules. Evidently, Boeing accountants are asked if they are confused and are having difficulty following the rules by the SEC. It is important that an accountant knows if plant improvements, tools and technology are sunk costs or are expenses directly applied to a project such as the 787. An accountant can assign plant improvements with long term costs written-off over years through an asset type program accounting system rather than writing it off against as a program expense during the course of the 787 program.

Boeing accounting class 110 homework example:

However, the 787 program has slammed into rough financial air as the SEC is frowning over Boeing's sophomoric attempts of classifying its balance sheets and Income statements using a liberal application for discerning what is a program related cost for producing a 787 or 747 or the actual cost of building a plant or facility for that end. Either way the process of recognizing cost has a tremendous effect on company profitability upfront or pushing it to the back-end of an accounting cycle. 

Assigning cost concurrent with a program will demonstrate immediately when an aircraft will reach profitability, and in how many units. Currently Boeing has about 28.5 to 30 billion in deferred cost against the 787, which does not affect its profit/loss line from the questioned programs. The 747 program also has a deferral of costs causing the SEC some questions about how Boeing does its accounting. The stock market reacted in a downward spiral for Boeing shareholders from these accounting questions today, as reported in the news by various sources.

Is plant improvement becomes an asset driven item subject to depreciation rather assigned against a particular cost of production for an airplane type? The SEC will soon determine what Boeing has cooked up in its books for stockholders.

The question of Boeing accounting has sent the stocks tumbling today. It should be made clear Boeing stock should fairly represents the affected programs questioned in this manner, and "no change" will be made to the book or where a "no" break-even change against its programs is hoped for, if they are fairly represented per SEC oversight.

It is also noted the break-even points for the affected programs must set accurately, and each frame delivered contributes to paying off the deferred cost bundle. If the SEC finds Boeing inappropriately has assigned its investments for the questioned programs, then it will affect when in time the 787 or 747 programs will become profitable. 

Either way of realizing it up front, or from a deferred cost perspective it will take about 1,300 787 to pay down all costs affecting the 787 and some other unit number for the other program questioned. Boeing has chosen showing a cash positive flow sooner rather than later, by pushing the reduction of deferred costs to the back to end of this saga. Making a unit by unit delivery "contribution margin", at least until Boeing obtains a zero balance on its deferred costs account. The contribution margin comes from a 787 delivered cash mechanism applied to the deferred cost reduction from each of the frames delivered.

The significance of this affects the stockholder’s perception over the affected programs. It becomes a "how it feels situation", rather than the actual reality of how it will play out over the years. Boeing pushed the accounting books forward making the 787 look profitable, by reaching a positive cash contribution at the earliest possible moment during December 2015. It's an aggressive effort sustaining a positive financial outlook for the programs. 

This is done by making many factory expenses depreciable as an asset and not a direct program cost. Deeper analysis is required by the investor for understanding the financial picture. The SEC wants to know the length in time, the 787 will become profitable from the accounting perspective. It also wants Boeing to adjust its books for fairly representing its case before the investor, using real time program activity applied against the cost of building each type. 

I told you in the beginning it was simple when basic accounting is in play. That's why it's so confusing. The SEC wants to know some answers because they have a problem with Boeing's basic accounting, which appears to be plain accounting entries from the Boeing perspective.

Randy Tinseth All In For 737-9 (Updated *Data)

Even having a 5-1 lead over the 737-900 with the A321, Randy Tinseth insist on the 737-900 is here to stay. *Data below suggest a 60% to 40% market split with Airbus and Boeing A321 to 737-900 Max order numbers. It's a winner, having booked about 217 (now 418), 737-900 Max versions over-all. However, Airbus has booked 1,052 A321NEO. Randy is the chief Boeing instigator for All Things Boeing in the market place. What Randy knows is projected out in statements like, "We are very pleased with the 737-900 aircraft, it offers... and so forth".

Footnotes suggest otherwise as the A321NEO to 737-900 Max gap tightens.

So why is the competitive order nature for Boeing's 737-900 so diminished against the A321? The Airbus A321 lead of 1,052 to 217 (now 418) is the largest reason for its having a 4,500 to 3072 lead over Boeing when calculating the Max vs NEO total headcount.

Boeing stays with the 737-Max-900, because of other reasons than just "we are pleased".

·      Something "bigger" is coming from Boeing??

·      Airbus line-cut with the A321NEO.

·      Market starvation for a new single aisle solution reaches a heightened condition at the NEO announcement.

·      Boeing was caught giant killing wide bodies during the Single Aisle revamp window.

·      Boeing cannot pivot on the MAX until after its delivery starts.

·      Timing is everything in the aviation Market and Boeing lost that window before 2013.

A <<Better aircraft comparison>>is the 737 MAX over the A321NEO! After linking above with the comparison you will understand Mr. Tinseth position in full.

Boeing really lost the A321 market in 2013 when it came late to the order window for single aisle renovations. It was about 15 months late of the Airbus theft of the single aisle market. It could never recoup the Airbus lead when announcing the MAX so late when the window was opened. The Airbus single aisle margin happens to equal the A321NEO backlog lead over the 737-900 backlog. The 737-900 Max is the better aircraft, but it languishes behind the market out of its lateness coming to the order opportunity. Fifteen months is the difference as Boeing had its hands tied, slaying those wide body giants. 

Footnotes: Pdxlight Data

Good news for Boeing lies in the option counts where it leads Airbus by 1,121 B-options to 1074 A-options at this snapshot moment. The numbers have grown since this chart was last updated where Airbus now stands at 4471 for all A320NEO types having 1094 A321NEO ordered with 125, options.

The Max 900 appears to have about 418 of its type ordered (per wikidata) narrowing the A321 gap over the 737-900 Max.

Boeing Data with far right column data from Wikipedia

Wiki Data: NG Tally for the 737.

Final Chart: NG Queue



As of February 27, 2016: Subject to change upon new orders and completed deliveries.

Note: 737-900 began in 1997 with orders while the A321 started in 1993. The A321 had a four year lead over the 737-900 when it announced in 1997. The Airbus A321NEO was announced in 2012 causing  a 19 year churning for older models and ordering for the latest A321NEO in numbers. A strong consideration for Boeing's catch-up challenge when it announced the 737-900-MAX later during 2013. It is no wonder why the A320-321NEO order gap exists over the Max. The A321 was ready for fleet renewal in Airbus' fleet offering to its customers. Boeing only has an eight years of aging inventory churning up for its recently offered 737-900 Max.

Paragon, The Next Boeing Renaissance

Taking all things considered, Boeing will build the next great project. It's not a rejuvenation project as found with the 737 MAX and 777X. But it becomes the sum of all Boeing's innovations. The Max is a highly advanced derivative of the 737 NG. The 777X is another highly advanced derivative of the 777-300ER. Boeing has yet to build an all new replacement for the 757. Many times Winging It has proposed the notion for a 757 replacement filling a gaping hole in its lineup of aircraft.

This time Boeing will lay all its cards on the table with a composition of innovations from all things learned during the last decade and perfected in this current decade. The "next" will be built in the next decade starting in 2020 moving forward. Boeing has better technology than Airbus can even develop in the next 10 years. While Airbus' main selling point is building more space for passengers in which to inhabit than Boeing has done by only inches. Airbus turns those inches into sounding like feet that have been added for the passenger.

Boeing has collected an astounding number of proprietary innovations of which Airbus could not touch or replicate. Though most innovations seem to cater towards an airline customer's operations, many of its innovations surround the passenger experience. The lessons from these advancements can build the next all-new aircraft type.

Having 787 technology on all Boeing types is the payback going forward. The $28.5 billion deferred cost bucket will pay forward and spread throughout the Boeing family. The 787 brought forward an all-electric core technology which most have forgotten about in the world of travel. The 787 technology has brought to the market better air for the passengers. It gave a relative flight altitude of 6,000 feet for its passengers while sitting in the cabin flying at 41,000 feet.

People can't stop talking about those windows and its shades. In fact the shade technology has improved as expected from the beginning, by completely darkening the horizon as black during the brightest sunlight days. Not all 787's will have the latest shade technology windows installed as it is just emerging from the lab. However, during the next five years as time and costs will allow an airline, the opportunity for window shade treatment enhancements is available. Say goodbye to pull down window slates.

The cabin lights are an advanced use for LED lighting mated with computer programming which can give you sunsets and mood changes during a flight. Even though competitors can affect a change for lighting Boeing lead the way effecting a passenger's flight experience. 

Boeing once proposed a 787-300. It was to be the gap filler for the 757 which the market wasn't ready to accept as mid-wide-bodies was a bigger gap. The wide body market had to fill the airspace first before demand for a "gap filler" would make a wave. Airbus saw an opportunity as Boeing resources were committed to the wide body effort. Then came forward with an A321 NEO, built on Airbus' lagging technology. An old adage is "Not so fast my friend" is where Boeing is today. There is a distinct gap to be filled or Boeing ends up with having an underdeveloped market. Boeing will clean up its march to market supremacy by taking the sum of its innovations, and cashing in those development cost it had won during its proprietary renaissance of the first decade of the 21st century. 

The paragon cost $28.5 billion and it will push the next great Boeing aircraft. 

Boeing's 787 Has Become A Cash Positive Cow

The 787 has a long history of costs, development setbacks and glitching. Those principal contributors have been set into one big pot called deferred costs. The pot is the scraps on the production floor which account for about $28 Billion not yet paid for in the program. The good news is Boeing has turned the long sought for corner where each 787 delivered starts paying for the $28 Billion scrap heap of program expenses.

Seeking Alpha Quote: "The biggest thing that Boeing has going for it is its technical superiority over Airbus (OTCPK:EADSY) that was developed on the 787 and will be used on future aircraft. The 787 plane is opening new direct point to point routes each month with the latest being Dubai to Panama city in 17:35 hours."

An important statement coming from financial heads concerning aviation. Boeing is turning on the 787 production engine of surplus cash. Each 787 forward from December 2015 contributes to the reduction of deferred costs from the program. In accounting its called a "Contribution Margin"(CM). The CM is used in breakeven formulation. Accounting heads look at variable cost, fixed cost and Contribution margins in order to find when the next unit produced will finally make a profit. The CM is used to pay down the 787 deferred cost of $28.5 Billion.

The next question comes from determining how many units are needed from this point forward in order  to reach a profit. Some have affixed 1300 787 are needed for that to occur. If true then Boeing needs to deliver another 1,000 787s. The have about 771 in backlog. However, going forward to be built would require another 300 gross numbers or so of 787 orders in order to make a profit based on price book numbers.

The good news is they have about five years to get it done! The order book will increase by 300 in about five years assuring the 787 program will be profitable. This indicates a stock buy from this point until large orders may occur. Any large orders place will make a Boeing stock more valuable in the future, and for Stock investors it is worthy to monitor the order book in light of the booked orders measured against a unit break-even point. Making the deferred cost no longer an item of concern. 

Spice, Jets, and Everything Nice

SpiceJet has a quandary. It needs builder's delivery slots on its time and it can't wait in line. The suitors banging at its door have a problem. One has already promised 4,500 NEO's the other is up to its eyebrows with 3,000 Max. The manufacturer can promise almost anything, but on SpiceJet's time, it's a false patronization from the suitor's.

Late to the party is how late SpiceJet must consider in its own demise. An important decision, indeed. What manufacturer best suits SpiceJet's latest interest in a build date is the problem? Will a SpiceJet dither will cause its Spice to wither while in waiting. How big a deal is the tease for either manufacturer, its $11 Billion big, and coming with bragging rights? It is not a matter who has the best Single Aisle, more than it's a matter for SpiceJet’s operational needs. It needs Single Aisle to arrive on-time. They are waiting for build slots for its own time before choosing.

An interesting conundrum for the framers. Is SpiceJet using the leverage of time of delivery for the deal making instead of a low ball price factor? The answer is not so simple as usual. Time and price are ranked one and two in the sequence of priorities. SpiceJet’s identified need for its growth is running up against a due date of delivery. It maybe, has identified a lull in ordering for both makers which will only last at most for sixty days. Every two months something happens with one or the other framers for adding more orders. The longer SpiceJet waits, the further opportunity pushes back for its fleet renovation and expansion. If SpiceJet had the financial chops pushing forward its expansion, SpiceJet might worry the framers into going lowball and promise a delivery moon, when it can't deliver an exact time for all its prior 7,500 collective orders.

It seems like SpiceJet is causing its own dilemma in this matter and may lose a window of opportunity before deciding on committing to an $11 Billion order for Single Aisle. Having a point number three, not mentioned earlier is the customer, after-all customers are kind of pointless in India. 

I almost forgot: With whom will win the order with SpiceJet's need? 

That answer comes from who has the most slots available for SpiceJet. A guess naturally comes from the 3,000 backlog of Boeing's Max.

Reference Article: Airbus or Boeing: $11 Billion Dollar Deal Rests On Timeliness

The NEO Two Engine Proposal Is Noodling

The A321 and the A320 have two new engine concepts. The Pratt & Whitney geared version and the CFM offering. It delivered the P&W geared version first with some engine hiccups causing a late delivery for the NEO's much vaunted arrival. The A320NEO delivered with diminished Airbus fanfare. It wasn't an auspicious occasion for any Airbus delivery.

 

Now it is moving the CFM version to the forefront of testing and delivery schedules as the PW steeps longer in testing. Even though the PW version has some entry into service engine issues, the indication from operations is for the CFM being pushed forward sooner rather than later. 

The CFM Boeing version stole the 737 Max First Flight Show! Airbus then announces the CFM is coming forward in its NEO progression. This is an interesting development coming from Airbus.

Many interpretations come into view with this change:

·      The PW has more engine reliability and performance issues in front of it.

·      The Boeing/CFM demonstration has captured Market interest

·      The PW problems are bigger than what has been reported

·      The MAX test flight was an outstanding result coming forward from Aviation Intelligence

·      The NEO program is more vulnerable than what has been reported

If this is all wishful thinking on my part, then Airbus is pleased with everything and is allowing PW more time becoming a happy thought, and CFM is a good neighbor on the project. Airbus hedged its bet having a dual engine offering. Boeing has four decades of experience with the CFM engine and trusts its maker. The rumor is the CFM Leap 1-B is a great engine surpassing the Airbus Leap 1-A.

Why this could be true is from the design aspect of the 737 MAX. More power is confined in a smaller space offering greater challenges for Boeing's version. CFM had to rely upon its 40 year old partnership with Boeing to get it right. The ceramic fan blades on the Leap 1-B is not on the Leap 1-A. The ceramic engine infusion is proprietary. The Boeing design team had to fit the Leap 1-B on its wing for optimal effect. Since the smaller diameter provided less efficiency, it needed to make up the inefficiency factors with better aero design surrounding the engine placement. 

The synergy comes from both Boeing and CFM. The Max had to be built for one engine and one engine only, in a concert of optimization from body and engine maker. 

The Airbus offering went with a basic airframe design able to accept two different engine versions. It could not have two different body enhancements for optimization for different engine makers.

Airbus had to have a vanilla approach because of two different engine options offering customers a variety of engine choices. One airplane design does not always fit all engine types. 

Boeing was all-in with the CFM when it was drawing up its MAX design. They worked with CFM sculpting and moving power around here and there for optimal performance. Wing trim was added to play off the CFM engine. Body design was for maximizing the 68" diameter and its "hotter" engine.

The Max was built for the CFM offering and CFM worked with Boeing to get it right. After-all every 737 airplane today flies with a CFM and this company knew its future hinged on working with Boeing for getting it right.

Therein lies the problem with Airbus' dual engine option. They, the engine makers, are not all-in with the NEO design, when Airbus has contracted two makers for powering the NEO. It has not demonstrated its commitment to either maker by switching engine production after P&W is slow coming off the production, and has "some" issues to iron out as Airbus calls forward the Leap-A for the big dance.

Airbus has just blinked as it straps on another engine to the same Airbus Body, which is already powered by P&W geared turbine. Bring on the CFM for Airbus, the MAX has just flown the coop. It was marvelous. 

How is this different for the 787 with two engine options and the 777 with one engine option? A good question in light of what has been stated above.

The answer is fairly simple, Boeing was going for a moon-shot with the 787 and it fully did not have its arms around the 787. It needed both world leading engine makers for this moon-shot. The 787 design was not going to change just to fit an engine. The engine had to fit the frame coming from the engine maker. It needed to fly as is within the new design constructs when Boeing did not know how it would perform. The caveat is Boeing could not change an experimental airframe design and materials until it knew what it had. Now both GE and Rolls Royce fly the 787 family.

The 777 family of aircraft was built to be powered by the GE-90 as a joint venture. Boeing knew its aircraft family has a propensity for a one engine per model philosophy. The exception was the all-new 787. Boeing needed an engine for competition with a new concept and for its customers preference.

The Airbus NEO is not a moon-shot, yet it hasn’t found its engine yet. The MAX already knows what works extremely well for Boeing and it will continue forward as the Airbus nuts fall not far from the tree. CFM and the MAX is the Boeing product offering for forty plus years.

Reference Article: Airbus Switches Engine Type for First A321neo Flight

Scrapbook Feature-Seattle Times-Dominic Gates

The 777X wing production is not your uncle’s wing plant found in Japan. This is a home brewed concoction which is reminiscent of your grand-pa's innovative acumen found during the industrial age from the early 20th century. Automation meets high powered computers with finally tooled machining from Mukilteo, Wa. How American is that?

Dominic gates presents: The 777X Wing in just one piece, I am referring to the article itself, but one piece is an apply considered statement for the Star Wars version of "The Attack of The Machines", via Everett, Washington Wing plant as part of the 777X production facility. Boeing looks to tug 777X wings over several hundred feet between buildings entering the 777X production floor starting by year's end.  

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Massive, speedy robots ready to build composite wings for Boeing 777X

Important: Use the "Red Headline link” above in order to watch the amazing video and original article.

To fabricate the composite parts of the giant wings of Boeing’s 777X, Mukilteo-based engineering firm Electroimpact has designed and built a new generation of robotic machines that haven’t been previously shown to outsiders.

By Dominic Gates 

Seattle Times aerospace reporter

Inside a new building just west of Paine Field in Everett, a team of young engineers recently gave outsiders the first glimpse at a technological advance critical to the future of airplane making in the Puget Sound region.

Robotic heads zipped along at great speed, whirling and repositioning at the end of each run, as their business end — which glowed like a line of fire — laid down thin strips of carbon fiber infused with epoxy resin.

The manufacturing machines giving this dazzling performance, designed and built by Mukilteo-based Electroimpact, will be used to fabricate the giant composite wings of Boeing’s next jet, the 777X.

Electroimpact:

What it makes: State-of-the-art automation used by aerospace manufacturers to fabricate parts and assemble aircraft.

Founded: By Peter Zieve in 1986

Headquarters: Mukilteo

Employees: About 650 in the U.S., with 125 more in the U.K. and a small presence in China, Brazil and Australia

2015 revenue: Approximately $250 million

Think of these machines as 30-foot-tall, 3-D printers, each costing tens of millions of dollars.

Machines have been making composite parts for several years, Electroimpact project manager Todd Rudberg said his team’s machines take the technology’s speed, scale and precision to whole new levels.

“ And we have data to back that up,” he said with clear delight. “I have two of the world’s best machines running at the same time in my building. This is awesome.”

Precisely placing layer upon layer of carbon-fiber strips infused with epoxy resin, one of these so-called Automated Fiber Placement (AFP) machines builds up the 777X’s composite wing skin, producing a single piece 110 feet long and 20 feet across at the widest end near the fuselage.

The second AFP machine does something more complex: It lays the carbon-fiber strips down on a surface that has two 90-degree angles to make a U-shaped structural beam for the wing, called a spar, again in a single piece.

The precise contouring made possible by this composite manufacturing technology is what allows Boeing’s engineers to design newly slender and aerodynamically perfect wings.

Electroimpact has already delivered the first AFP spar machine to Boeing’s new composite-wing center, which is nearing completion just across Paine Field.

Thanks to Electroimpact’s location, the machine was loaded onto an oversize trailer and had to travel only a couple hundred yards of public road to reach the airfield.

Next summer, Boeing will start using the machines to manufacture wing skins and spars for 777X development and production.

Making the skins and spars of such a giant wing in single full-length pieces is new. It should reduce the cost of manufacturing and save some weight because there are no joins.

Using a wholly different method, the composite wing spar of the 787 is made in three sections by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan.

In the U.K., Airbus supplier GKN uses AFP machines to fabricate the spars of the A350 wing, also in three sections.

To protect Boeing’s competitive advantage with the new equipment, Electroimpact has assigned the proprietary intellectual property on the 777X machine heads to the jet maker.

So though Electroimpact will certainly sell future AFP machines to rival plane makers, the key technology in these machines will be exclusive to Boeing.

For initial, low-rate production, Boeing will need just two of each machine. But at peak production sometime in the 2020s, there could be half a dozen or more of each lined up inside the vast 777X wing facility.

Lead process engineer Chris Kingsley, front, and control engineer Kyle Walker work the controls for the Automated Fiber Placement machine making 777X test wing spars. (Mike Siegel/The Seattle Times)

Hypnotic dance

Suspended delicately from a 42-foot-wide gantry, the 1.7-ton robotic head of the wing-skin AFP machine zips back and forth across a contoured horizontal surface, laying down the strips of carbon-fiber tape, each pass building another layer of material.

Where the machine head lightly touches the surface it’s building up, a glowing heating element at the tip makes the substrate tacky so the next layer will stick more easily.

As this hypnotic dance unfolds, the machine head dispenses the tape simultaneously from 20 large spools that resemble movie reels, covering a 30-inch-wide swath with each pass.

The only sound is the light ticking of pneumatic actuators as the head shifts to lay the tape down at another angle or ends a pass and cuts the tape off at the correct length.

The wing-spar AFP machine’s half-ton robotic head lays down thinner, half-inch strips of carbon-fiber tape from 16 large bobbins that allow the tape to shift as needed when the head zips over the edge of the spar with nary a pause.

Each wing has front and rear spars, long curved structural beams along the leading and trailing edges.

(The 777X wing’s 11-foot folding wingtip is a separate structure, which will be built by Boeing in St. Louis and sent to Everett for assembly.)

The machine can lay down a full lengthwise layer along the spar in approximately 10 minutes. Dispensing another layer with strips traversing the spar at an angle can be done in about 25 minutes.

Minimum downtime

Once the AFP machines are up and running to produce wing parts, Boeing will operate them continuously for as much of the day or night as needed to support its production rate.

Downtime must be minimized.

On current AFP machines, minutely inspecting the parts for defects while the machine is stopped takes as much time as laying down the material.

Brock Jahner, 29, lead engineer on the wing-skin AFP head, said one piece of the “neat new technology we’ve been able to build in designing all this new hardware” is an integrated self-inspection system.

The machine takes measurements as the carbon-fiber strips are laid down and will alert the operators if a strip is missing or misaligned in any section.

Then lasers overhead will shine a green outline around the patch that requires attention, so the operators can quickly determine if they need to take off those plies and redo it.

Also to enhance productivity, Electroimpact has built a head-changing station beside the machine, so that when the spools of carbon-fiber tape have unwound completely, a fresh head is waiting and can be switched out for the old one in less than two minutes.

Electroimpact is already a world leader in drilling, fastening and automated assembly equipment.

It has supplied major tooling systems that assemble the wings of all Airbus aircraft.

Bombardier uses Electroimpact-designed final-assembly lines for its business jets and a wing-assembly line for its CSeries jet.

Electroimpact also provides tooling to Embraer for the wings of its KC-390, a military transport.

In Renton, it provided the latest technology to automate the drilling and fastening of the 737 wing panels, a key part of that plant’s acceleration of production.

AFP machines are its newest endeavor, and the 777X work vaults the company into the front rank of that technology.

Control engineers Brad Davis, left, and Kyle Walker check the placement of carbon fiber by the machine that is making test wing spars for the Boeing 777X. The machine will alert operators of a missing or misaligned carbon-fiber strip. (Mike Siegel/The Seattle Times)

Young and smart

Between 80 and 100 electrical, mechanical and software engineers — strikingly young, as a rule — worked on the 777X wing project at peak. With the design now complete and the project in the testing phase, about half that number are still working on it.

Of a small group of engineers clustered around their computers next to the spar machine on a recent day, four were between ages 23 and 25. The fifth, Chris Kingsley, lead process engineer on the spar AFP machine, is a relatively grizzled veteran of 28.

At Electroimpact just a couple years, Kingsley previously served in the Peace Corps in Panama as a water and sanitation engineer.

As that background suggests, Electroimpact attracts engineers who are not only smart but also open to new challenges.

Justin Nielson, 33, the lead engineer in designing the AFP wing-skin machine structure, has been at Electroimpact for eight years and before that spent a couple of years as an airframe stress analyst at Boeing.

The job of an engineer differs between the two workplaces, he said.

At Boeing, an engineer works on one small piece of a massive airplane project.

At Electroimpact, an engineer must integrate his piece into the whole and get out on the shop floor with the rest of the team to build the entire piece of equipment.

Together, they then must test it, debug it, get it working smoothly and install it wherever it’s going.

1 of 6 Engineers Cameron Gillespie, left, and Andy Stulc examine the head of an Automated Fiber Placement machine made by Electroimpact. (Mike Siegel/The Seattle Times)