... Is a study with two different strategic projects for commercial airlines both predicated on the costs of airline fuel. The first goes 9,000 miles with 234 passengers on a 787-9 and the second carrier will go 3,00 miles with 330 passengers on a 787-10. The strategies use a combination of ticket prices and fuel efficiency for its respective bottom lines.
Boeing proposes a name your proposition with the 787-10 and Singapore Airlines proposes 49 787-10's for traversing Asia or Africa with one take-off from Singapore. If going far on a 787-9 with 234 passengers the ticket will go North of $2,000 per seat. If going near-by with 330 seats on a 787-10 the ticket price may go South of $500. Multiply those seat prices at estimated ticket value times the seats and a revenue flight will look like these results. 234 Seats x's $2,200 = $234,000 and 330 seats x's $500 seats = $165,000.
The seat mile 787-9 revenue factor would look like this: 234/9,000= .106 and the seat/mile 787-10 revenue factor would be 330/3000 = .111. As you see both have a similar revenue factors but the 787-10 to Osaka burns significantly less fuel and will gain a larger profit potential with this strategy.
Singapore Airlines has ordered 49 787-10's for its fleet. Draw a 5,000 mile circle around Singapore and see the high density city pairings found with its higher performing seat/mile machine.
Over half of Earth's population is within range of Singapore's' 787-10 fleet and that's a big number. This includes India, China and even into Africa. The 5,000 mile circle is immense and that is why Singapore bought the 787-10 in a large quantity. The 787-10 can fly another 1,500 miles than the 5,000 miles in this example. The world is watching to see what happens when Singapore launches its 787-10's, especially the middle eastern air force of Emirates, Qatar and Etihad. Why buy a 787-9 Singapore? when they could buy Boeing in ten years flying its 787-10's flying over half the world's people.
Friday, March 16, 2018
Tuesday, March 13, 2018
Boeing Post 1,300 Since September 2012 Jon Ostrower
I never thought I'd reach 1,300 posts back in 2012. Never thought I would live so long either. It’s good to see Jon Ostrower blogging again since he is my inspiration from the beginning. He held a supremely well insightful Blog on the 787, back in the heady days of announced miracles in manufacturing as Boeing stumbled its way towards its 787 Moonshot. He showed how it would come together as it happened. This blog is a feeble attempt of mimicking his own pursuit of the elusive 787 program. The inside information obtained during those days reflected Jon's own talent for piecing together this airplane. Now that the 787 program sees the financial light at the end of the tunnel, Jon has returned to his roots of blogging for I am guessing, "a little while". He has graced the Wall Street Journal with his insight and most recently CNN at it has turned its big business eye towards its own purpose and left Jon aside but as he indicated his love for aviation and big ideas is close by. The Blog Site link is Jon Ostrower.com.
Jon Ostrower
Whether he reads this tribute is not important as we are ships passing in the night sky with asymmetrical blinking from wing tips flying by each other. The important point is to follow his blog because his valued lessons learned in the aviation business transcends all continents at the head of the aviation pack. He refers to Mary Kirby at "Runway Girl" as one who supported his trajectory as he aspired in the aviation news industry. When someone has that "it" factor you know it. For this 1,300th blog, I will dedicate this simple contribution to his budding family and his care for them. I can't wait to hear from him as the 777X program unfolds and the 797 takes off. Of course, the 737 will be remade after the 797 sells another 2,000 units to happy customers. I may not be around for those events, but I am counting on Jon Ostrower to lead the way for all other dreamers who dare to dream skyward.
Boeing Orders 2018 Including February
The additions include 14-787-8F's and 4-767 for UPS. There where another 10 737's of which two where Identified as TUI Travel. It appears unidentified customer(s) converted from NG to Max for 7 frames, In total, a net of 34 airplanes are booked YTD for Boeing Co.
Note: not included where the 25 firmed 787-9's ordered by Turkish Airlines this March.
Note: not included where the 25 firmed 787-9's ordered by Turkish Airlines this March.
Monday, March 12, 2018
Jon Ostrower's 797
When those in the "know
weigh-in it becomes time to speculate with some knowledgeable wisdom or just
some Wild A. Guessing. Winging IT talks about what Jon Ostrower surmises.
The 797 rendering is a logical procession in its advanced technology. Boeing will use what it uses best, its own stuff.
The 797 Renderings BY: Jon Ostrower on his welcome back blog. Please link to John's blog as he will soon become a valued contributor at another aviation site. This is a great opportunity for aviation fans following a knowledgeable contributor.
So, what might Boeing’s ‘Atlantic Fragmenter’ become?
Jon Ostrower's photo of:
Ostrower recognizes a 767 front snout and windows, a 787 like body composite and wings and a 737 tail cone. The oval is not dead! It is a plausible concept attracting all 767 fans and 787 aficionados.
Saturday, March 10, 2018
The 797 Cargo Conundrum
China wants cargo space when Boeing designed passenger space using an oval shape allowing a wide cabin for 250 passengers. China wants a Swiss Army knife style that hauls both passengers and freight at the same time. Boeing customers, such as Delta, want passengers for its 797. The China market is the fastest growing region of untapped commerce on the planet at this time. Both Delta and United are fickle for future airplane sales. Airbus is looking for a market stopping answer to Boeing's 797 proposals. If Boeing goes passenger in an oval shape then Airbus will go to a traditional body circle for its designs thus allowing both freight and passenger service for its potential customers in China.
The conundrum is for Boeing, not Airbus. Boeing could re-engine the 767 for freight and for its passengers hoping to snag a large Chinese order. That risk is too much for Boeing's canceled 767 passenger program. Boeing will not make two different 797 models, one for passengers only and another for passengers with a freight capacity. There is no solution for Boeing, in this case, it will build the passenger oval 797 hoping for at least two thousand orders while leaving the Asian market to an A-330 NEO like Airbus offering. Building a 787 light version for the 797 program is not advisable or should be considered unless copious numbers of orders exist for a 787 light version.
Boeing has the orders for a 797 start, but the number is way short of where it sees its financial targets before announcing. It probably has about 400 797 promises at this time but it would have to reach a thousand units committed before going all in on a 797 flying oval. It needs China in its battle with Airbus, Airbus needs China to save its widebody bottom end of the A-330/350 family. An A-360 or whatever is on the horizon from Airbus. The 797 was supposed to be a killer shot plugging the A-321 NEO. Instead, the game of aviation leapfrog will continue for both makers trading off model against the model for years to come.
A concluding sentiment is for Boeing. Build the 797 flying oval and well above its competition capability, Airbus. China does need to move passengers at this segment in time. The option for freight service by the 767 (i.e. FedEx, UPS) is well established.
China's freight needs will outgrow dual passenger level freight services almost immediately, and any other dual threat airplanes hauling both passengers and freight at the same time which will not serve its greater market but will only serve only in niche regions. The Gap airplane is not meant as a panacea for moving stuff but is meant for moving passengers up to 5,000 miles.
The conundrum is for Boeing, not Airbus. Boeing could re-engine the 767 for freight and for its passengers hoping to snag a large Chinese order. That risk is too much for Boeing's canceled 767 passenger program. Boeing will not make two different 797 models, one for passengers only and another for passengers with a freight capacity. There is no solution for Boeing, in this case, it will build the passenger oval 797 hoping for at least two thousand orders while leaving the Asian market to an A-330 NEO like Airbus offering. Building a 787 light version for the 797 program is not advisable or should be considered unless copious numbers of orders exist for a 787 light version.
Extreme Oval Design With Freight
Russia's version came before the 797 concepts: Pictured below.
Boeing has the orders for a 797 start, but the number is way short of where it sees its financial targets before announcing. It probably has about 400 797 promises at this time but it would have to reach a thousand units committed before going all in on a 797 flying oval. It needs China in its battle with Airbus, Airbus needs China to save its widebody bottom end of the A-330/350 family. An A-360 or whatever is on the horizon from Airbus. The 797 was supposed to be a killer shot plugging the A-321 NEO. Instead, the game of aviation leapfrog will continue for both makers trading off model against the model for years to come.
A concluding sentiment is for Boeing. Build the 797 flying oval and well above its competition capability, Airbus. China does need to move passengers at this segment in time. The option for freight service by the 767 (i.e. FedEx, UPS) is well established.
China's freight needs will outgrow dual passenger level freight services almost immediately, and any other dual threat airplanes hauling both passengers and freight at the same time which will not serve its greater market but will only serve only in niche regions. The Gap airplane is not meant as a panacea for moving stuff but is meant for moving passengers up to 5,000 miles.
Tuesday, March 6, 2018
How Big Is Boeing's Hawaiian Airlines Ticket Announcement BIG!!
Its only for 10 787-9's for $2.82 Billion
Currently:
"Hawaiian currently operates a mainline fleet of 54 aircraft: 24 Airbus A330-200 and 8 Boeing 767 wide-body aircraft, 2 A321neo and 20 717 narrow-body aircraft. The company selected the 787-9 as part of a competitive bid process that also included the Airbus A330-900. "
But:
Hawaiian has long held a preference for Airbus product over Boeing as it expanded its fleet with 24, A330 aircraft. They had a penchant for old equipment so the Max aircraft would be a natural replacement for its older narrow-bodied aircraft. The importance of the 787-9 order with Hawaiian makes this a BIG get for Boeing as the North American carrier blinked at a fleet opportunity change for Boeing product. Hawaiian has a history of holding onto equipment for a long time such as its 20 717 narrow body aircraft.
Expect some kind of heated competition for a narrow body order with both Airbus and Boeing bidding over the next few years. So far Airbus has 16 A-320 on order with Airbus. Hawaii is an American Iconic destination for world travelers and the advertising potential for an airplane product is almost limitless. Boeing has gained a significant toehold on this Island paradise with this widebody order. It only has to crack into Delta's fleet in a bigger way. This is a Big Boeing Bash for its 787 family of aircraft even though its order for 10 seems small compared with other airshow type orders.
Boeing 787-9 "Dreamliner" to Join Hawaiian Airlines Fleet
Currently:
"Hawaiian currently operates a mainline fleet of 54 aircraft: 24 Airbus A330-200 and 8 Boeing 767 wide-body aircraft, 2 A321neo and 20 717 narrow-body aircraft. The company selected the 787-9 as part of a competitive bid process that also included the Airbus A330-900. "
But:
Hawaiian has long held a preference for Airbus product over Boeing as it expanded its fleet with 24, A330 aircraft. They had a penchant for old equipment so the Max aircraft would be a natural replacement for its older narrow-bodied aircraft. The importance of the 787-9 order with Hawaiian makes this a BIG get for Boeing as the North American carrier blinked at a fleet opportunity change for Boeing product. Hawaiian has a history of holding onto equipment for a long time such as its 20 717 narrow body aircraft.
Expect some kind of heated competition for a narrow body order with both Airbus and Boeing bidding over the next few years. So far Airbus has 16 A-320 on order with Airbus. Hawaii is an American Iconic destination for world travelers and the advertising potential for an airplane product is almost limitless. Boeing has gained a significant toehold on this Island paradise with this widebody order. It only has to crack into Delta's fleet in a bigger way. This is a Big Boeing Bash for its 787 family of aircraft even though its order for 10 seems small compared with other airshow type orders.
Hawaiian Airlines 787 photo imagery
Monday, March 5, 2018
Three Horse Engine Race For The 797
The closer the 797 becomes a reality the closer an engine maker(s) emerge. The three top contenders will be a GE sponsored product (CFN), P&W redo from the A320-NEO world and finally Rolls Royce picking up where it left off with the 787 program competition. Boeing will not go the single-engine type route it did with its 737. The 797 airplane stance will allow any configured engine a maker could think of at this time. However, the matter could become a three-engine choice for customers.
CFN exclusively makes the 737 oval shaped engine because the low slung 737 wings only allows for a wedged in CFN from yonder days from the early 737 design screens. Other engine makers would not try for a Boeing 737 engine acceptance as it would cost them too much for an attempt at having no certain outcome. Boeing has now positioned itself to accept all attempts for an engine mounting just so its airplane buying customers are happy with superior engine performance. Boeing expects an initial order book of 2,000-4,000 797's and will bear the brunt of developing new airplane risks along the way.
The 787 program dug a 31 billion money pit as it trialed and error its way during the 2011-2015 787 time period. It will deliver a 787-10 this month with Singapore Airlines. Boeing may never or will probably retire the money pit by the 1400th model ordered. It now has an order book of 1,294 787's ordered which is short of the 1,400 unit block Boeing requires for extinguishing its deferred cost account. That account stands at or about 25 billion at this time. The deferred cost set aside allows Boeing a profit margin for each 787 delivered and thus reducing the deferred cost balance when delivering one 787. It thinks by unit 1,400 delivered. its 25 billion costs will evaporate. It will probably have to go farther in units delivered when it aspires for a zero balance.
The 797 is a big risk based on experience with the 787 program. However, Boeing became profit-addicted with its prior programs since the 737 through the 777. The 797 show a promise of profit and the high ground over its competitor. Airbus will answer Boeing's 797 attempts by various means such as its A-330 NEO or A321 NEO rendition. But history suggests those who are second to market never seem to capture the market high ground. Boeing can and will adjust later its 797 model according to how the market reacts. Otherwise, keeping the Boeing boot on the Airbus neck.
Back to engines and the 797. Its a big risk for the big three engine makers mentioned above. The question asked is how lucrative would a 4,000 engine market be split among the big three. The answer comes down to a big two answer where a European engine maker and a Western engine maker become the engine suppliers. Gear drove vs classic turbofan and so forth. The engines are the problem, not the 797 concepts. The latter is already finished. Boeing is waiting for big engine makers stepping forward with a reliable proposal for saving fuel for its Boeing's customers.
CFN exclusively makes the 737 oval shaped engine because the low slung 737 wings only allows for a wedged in CFN from yonder days from the early 737 design screens. Other engine makers would not try for a Boeing 737 engine acceptance as it would cost them too much for an attempt at having no certain outcome. Boeing has now positioned itself to accept all attempts for an engine mounting just so its airplane buying customers are happy with superior engine performance. Boeing expects an initial order book of 2,000-4,000 797's and will bear the brunt of developing new airplane risks along the way.
The 787 program dug a 31 billion money pit as it trialed and error its way during the 2011-2015 787 time period. It will deliver a 787-10 this month with Singapore Airlines. Boeing may never or will probably retire the money pit by the 1400th model ordered. It now has an order book of 1,294 787's ordered which is short of the 1,400 unit block Boeing requires for extinguishing its deferred cost account. That account stands at or about 25 billion at this time. The deferred cost set aside allows Boeing a profit margin for each 787 delivered and thus reducing the deferred cost balance when delivering one 787. It thinks by unit 1,400 delivered. its 25 billion costs will evaporate. It will probably have to go farther in units delivered when it aspires for a zero balance.
The 797 is a big risk based on experience with the 787 program. However, Boeing became profit-addicted with its prior programs since the 737 through the 777. The 797 show a promise of profit and the high ground over its competitor. Airbus will answer Boeing's 797 attempts by various means such as its A-330 NEO or A321 NEO rendition. But history suggests those who are second to market never seem to capture the market high ground. Boeing can and will adjust later its 797 model according to how the market reacts. Otherwise, keeping the Boeing boot on the Airbus neck.
Back to engines and the 797. Its a big risk for the big three engine makers mentioned above. The question asked is how lucrative would a 4,000 engine market be split among the big three. The answer comes down to a big two answer where a European engine maker and a Western engine maker become the engine suppliers. Gear drove vs classic turbofan and so forth. The engines are the problem, not the 797 concepts. The latter is already finished. Boeing is waiting for big engine makers stepping forward with a reliable proposal for saving fuel for its Boeing's customers.
Sunday, March 4, 2018
787-10 Is A Master Piece For Emirates
Below: is a copied article (excellent Boeing 101 class on the 787-10) which explains why the 787-10 beat the A-350 in a deal made with Boeing and Emirates late last year. It has yet to be booked by Boeing until all "deal" details are finalized. Probably during 2018.
November 15, 2017
Why did Emirates choose Boeing’s 787-10?
By Bjorn Fehrm
November 15, 2017, © Leeham Co.: Emirates Airlines (Emirates) has finally decided which aircraft shall complement their long-range Boeing 777 and Airbus A380. The decision coming at this year’s Dubai Air Show was more surprising than the choice, Boeing’s 787-10.
We have already written about the Emirates selection. Now we go through in more detail, why the choice should surprise no-one.
Boeing’s 787-10 compared to Airbus’ A350-900
Many write that the choice was about a medium-range aircraft versus a long-range model. This is part of the answer but it’s not the whole answer. The full answer is more involved. It’s equally about a more tightly packaged aircraft versus a more spacious one.
We will go through the key differences that decided which aircraft was the most suitable for Emirates need. In a second article tomorrow, we will quantify each difference and show how key choices for the aircraft series, many which had little to do with medium versus long range, finally add up to the differences in performance and economics that swung the choice.
Fuselage
At the base for the difference between the aircraft stands the choice of fuselage cross section. The fuselage cross-section decides the width of the cabin, but it also sets the weight and drag of the fuselage.
The weight of an airliner’s fuselage is dictated by the outer surface area of the fuselage. The reason is aircraft fuselages are “stressed skin” constructions since World War 2. “Stressed skin” construction means the fuselage skin carries the loads, stiffened to not buckle by vertical frames and horizontal longerons (the longitudinal profiles attached to the skin, also called stringers).
Weight
Aircraft certification rules result in, fuselages designed with the same technology and the same dimensions, end up weighing the same.
This means: more fuselage surface area, more weight.
If we now return to the 787-10 compared with the A350-900, we have a difference in fuselage dimensions. The 787-fuselage width is 5.77m with 5.97m height. The A350 fuselage has the dimensions 5.96m wide and 6.09m high.
This means the surface area of the 787 fuselage is 2.5% less for each unit length of the fuselage. One would think it would stay with this difference if both fuselages are of equal cabin length. It doesn’t.
If your fuselage diameter is larger, your nose and tail areas grow. For aerodynamic reasons you only taper your nose and tail at a certain rate. Larger diameter, therefore, means longer nose and tail. And this means more fuselage surface area. Airbus is now proposing to use the A350’s longer tail to house further cabin items.
Drag
Now onto the drag of the fuselage. A larger diameter fuselage has a higher drag. It’s not the drag that comes first to mind, the frontal area or pressure drag (which is insignificant for a modern airliner).
The dominant drag of an airliner at cruise is skin friction drag. Skin friction drag comes from the air rubbing the aircraft’s skin. So, more fuselage skin, more drag.
Observe that we have not yet talked about medium or long range. We just discuss the consequences of the A350 cabin being wider and therefore more comfortable for economy passengers. It results in differences, which are significant.
The rest of the aircraft
We now continue with the other components of the aircraft. If your fuselage weighs more, you need a larger wing and stronger engines for the same operational performance. A larger wing and engines, in turn, demands larger tail surfaces (with the same length fuselage).
The end effect is, the aircraft with the more spacious fuselage will, for the same passenger capacity, have a higher empty weight and higher drag.
This is true when everything else is equal. One could argue it’s not between the 787 and A350.
If we exclude the range difference, I would argue things are equal. The 787 and A350 are very similar in their build techniques.
Over my years of analyzing aircraft, I can find no difference between aircraft because one uses barrel based carbon composite fuselage sections and the other panel based sections.
And there seems to be a minimal operational difference between the more electrical system architecture of the 787 versus the conventional system architecture of the A350.
The builds of the wings are also similar. Both have high aspect ratio composite wings (their aspect ratios are within 1% of each other) with wing shape tailoring at cruise via movable spoilers/flaps. And both employ Fly-By-Wire load alleviation.
The differences from the fuselage packaging are by a wide margin more important than the differences in composite build or other techniques for the aircraft.
Medium range versus Long range
Up to this point, we have not discussed the consequences of designing an aircraft for medium range (we call 6,400nm medium range in this discussion) and another long range.
The difference is, the longer-range aircraft needs to take off with more fuel on board. So, if the aircraft carry the same payload, we have a higher empty weight (to hold the heavier fuel load) and higher Take-Off Weight (TOW, = empty weight + payload + fuel).
To get the higher TOW in the air on the same field length, the longer-range aircraft needs a larger wing and stronger engines.
In summary, the 8,000nm A350 has a larger fuselage, wing and engines. This all creates higher drag and therefore fuel burn when flying the same payload over a route.
It comes partly from the A350 being a longer range aircraft, but also from the A350 being less densely packaged.
Economic consequences
The consequences of a heavier and larger aircraft are not only a higher fuel burn.
Fuel was historically the dominant cost, the most important one when choosing aircraft. It’s still an important factor, but the importance is now shared with equal size crew and fee costs (fees paid to countries and airports for their air transport services).
Crew cost differences between aircraft like the 787 and A350 at equal size cabins, is dominated by the flight crew costs. For aircraft with equal capacity, maximum weight and range, flight crew costs are the same within an airline. If an aircraft type is more capable in any of these capacities, it means the flight crew is paid a higher wage.
Airport and airway use fees are based on the size of the aircraft. The parameter used to determine aircraft size is the Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW). A larger and longer-range aircraft will cost more in fees, as its MTOW will be higher.
The final part of the Cash Operational Costs (COC, meaning we exclude the capital costs of the aircraft) is the maintenance costs. Both the 787 and A350 are modern composite aircraft. Their airframe maintenance programs, and therefore costs, are similar.
The difference in aircraft size and capabilities means different size engines. The 787-10 engine Take-Off thrust is 76klbf versus 84klbf for the A350. The engine mass of the Rolls-Royce Trent XWB on the A350 is 2.3t higher than the Trent 1000 for the 787. Higher thrust and larger engines mean higher engine maintenance costs.
Summary
Emirates President Tim Clark said this week: “The Boeing 787-10 aircraft is the best choice for Emirates, it’s a good eight-hour aircraft.”
An eight-hour mission has a flying distance of 3,800nm. This is well below the advertised maximum range of the 787-10 (6,400nm) and certainly below the 8,000nm of the A350-900. The -900 can be “paper de-rated” to get the MTOW the same as the 787-10. But then the range is below the 787-10, at 5,900nm.
The costs being reduced are the flight crew costs, the fees and the engine maintenance costs (due to lower stress from lighter take-offs). But the fuel burn differences don’t change.
If Emirates are looking for the best eight-hour aircraft, the Boeing 787-10 is the best choice.
Friday, March 2, 2018
What Drives The 797 Idea Cost, Cost Costs
Starting any conversation concerning the 797 has to begin with How much will it cost Boeing to Build the 797? The cost driver will locate the assembly point, design points and its suppliers. All which seem to reside near or in the USA. A mature infrastructure with trained engineers are required. A intact supply chain is a must. The big three happen to be in the Northwest corner of the US. Labor is the wild card for this project as the "Union" has a grip in Washington State. If the Union(s) can agree they will lock up the 797 for years to come. Boeing is waiting not on its customers to pull the 797 trigger but all is massive costly lose ends.
Most of those lose ends are already resolved but a significant element is the labor quotient. Automation is labor's undoing. Boeing is automating the 777X and has dialed in the the work force component with the 787 program. Boeing is figuring out how many workers it will need and how many machines can be positioned for the manufacturer of said product. The Unions are here to stay in Washington state but the numbers can be mitigated by new processes. When 10,000 workers were needed during 1950 only a 1,000 are need today for the same production output. Boeing hopes to reduce that number into the hundreds as machines drill holes and place fasteners in the process. Human hands are needed for stuffing and airplane body of all its wires, insulation and mechanical applications. Only time will give a complete snap together body connecting the parts which works into one snap. It will take only a few workers to finish the work in that future.
However, the 797 would only be half way there for a complete low cost high tech solution having precision beyond what a human can do. It just a matter of time before that happens. The 797 finds itself closing that gap because Boeing insist it will need to build 797 excellent enough and cheap enough at the same time. It will close the cost gap with plant, design and supplier innovation but it will need just enough people to build the 797. That is holding Boeing back until it figures the 797 costs component of the program.
Most of those lose ends are already resolved but a significant element is the labor quotient. Automation is labor's undoing. Boeing is automating the 777X and has dialed in the the work force component with the 787 program. Boeing is figuring out how many workers it will need and how many machines can be positioned for the manufacturer of said product. The Unions are here to stay in Washington state but the numbers can be mitigated by new processes. When 10,000 workers were needed during 1950 only a 1,000 are need today for the same production output. Boeing hopes to reduce that number into the hundreds as machines drill holes and place fasteners in the process. Human hands are needed for stuffing and airplane body of all its wires, insulation and mechanical applications. Only time will give a complete snap together body connecting the parts which works into one snap. It will take only a few workers to finish the work in that future.
However, the 797 would only be half way there for a complete low cost high tech solution having precision beyond what a human can do. It just a matter of time before that happens. The 797 finds itself closing that gap because Boeing insist it will need to build 797 excellent enough and cheap enough at the same time. It will close the cost gap with plant, design and supplier innovation but it will need just enough people to build the 797. That is holding Boeing back until it figures the 797 costs component of the program.
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