Pro s And Con' s Of Everett or Charleston 787-10 Selection

Boeing is currently unfurling the blue prints for either Everett or Charleston selection of whom will build the 787-10 and at what location. The pros and cons are weighed for each in my sophomoric attempt at discerning the outcome.

Everett Pros

• All or most the 787 talent lives in Puget Sound
• Synergy of Suppliers in Puget Sound
• Infrastructure intact for New airplane evolution
• Testing and engineering  slots in behind the dash nine
• Production slot ready for the Dash Ten with best work force.

Everett Cons

• Higher Labor Cost and unsettled labor force
• Property Expansion issues
• Additional distance for parts delivery from Charleston
• Over-all manufacturing costs are higher.

Charleston Pros

• Space, Space, Location
• Non Union
• Cheaper Location Cost than Everett
• Supply Line shortened: mid section and other European assemblies
• and more space

Charleston Cons

• Wings come from afar
• Labor pool shallow experience but cheaper
• Under developed production acumen
• Years off of Everett pacing and experience.
• Too many variables not reconciled, but will be in under 5 years

Going on about both is a tedious journey and ends with minutia for both places. In biblical fashion King Solomon will split the baby. I would suggest that 787-8 production goes to Charleston where both 787-9 and 787-10 will stay in Everett, Wa.

Why that answer?

Because RD is set in Everett and Boeing wants a quick launch using the experienced contracted union workers and engineeers.

The 787-8 will be  mastered in Charleston at 5  a month within the year of 2014. Charleston can dwindle the remaining 360 on the books within six years. Commonality on the production line will make efficiency improve as both units master its respected models in quick succession. Charleston is several years away for completeness in its production skills and leadership schemes. Everett is ready now for a two model split. The 787-9 and 787-10 is a natural and logical follow-on production sequence with two infusing lines of production.    Building #40-24 for the 787-9 and building #40-26 for the 787-10, is the second line with experienced protocols.

It would be reckless for Boeing to rely on Charleston for untested production models like the 787-9 and  787-10. It is high risk on Charleston, as it may be prone to massive cluster F**K on a gigantic plant scale. Boeing needs a solid production scheme in final stage of 787 development. Boeing should not risk billions more at this point, where customers are jittery over the Li-Ion battery driven aircraft. No more glitches is the Boeing motto in decision making. So this becomes one more point of why splitting the baby in Solomon's palace is necessary.  Charleston could work through the Dash Eight orders in consistent and a precise fashion. Giving Charleston an extra five years of building 787-8's would allow it to reach its full potential for follow-on aircraft such as both the -9's and -10's later on.

Follow-on orders from this point forward:

The dash 8's are in a slight pause period until market saturation demonstrates what both Airbus and Boeing can do with its plastic airplane. Only service efficiency  from this point forward will sell large blocks of aircraft. Airbus has sold large blocks of the A350 as Loyalty and commonality sales. When the final analysis is in, Boeing will show with its fuel cost reduction combined with service cost reduction that Airbus cost more to fly 365 days a year. This begins the long effort for follow-on orders for Boeing where both Everett and Charleston are sufficiently positioned to receive blocks of new orders in its respective roles as 787 producers.