Part III Winging IT: The GAO
report is an auditor's delight. The decision point comes in October for all
players scripted in this immense saga of the KC-46 Tanker program. Aviation
Class take note; Read the GAO report before raising your hand and then write a
500 word essay on what it actually means for Boeing and its KC-46
problems.
Winging It Findings and Recommendation:
The GAO Report Link April 2015
Your reading assignment "should be" completed before making comments.
Having read through it, I came to several
conclusions, the GAO audit was cautiously crafting warnings, while sounding calm about the whole matter. Cost to the government are below
expectations. Cost excessive conditions for Boeing, isn’t a GAO’s problem.
However, the Taxpayer and aviation junkies
should know this, Boeing has its hands full on this project, since it’s a fixed
cost on Boeing’s shoulders weighted down by the specter of cost over-run.
Secondly, all the issues not delved into
explicitly by the GAO remains a dangerous tight rope for Boeing. Parts in the
fueling area haven’t reached a state of completeness or otherwise known as engineering open
problems are running in the background, as exampled with some fuel delivery systems, remaining on the design table renderings.
What does that mean to Boeing? Anything on
the design table is costing Boeing until completed and is not ready for gaining a full Air Force
Validation or a demonstration of its operational competency in front of the
government compliance teams.
Let’s cut to the chase: The GAO cheat sheet
“The program is also working to
resolve other development challenges that pose additional schedule risk to the
flight test pace needed to demonstrate aerial refueling capabilities, such as
late delivery of parts, software defects, and assumptions related to flight
test cycle times. These challenges could result in additional schedule delays.
The following is a summary of these development challenges and any steps Boeing
is taking to address them."
Findings points: By Government Accountability
Auditors
Officials of GAO's Corporation Audits Division, 1949.
Ted Westfall is fourth from the left.
• Late delivery of parts for aircraft final assembly: Boeing’s
suppliers are having difficulties delivering several key aerial refueling
parts. For example, the telescope actuator, which extends and retracts the
boom, needs to be redesigned in order to work properly. A redesigned telescope
actuator is tentatively scheduled to be delivered in April 2015, enabling the
boom that will be used to support the July/August 2015 demonstration flights to
be delivered two weeks prior to its June 2015 need date. In another example,
the supplier of the wing aerial refueling pod and center-line drogue system is
experiencing delays in delivering these subsystems due to design and
manufacturing issues with a number of parts. To stay within schedule targets,
Boeing and the supplier have developed a plan to complete parts qualification
testing and safety of flight testing in parallel. Program officials have said
that one of the risks of this parallel approach is that discoveries during
safety of flight testing could drive design changes that would then require
qualification testing to be re-done. Boeing has sent engineers and other staff
to help the aerial refueling suppliers overcome these challenges, and held
regular management meetings to stay abreast of the latest developments.
9 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of
Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-14-340SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2014). Page
15 GAO-15-308 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft
• Defects in delivered software: Boeing and the program office
consider the resolution of software problems as one of the program’s top risks.
According to program documentation, open problem reports may have peaked in
December 2014, at roughly 780 priority problem reports. Boeing fixed 170 of
these problems over the past few months. As of March 2015, however, a little
over 600 problem reports were still not resolved, including several hundred
that must be addressed prior to the KC-46 first flight, currently planned for
June 2015. Many of these problems are related to the military subsystems and
either adversely affect the accomplishment of an essential operational or test
capability or increase the project’s technical, cost, or schedule risk—and no
workaround solution is known. Additional problems may be identified as Boeing
integrates the last two software modules related to aerial refueling. Boeing
expects to fully integrate these software modules in April 2015, about 10
months later than originally planned.
• Flight test cycle time assumptions: The program may not be able
to meet the established time frames, or cycle times for flight testing. Both
Boeing and the program office regard maintaining the planned flight test rate
of 65 hours per month for the 767-2C aircraft and 50 hours per month for the
KC-46 aircraft’s military tests as one of the program’s greatest risks. DOD
test organizations have shown that the planned military flight test rate is
more aggressive than other programs have demonstrated historically.
10 10 According to the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation’s FY 2011 Annual Report, military testing experience with aircraft
including the P-8, C-17, C-130J, C-27, and C-5 reflects fewer than 30 flight
hours per aircraft per month on average.
· The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation also
reported that the test schedule does not include sufficient time to address
deficiencies discovered during tests. Despite these concerns, Boeing predicts
that it can achieve the flight test rates as it has local maintenance and
engineering support and control over the flight test priorities as testing is
being conducted at Boeing facilities. Deviations from its proposed flight test
cycle times could pose risk to the program’s ability to capture the knowledge
necessary to hold the low-rate production decision in October 2015.
Page 16 GAO-15-308 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft Boeing provided an
updated schedule to the program office in January 2015 that may address some of
the risks we highlighted.
· As part of the updated test plan, the program office and
Boeing also revised their approach to conducting operational test and receiver
aircraft certification. The new approach re-phases some receiver aircraft
certification and shifts test execution responsibility for 10 receiver aircraft
from Boeing to the government. This approach may result in adding additional
risk to the program should the Air Force fail to complete the testing on time.
The new schedule and associated contract modifications are expected to be
approved by early 2015. Program officials stated that they are reviewing the
information to determine whether they need to further adjust milestone dates,
including the low-rate production decision and the start of operational test.
That analysis has not yet been completed.
The GAO survey team that studied the feasibility of opening
an office in Europe in 1952 Note: Ted Westfall is no longer fourth from
Left and is missing from the European Junket. The stiffs were not included in
photo.
...and you thought I would feature a KC-46 Tanker Picture. It’s always been about auditing and not aviation!
The Marquis of Queensbury rules says these
are friendly slaps of encouragement administered to Boeing. The real rubber
meets the pavement event, arrives during October 2015, when it is determines if
Boeing can actually start its slow build rate for the KC-46. If it does not gain
approval in October 2015 for an initial build rate, it means it did not
solve many of the critical problems found within the program during the interim time, as suggested with the
GAO summary report.
Part I: Boeing KC-46 Takes
Write-off for stock holders, Fixes found during phase 1.
The news is when "another
GAO interim report is due", as it comes before the decision to proceed is granted for
Boeing. This is an important news event for the KC-46 program, which all
aviation outlets should be tuned-into, as part of the running up to the "October’s Build Status" announcement.
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