The Boeing Moon Shot Changed Its Manufacturing Scenario

Before the Boeing Moonshot, Boeing Aircraft were individually crafted aircraft like the 737, 757 and 767. Each with its own unique avionic suite. Airbus pioneered commonality with its family of aircraft. Boeing lacked an industrial common denominator, which would underscore each new model and stop the variability in aircraft building as Airbus had done. The variability between Boeing models and costumers who fly its models for different missions, cost customers training for different aircraft behaviors, additional ground crew with a broader service scope. It meant more cost invested in the service and operation of its fleet.

Boeing needed a moon shot for any hopes of leading its competitor. The 787 was a wild and expensive development ride with little hope of instant financial gratification. It was really banking on its impact for all its airplane programs, and not just making a profit on the 787 model. It was a Strategic Air Command performance or could be said, “SAC”. The 787 was the central core-Sea Change at Boeing. It brought all its resources to bear in on the 787 for the sake of Boeing’s future. Part of this capitalization investment was written-off directly against the 787 project. The future SAC programs are now drawing on the 787 well of technology. These 787 benchmarks are ready for an additional thirty years of Boeing’s Aircraft development.

So far the Max has drawn in its new wing development, engine refinements, and avionics to its aircraft. It has taken lessons learned on plastics forward from the 787 project. Software improvement are included in its electronic flight bags, and a host of other maintenance improving tools. The totality of the Max program can owe its advancements from the 787 project. In that, the cost of the 787 project will share R& D with the follow-on projects.

The 777X has reached a milestone with selecting the GE core module system from the 787 project. It is going with its Michigan operations, supplying the central core architecture; saving hundreds of pounds in wiring, and gaining more efficiency when it operates. It also will borrow wing technology from the 787. Boeing is building an adjunct wing plant next to the current 777 assembly building. A question came to me why the 777X doesn’t use more plastics with an all plastic hull. I can only speculate or get an answer by doing an interview. However, the aluminum used is heavier than the plastic body option, but over-all fuel burn is tackled with a composite picture of aircraft weight, body size and lift and drag ratios. All these items add up in negating the difference between aluminum weight compare to all composite weight. The 777X will beat the all plastic A350-1000 by a “country” mile or more.

The year 2030 is Y1 time for Boeing. Y1 will be defined as a segue way for its family of aircraft. The single aisle, currently flows to the dual aisle with an awkward gap in passengers and range. The 757 and 767 had continuity in its offering. The 787-8 tries reaching down to the 737-900 while competing with the A321 Airbus. It has become an awkward fit at best. Plans are in engineering with an undefined y1 model meeting all the requirements for the market while using the 787 Moon Shot Pot draw down. 

It is an easy projection from this time to say they will come up with new plastic application in the next fifteen years and the evolution of engine will remain with a raging competition. Boeing will come out with a dedicated 200-220 seat super aisle plastic airplane filling the 737-900 to 767 gap. The super aisles is a concept where more space for seats and more aisle space for passenger movement or service access. Rather than WB’d it, as a 18 foot wide interior (787 style) with two aisles, go 15 feet wide and make two aisles with a 2-2-2 layout. The 737 family is about 11.9 wide on the interior.  What makes this work is 35 total rows at 210 seats and giving it a 6,000 mile range. It’s a mini WB with plenty of room. It can hop the Atlantic or cover a continent. Name it the 757 clipper going mach .85 of the speed of sound. This would be a competent family member.

Reference Article: Seeking Alpha

Boeing: What The Boeing Y1 Might Look Like

Summary

·       Boeing Y1 will be revolutionary in its market segment.

·       Boeing quality engineering is key to financial success.

·       The Boeing Y1 should regain market share Boeing lost to Airbus over the years.

Aspire Aviation's Talking Points (Research Article)

Boeing stretches 777-9X fuselage from 76.5m to 76.7m: exclusive
Airlines, most likely Emirates, asking for more seats on 777X: sources
Boeing to announce more seats on 777-9X in Q2 2015: sources
777X de-icing can only take place at Code F stands with FWT down
787-9 OEW 277,000lbs is 11,000lbs lighter than A330-900neo’s 288,000lbs
787-8 OEW 260,000lbs versus A330-800neo’s 280,000lbs
787-8 is 9% more fuel efficient per seat than -800neo on 6,000nm missions
Using 253t 787-9 in A330neo comparison pushes up -9’s landing & overflight fee, DMC
787-9 carries 13 tonnes more revenue cargo than A330-900neo
A330neo Mach 0.81 means 25 mins longer flying time on 6,000nm missions
Virgin Atlantic 787-9 has 9-abreast economy seats at 18.9-inch width
Boeing sees A330neo 9-10% more fuel efficient than A330: sources
777-300ER carries 23t of cargo, A380 only 8t: Emirates

Delta loss shows availability key to Boeing’s widebody strategy

Delta Dithers An Airbus Order Forward

Delta claims Boeing couldn’t put slots together soon enough suiting its growth mapping. Boeing could conversely say options exists and slot did exists where Delta could of planned better, taking advantage of optimum opportunity for new equipment. The argument continues from Delta, they are exacting on five year plan time-lines, where by happen chance, Delta was out of phase with Boeing’s own production timing, and Boeing could not supply Delta during its window of buying. No matter what happened Delta bought Airbus’ less preforming A330 and the not quite equivalent A350 in place of either the 787-9 or 7779X.

Whatever the Delta reason, they were bent on its own plans no matter what the airline manufacturer had in play at that moment. That to me smells of poor planning when you have years of managing a buy. Delta did not manage its buy, and got stuck with an inferior Airbus package under the guise with its A330 and A350 package.

Why do I say that! Because the metrics aren’t there when comparing aircraft performance. The A330 NEO is a knee jerk golf lay-up when comparing it with the 787. The 787 family flies further carries more people even if you have to wait eight years for delivery. Delta should have split the strategy by leasing the A330 NEO, until it obtained the 787. It should have ordered the 777X’s in number while there is still a front of the line. They have put themselves 20 years back on even considering the 777X with its A350 order, as it attempted a lay-up shot against the “on the green Boeing shot”. 

Conservative, and oh so clever financial minds prevailed in the board-room. The ”we can get by with the order, and on time with Airbus”, committee prevailed. Airbus said, “We are just better”, one more time, even though it was another defaulted order from Boeings large order book. Order book parity is approaching between Airbus and Boeing. Boeing productivity is running the roost, however. Boeing may get to delivery slots sooner rather rathr than later inspite of what Airbus says.

Airbus has yet to ramp up A350 production. It has yet to build the A330-NEO. Airbus is confident on the NEO since it just an airplane make-over. That will take two years at least. In the meantime, Boeing will have produced and delivered 240 more 787’s, dropping its order book backlog lower than the Airbus A350 backlog. It will be producing its first 777X prototypes by 2017. Delta knew these conditions. They looked at Boeing order book sequence. It was aware of 12 available 787 slots, where in two more years more slots could develop. It seemed like Delta bent its vision anyways, with board-room momentum of self-assurance. A decision like this is not for the next five years, but the next twenty years before a board would consider any fleet reversals towards another manufacturer. Airbus strategy is one of flipping fleets guaranteeing follow-on orders for years to come. Boeing is aware of this and was caught with its production slot pants down. This happens at times, during the normal course of all moving parts from R&D, production and sales, Boeing was caught short. 

Unfortunately it was Delta this time. Airbus gained crowing points when it essentially had a slower order book to merit this order, and not better aircraft.

Must Read On The A330 NEO

Will The Airbus A330neo Bring Airlines What It Promises?

Seeking Alpha: Important stuff:

Summary

• Calculations show reduction in fuel burn per trip is slightly lower than estimated by Airbus.
• Calculations show reduction in fuel burn per seat in line with estimates by Airbus.
• Although not as efficient as the Dreamliner Airbus A330neo remains an attractive airplane.

Get your coffee and donuts, and get into the research game and link to this seven page article on the A330 Neo.

Seats

Seats are what you pay for on your airline ticket. Seats are what makes your journey special. A Seat is not a “single engine air tanker”, it’s your room as your travel the world. Two items make up your seat that directly relate to your ticket price. Seat Weight and cubic meters needed in your rented space. A luxury seat may cost 200.000 dollars and weigh a quarter ton in accessories. It may take up the space what three people have in economy. Or it may be in economy demanding several items:

·       Accessibility

·       Personal Space

·       Comfort

·       Command and Control options during travel.

Before we go gonzo on luxury seats, it is more productive discussing what 80% of the traveler will encounter in economy. Beginning with accessibility is the primary frontal lobe experience you will have boarding and the last thing you remember when leaving the aircraft. Many airline have a cattle call when loading passengers then the frenzy builds as everyone rushes the line as if somehow if in line first will make a journey better. Sometimes it does improve the experience by getting in line first.

However, Airline loading will help the passenger’s first impression last in a good way, if they do a couple of things. First drop the row call out and go into a vertical mode and alphabet soup it. In a nine across seat alignment. Call window and aisle center seats by letter. First all tickets with seat letters having “A, E, and I” are ready to board. The windows and center seats fill first no matter the row. Follow with letters “B, and H” second and all aisle seats last. Or at least color the tickets with its seat according to color code. Example rows 33-44 color code green board now and so forth. This would stop the passenger climbing over your face as you try to drop down your tray or look at an airline magazine.

Save first class for last, since they pay good money not to have economy class parade by them in one gigantic stream. In fact put them in a separate terminal lounge seat with the same seat number in waiting with valet service, since they will load last just the same, it will make the whole process more efficient and reduce the jungle warfare on seating passengers. Since it’s the bane of starting a journey having people walk over you to get to its seat make it civil and convenient. The Airline will achieve a great impression, (SWA).

Personal space can be achieved through the new slim line seats. More is created out of less. It protects the passenger experience giving them a place of functionality for long trips. All your travel interaction is protect by the seat. The person front or behind can’t harass your experience. The lateral incursion of your seat mates are cut-off in a flanking structure giving you privacy you may desire or it can open up as all inclusive when sitting with loved ones.

Ah, comfort is what it is all about. Pitch comes to play, space is gained in the seat in front of you as can accept your feet under the seat in front of you. Also the seat in front has enough room to store something else under its seat. It becomes a sense of personal space and flexibility for accessing the devices or taking a long nap.

The mid-flight embarrassment is encountered when at some point you need to “go” and you have two more seat mates to get over. Everyone watches out of boredom and how you will handle the feat, because they have to go too. Once again the seat must come to the rescue of passengers who have to “go”. The window or center seat passengers should be able to toggle a button for exit which informs the passengers in the way, by vibration, someone needs to exit. They in-turn can slide its slime line seat back and upward within the frame, creating space for a passenger to exit without imposing on the back or front of passengers space. A semi standing room maker seat without having passengers get out and standing in the aisle, it makes room for the stressed passenger. It could be even power driven seat, making it effortless to do the deed. You barely need to wake up to make it happen. I may be crazy for this kind of concept but I still got to go sometime.

The command and control method is a civil way to travel.

Transcending The 787 From The Back Door, A330 NEO

Slap a NEO on the A330 frame and you have an A330 NEO. A derivative of 787 engine technology, implants some 787 like metrics without using a clean sheet change out, or a new model class for Airbus. The advantage for Airbus is quickly summarized on balance sheets. How many gallons of Jet A can a customer buy from cheaper capitalization cost on one A330 NEO over buying the 787? If the answer is,  $20 million US dollars, then 10 million gallons of Jet A is bought with current prices becomes a number of significance and a Airbus selling point. If twenty-five thousand gallons is loaded on a Trans-Atlantic flight for an A330 NEO then it cost about $50, 000 dollars as a full load. But it will load something specific for its range and weight metrics with a standard safety margin within economic measures. Even if you go 70 % fuel capacity for an extended range trip of up to five thousand miles, the gallons will convert to about 15, 000 gallons or about $30,000 dollars fuel costs for one trip. Buying an A330 Neo with a new 787 type engine evolution will take the A330 even further.

As an A330 is sold for 20 million cheaper than the 787, you have tapped into capitalization savings and interest averted with the significant lower cost of buying cheaper. That too buys a lot of fuel for a less efficient aircraft than the 787. If the A330 NEO is 10% less efficient than the 787, as a number for this exercise, then an A330 NEO airline will slid slowly backward against the 787 performance, but it will have that $20 million advantage on price, as it uses its Extended Operational Cost Advantage (EOCA). A fancy way of saying, "we are leveraging the bargain". The metric also includes interest on capitalization investment, which also buys more fuel making-up the 10% efficiency margin the 787 has over the A330 NEO. The 10% percent fuel efficiency of the 787 over the A330 NEO and its 20 Million less cost, signals an A330 can fly for a long time within its routes at the same competitive nature of the 787 using the EOPA model. Here is how:

10 % fuel efficiency on an average, is on a load of 15,000 gallons on a medium route, (4,500 miles), which includes 1,500 gallons or more needed for the A330 NEO than the 787. At $2.00 (US dollars) a gallon, buying 1,500 (10% margin) more gallons for the A330 NEO cost about $3,000 dollars.  This amount divided into 20 million from its purchase savings, plus capitalization interest saved, means the A330 can fly about 7,000 different times on routes, before even approaching going into the red against the 787 in a daily comparison, of the bank accounts. Tack on a “baggage fee charge” (sneaky) on 250 tickets for $12, and the A330 NEO can buy the additional fuel margin lost to the 787. It will always stay even with the 787 on the bottom line. These are very rough numbers, but it is the selling or talking points Airbus uses when selling the A330 NEO. You can have a cheap 787 knock-off in the A330 NEO, and make money like a 787. Airbus is hoping for any lower tier and emerging Airlines will buy it.

A-380 is A Saturated order Book While The A350-1000 Wants The Table Scraps

How many more A380's will Airbus sell in light of its A350-1000 push? Qatar pushed back on the A-350 without cause, and is silent with an unannounced reason. Most think it’s business as usual for Qatar. After all they are known for leveraging Boeing into compliance from asserting customer preferences before delivery.

Evidently they (Airbus) must have made a deal with its customer, squeezing some monetary gain for Qatar. Where in return, it will zip it up and not say anything! Boeing couldn't foresee a Qatar hostage advertising scenario, before its first 787-8 delivery. Qatar made Boeing make it right or no delivery, plus they broadcast its displeasure, as if it were some kind of advertising junket using its displeasure concerning Boeing imperfections.

It proudly reports how exacting and conscientious they are over its aircraft. Once again it appears, Qatar has Airbus by the vitals between its fore finger and thumb in a pincher movement. It will squeeze more out of Airbus, as pride has a price in Paris.

Bloomberg News:

Airbus Faces Investment Conundrum as A380 Orders Vanish

The infamous Airbus Hat-In-Hand surge in Airplane Wars

What is really happening is hushed money is paid in some kind of. "In kind payment" from the Airbus production line level? Where in Boeing's case it trusted everything, and it was good to go before Qatar played its cards. What is not known, is what cards does Qatar hold, a two of Hearts or Ace of Spades? The two of Hearts is a Boeing card, and the Ace of Spades would be something fundamentally wrong with the Airbus A350 offering. Qatar is holding its card tight to the chest. I always take the somewhere in between card, and I think it’s a well-played Joker on Airbus as they are fighting A380 order stagnation, and overly aggressive investment commitments for all its types, tempered by sales parity with Boeing. The investment analysis is simple, too many plates are spinning in the air at the same time as the 787 market presence grows beyond 200, 787 in service.

An industry rethink is occurring. It is filed under fickle next to the pickle.

• Can the 777X straddle the A350 and the A380 conveniently?
• Will the 787-9 and -10 make more market perfect fits than the A350 family?
• Is the A380 in an Airport Pickle?
• Is Qatar stalling on the A350 in its rethink?

That is enough questions for any press conference held in abstention. Here are some important general thoughts on these bullet points.

The 777X is of great concern for Airbus, once it takes to the air, and once its full metrics are validated. It will haul 80% of the passenger payload of the A380 but will fit in every major airport in the world. 

The 787-9 and -10 family will bisect the A350 market in pieces. Even the 787-8 has a Max capacity configuration for economy travelers going worldwide. The 787-8 carries from 291-335 passengers on week-end wonder routes. The 787-9 does that sensibly appointed. The 787-10 is a high density route maker with a 7,200 mile capability. Even though the A380 can go farther and carry more passengers economically. Only 10% of the world's route needs that kind of density and distance. 

However, the 777X can capture that 10% of the market without airport renovations at either end of the route. There is the major re-think airlines are undergoing at a crucial time for both the A380 and A350. The question remains which tool box do we want to own, Airbus or Boeing? Re-thinking is now critical for this important answer. The Qatar order delay may be more important than installing the right seat colors. It may be a prevent defense milking the order clock as it ponders the order log, before orders climb in the Boeing book.

Now for some important direct answers on the bullet points.

Yes, the A380 is in a pickle, because of its niche spot in the market, where it's reaching saturation, unless customers become more innovative for its equipment.

Yes, Qatar is playing the order clock and rethinking its positions and its airline strategy. Possibly many other airline companies are in the rethinking mode, as customer fickleness sets in. Better plans mean better profits is a common corporate model.

Qatar has sent Airbus a warning shot over the Airbus bow as is customary for this Airline. They are testing Airbus resolve for the A350, as well as buying time on the delivery clock. Money is not an issue, however, the Qatar fickle business is strong.

The pickle business is in that 10% slice of the market where the A380 lives.

The Most Sultry Woman In The World Is A 787-9

Etihad had its first airplane flown in test today. What's so stunning is not that its a 787 but a sultry beauty is unleashed. Sometime the subdued is more beautiful than the gregarious and ostentatious scheme. The Etihad paint scheme reflects the beauty of the desert. Something that achieves a relevant place in your heart as you look at the lines. Its how you wear the clothing that captures the heart. The Etihad 787 most import flight was not how she worked taking-off, but more importantly how she looked doing it. Simply elegant!



Photo Credit Airways News

After looking at this first test flight photo of the 787-9 and trying out my observational critque, I grew to love the subtile paint scheme. It spoke of hot desert nights with a cool light reflecting on its body. Simply sultry and captivating. No flash, but a soft glow of what Etihad tries to emulate with its company colors.


Photo Credit Airways News

How does the its 787-9 look in the rain's high gloss? It's simple to see it's the "Best of the Paine Field Show" , is Etihad's paint scheme.

Selling Furniture is Divergent to Selling Airplanes

Customer/Builder Divergence

When making a presentation to corporate heads, it is best understanding the audience. Better than the audience knows itself. If you don’t, you lose the audience in a divergence. They, the audience just doesn’t get it. Parry this down to the Board Room level, with a marketing representative, the presenter, who must become a chameleon in the room. They must understand the divergent dichotomy of decision making from the selling company as compared to the buying company. 

A sales person has a lot riding on its effort for those thousands of workers back at the factory. I know this on a small scale as I was owner and sales rep for the small factory of workers back home. I needed to keep their jobs intact, pay the materials bill, and meet payroll in one road trip.

Not only was I involved in the many-hats-I-wear division, I designed the product with the work force made advertising, and cold calls over a seven western states region. On and on went the duties for this small endeavor. It’s not much different than what Boeing does for its $$billions, as I was dealing with thousands of dollars.

·       The first task is to find out what does a customer want, not what you have for them.

·       The second task is understand a customer’s vision and how they see themselves obtaining its goals and objectives. Not thinking what’s printed on the company’s flyer for a mission statement.

·       Talk about dreams, aspirations and failures.

·       Know your enemy (Competitors) better than the enemy knows itself.

Once you have established a relationship and common knowledge you are almost ready to start sales. I never hurried the relationship part, as a bond must form first, and a trust evolves during short exchanges on ideas and opinions. I generally morphed into the person I wanted to sell to not out of some kind of patronizing effort, but out of the necessity of knowing your customers heart. I remember one time going to a customer on a cold call, driving through western United States. I think it was Idaho Falls, Idaho. I was 350 miles from my home shop. Nothing had happened on this trip. I was enthusiastic about the product, I had a stake in it, and I didn’t even know the next person I was going to tell about it!

So I pull up to this fancy store because it had space to park my truck and trailer. My trailer contained samples and furniture to sell. Not airplanes, but furniture. Walking into the store, I hunted down the person in charge of buying. No letter of introduction, no prior conversation and no appointment. So I told him like it was straight up, and then broke the Ice with asking him how it was going for him? We got it going by not talking furniture product. I told him how many places I had gone to this week, and people I had talked with. In particular to him were his competitors. He wanted to know what they were carrying in those stores. I told them everything they got came out of South Dakota. This also, was my main competitor in furniture making. They had a rail siding bringing in materials. I knew I only had this truck and it is nice truck, but I didn’t tell this man about how small we were. I only said they were our chief competitor, and we had made progress over what they did. He said, “Let me see”.

I went out to the trailer and set down a sample of each furniture type. By now we were on the same team slaying that same South Dakota monster furniture builder. We were no longer divergent, disparate or unalike. His problem now had become my problem. I was on to something, and I had a solution to both our problems. I had the high ground of a great product bonded with this company’s need to compete.

I then sold a hundred pieces that day and a hundred more each month because he blew them out of the store for a ridiculous low price, and still made money. Much like selling airline tickets flying with this furniture.

This story was repeated over and over again. I remember going from 100 production pieces a month to twelve hundred pieces a month in one year.

Boeing on a much grander scale has now obtained 1276 orders this year similar to what we built in a month. It was good stuff and people responded in spite of the South Dakota hype machine. I didn’t wear a tie, but I could tie a deal, because it was fun selling something that was so good.

Qantas A-380 Renacted Safe Landing After Engine Destruction

Part II The Movie:

Below is Qantas Flight 32 renacted on video of what happened after a castastrophic engine explosion in 2010. It was due to an oil fire in the engine housing near the main turbine disk. The Saturday feature is for your own information as a follow-on with an earlier Scrap book feature on LiftnDrag from July 26, 2013. Enjoy the video, well done.

Liftndrag Scrapbook Feature The Qantas A380 Incident in 2010

"This is just one thought for flight management. The main thing is to: 

• simplify pilot options of a hugely complex aircraft, 
• give the crew committee the best information during decision making,
• and present best available options with priorities. "

Delta Order Playback

Delta recently ordered 25 A330 NEO and 25 A350-900's. Here are the three talking points for this order.

• Time
• Timing
• Timeliness

There is a time when Delta is ready to move. That time is now, irrespective of where the Airplane builder has a slot or a position for its accommodation in time. The time is now for Delta to upgrade the fleet. Could Boeing answer the order bell? No they couldn't, as the 787 backlog swamp and the future 787-10 planes are way down the road considering Delta's time piece. Boeing can't meet Delta's corporate time-line.

The second point is timing for Delta. They need to receive these aircraft in a timing sequence, in order to fulfill its fleets expansion in a seamless motion.  It needs a whole new fleet improvement from latest technological aircraft that are efficient without waiting. The timing failure is from a Boeing order book predicament, which would swallow Delta with the cost of waiting on a long order book.  Airbus answered this question sufficiently, it could meet Delta's timing with A330's and the All New A350, where the 787-10 is not going to be ready until 2020. Delta could also reieve an A350-900's sooner than the 787-9. Left out of Delta's conversation is the 777X. This model also falls out of timing until 2020, even if Delta were first in line to receive one. A Delta 777X would be more likely arriving in 2024 than 2018 because of prior customer's build slots. A 787-10 is more likely in 2024 than 2018. That leaves Boeing timing for 2018 on the backs of the 787-9, which does not reach the broad spectrum of Delta expectations for 315 well placed passengers. The 787-9 could compete with what Delta wants, but thy have a backlog problem. The A350 is at 750+ orders and also has a backlog problem for Delta,  but has more flexibility within its order books, as the A350-800 and A350-1000 are not in play yet. They are planning a build-up on the A350-900 production during 2014-2018 where it will begin streaming aircraft towards Delta in 2018 with its A330 NEO followed by the A350-900 later.

Motley Fool Photo Credit

Delta sore card:

• 787-9 wouldn't be delivered in Delta's window by 2018.
• A330 Neo is a rebuild and upgrade project it can do, fitting in the Delta 2018 window.
• 787-10 isn't even built or tested and won't be ready for Delta for six more years as it would wait behind 132 787-10 orders.
• The A 350 is starting its delivery in days (December 13), and a delivery schedule has holes in it for Delta sliding in at a regular pace from 2018-2020, fitting its growth model. The 25 unit A350 production slots can be fit-in during 2018-2020 time frame at a rate of one a month.  
• Boeing is booked-up as its own production schedule, when others have dropped or asked for delivery extensions. Even Delta has extended out its own 787's delivery schedule from its prior ordered 787 models and Boeing back filled those openings. Boeing couldn't promise more slots to Delta from other customera. Demonstrating how critical delivery is for Delta during a fleet renewal period it went with Airbus.

This brings us to the final talking point timeliness. Boeing is producing a balance of 787-8 and 787-9 in a simultaneous effort, appeasing its own customer thirst for the 787. The model is exceeding in spite of "787 glitching". Its far more complicated than what Airbus offers, and will continue its maturation for another thirty years. Having said that, Boeing is primed for an airplane sales explosion in 2015 and couldn't help Delta, even if Boeing's eyes were bigger than its stomach. Boeing will say anything to close the deal as would Airbus. But Delta looked at each company's position and decided that Airbus was less encumbered with order status, and therefore the likely hood of timeliness is more predominate with Airbus. This is built on several assumptions. One is that that Airbus will not endure any 787 like faults since it employs standing technology fully vetted for reliability. When Boeing reaches its final vetting process for its systems and battery. The 787 will be a great and greater airplane than what Airbus offers in "Time". Boeing's full 787 and 777X potential will then be reached, setting Airbus back decades in the race. I would expect Boeing will transfer "in-time", the "All Electrical Architecture" to its sibling aircraft, but not until all faults are resolved in the maturation process. Timeliness is a perception issue for Delta, more than an actual problem with Boeing. They see Boeing biting more off than they can chew with quantum leaps in technology and concurrently running projects. Delta views Airbus timeliness more achievable as it had taken the lower road for airplane progress. They have bet on Airbus timeliness with this order, which fits its own corporate goals.

Home work is a good assignment for readers. Below is a link of a fairly minded view on the Delta decision, and is not neccessarily a bad thing for Boeing. I recommend reading this article as it may shead more light on the subject, as it did for me.

Motley Fool Reference Below:

Why Airbus Got a Big Order From Delta Air Lines Inc.

Almost Missed This: Ryan Air Books 100 737 200C's with Boeing

Asleep at the order switch was I, as Ryan Air and Boeing booked the deal on November 28th which was announced as an intent, a little while back (September 2014), saying they would sign when enough cash is printed. What lies beneath this order was not mentioned in the below link, as this is a new class 737 holding 197 seats for Ryan Air. It has an additional door, less kitchen amenities but keeps the Max efficiencies. This aircraft is designed as a Ryan Air passenger work horse. 100 options on this order were added per further news reporting.

File Photo Rendering for 737-200c

Air Transport World Link and clip below:

"Boeing capped the month with the Nov. 28 finalization of Ryanair’s order for 100 737 MAX200s (valued at $11 billion at current list prices). Bookings logged earlier in the month included 80 737 MAX 8s for SMBC Aviation Capital (valued at over $8.5 billion at current list prices); six 737 MAXs (variant undetermined) to an unidentified customer; four 737-700s (valued at $313.2 million at current prices) to an unidentified customer; 30 737 MAXs (variant undetermined) to a third unidentified customer; and a 787-9 Dreamliner (valued at $257.1 million at current list prices) to Virgin Atlantic."

Rendering of Boeing 737-200 C

However, 737-200C options are mentioned on this link below:

Options are reported in Link:

From, Aero Space Manufacturing and Design:

"Dublin, Ireland –Boeing and Ryanair have finalized an order for 100 737 MAX 200s, valued at $11 billion at current list prices. The order, originally announced as a commitment in September, includes options for 100 additional 737 MAX 200 airplanes, and makes the Irish low-cost carrier the launch customer for the newest member of the 737 MAX family of airplanes."

Other airlines are measuring Ryan Air's metrics on this configuration, and I believe competitors will follow suit for its higher density single aisle routes. I would expect conversions from prior orders over to the 737-200C Max and addtional new orders for this configuration.

Li-Ion Battery 101 From The NTSB.

The battery simplified. In order to not oversimplify Boeing’s  battery with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determination regarding its battery fires, and mishaps, it is an attempt to lay out what went wrong during 2013 and what the state of the Boeing battery is today. I have in other blogs attempted an objective understanding of battery woes, particularly the Lithium-ION monster that grounded Boeing. Since they are the world’s largest airplane maker in sales and production at this time, Boeing bet the bank on its LI battery problem. They willed a resolution from its failure. The NTSB came back and pointed fingers at the Battery manufacturer GS Yuasa, FAA, and Boeing.

I have learned several things of importance from the NTSB.

1.       At the time of testing and development the NTSB was not involved and could not help.

2.       FAA was well out of its technical scope giving oversight to both Boeing and GS Yuasa.

3.       FAA deferred from its own battery technology weakness, to both GS Yuasa and Boeing when they in return presented to the FAA engineering solutions. FAA did not have the expertise to give oversight.

4.       In this gap of expertise for both Boeing and FAA they deferred to the battery manufacturer when that manufacturer had never before built an airline battery of this stature until the 787.

5.       A cascading event leading to the battery failure was about to expose the depth of everyone involved knowledge, and its understanding of battery failure concerning a mitigation process for inherent risks. The NTSB has the high ground in this case, and they have spoken even though Boeing has installed battery safety through measures enumerated in 2013.

Below is a flow for resolving battery risk without knowing a precise moment of failure and its cascading consequences.

GS Yuasa did not meet a high enough standard of battery production, consistent to aviation risks. Impurities were allowed-in or missed during processing this battery’s substrate. Faults and flaws within the battery would lead to failure eventually. They have currently upped its aviation battery standards since 2013. Aviation LI-ION batteries now follow a tight standard and production protocol mitigating any impurities previously found in the battery.

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The “Boeing Safe Battery system” is safer than any electronics battery found on equipment today.

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Boeing engineering set voltage regulation too high at first, when sending electricity from its generators.  The Boeing problem: inputs electrical flow into the battery having a wide range of voltage spikes, beyond what would be safe, for a vulnerable battery not aware of  “shorting worthy impurities”. It was a big unaware of risk for Boeing during early testing and commercial service. Boeing has seen to it by narrowing and regulating the voltage spikes coming into the battery, which makes it safe for the battery, and will not cause shorting found within a battery impure substrates.

Boeing doubled down by encasing the battery with a stainless steel housing. It robs the battery encasement from oxygen, therefore no fire potential just battery heating. Further it vents the battery encasement by going outside the airplane where any toxic gases produced during a battery crises is dumped safely from the crew and passengers. Boeing presented a worst case scenario to both the FAA and NTSB, demonstrating a total battery pack failure, fire, or explosion. Showing it completely contained at all times. Plane flies on until safely landing. Only the airline deals with the mishap not the passengers during flight.  

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The NTSB is concurring with what both GS Yuasa, battery maker, and Boeing on product saftey, while pointing its finger on Boeing and GS Yuasa for its failures. Both were out there winging it with battery technology without having federal governance (FAA) who was or is incapable of giving oversight with this technology. It is an emerging technology, where no one has gained an “arms around it” mastery. Boeing has corralled it in a safe area good enough for extremely safe flying for its customers. The good news is that aviation is using the Li-ion battery in its current evolution which will spur on further and complete mastery over battery development. On my first DC-3 ride, I remember watching sparks coming out the engine cowling, like we were on fire. We were flying over the continental divide. I felt I was in a “Lost Horizon” movie going into Tibet. It was winter and it was snowing, but the sparks have been long replaced by the likes of the 737, 777 and 787.

End Of November Macro Stats (Updated 12-4-14)

A quick look at the chart belows sees an off production month for Boeing with only six 787 delivered. Will they make its goal in 2014 for 110 787's? Here is the pent up factory backlog in forward position for delivery. Starting with two 787 already delivered in December knocking down the goal to 12 to go. Here is the backlog energy in waiting on a short production Month with Christmas, vacations and New Years eve.

Delivery waiting for customers (4 more Dec). They should deliver as they were ready in November, meeting a goal of 10 in the first two weeks weeks of December.

Production testing maturity before "Ready for Delivery" status- 10, 787

5 aircraft have 3-5 tests flights already, and can be ready for delivery by the 10th of this month as my own prediction.

5 aircraft each have one test flight and its feasible for December delivery.

Customer hesitation on its own financing, or quality inspections with a Boeing remedy could cause problems for Boeing, as it may roll a few deliveries into January per customer direction. However its possible for Boeing reaching its January 2014 goal of delivering 110 787 aircraft in 2014. It is equally possible Boeing will fall just short of the goal with units standing at 100% completion on the 2014 flight line, but delivered in January of 2015.

Goal +/-                          *09/2014    **10/2014         Projecting    November  (actual) Delta 

Month Deliveries              10            **11             10              6.0                     -4

3 M-M-avg                      10.33          11.33            10             9.0                     -1.0

Production Goal               10               10              10             10                          0

Delivery Trend (+/- )       + .33            +1.33                   . 0            -1.0      /Target       >                

                                       *PM-Start      **M.A.P.                         PM-End

*Progression Months

**Moving Average Progression

Other Notes on the 787 Production analysis.

Total Year To Date 787:   98 (2 December deliveries already counted)

2014 Goal                       110

One Month Goal               14

Net to go in December     12

Round 8 Boeing Battery Fight Over

Boeing's battery caught fire in early 2013. Fleet grounded. Round 1 ended with Boeing's 787 laying on the mat for three months grounded! Round eight ends with the FAA coming out with a proclamation as referee breaks up the combatants from clinching each other. It has removed the battery and the airplane to its respective corners. What has been found is a series of fact finding flawed procedures and naivety about the Lithium Ion battery in service. Engineering design didn't account for battery usage under the Airplane conditions. Or otherwise know as underestimating the complexity of 787 demand on the LION battery. Boeing has since mitigated the underestimation of design parameters by taking multiple steps in overbuilding the battery system over the last several years.

Round 9 is compliance and agreement by Boeing on these findings. Correction are completed and become part of the Boeing LION engineering process.

Round 10: Knockout of the problem, a high level of reliability is established with a high number of airplanes and a higher number (million) of flights with no problems.

Dreamliner battery fire triggered by Boeing design, probe finds
Chicago Tribune link: By Alan Levin, Bloomberg News,
Bloomberg"Inadequate design and testing caused last year's battery fire that led to the grounding of Boeing's Dreamliner jets for more than three months, investigators concluded."

The FAA faulty trail:

• "The fire occurred Jan. 7, 2013, while a Japan Airlines 787 Dreamliner sat at Boston's Logan International Airport. Boeing uses two lithium-ion batteries in the Dreamliner to power electronics and other equipment. It was a short circuit in one of the battery's eight cells that triggered a runaway failure that engulfed the entire power pack, the NTSB said.
• Cells may overheat when large amounts of power are being drawn and better protections should be installed, the NTSB said.
• The Japan Transport Safety Board found in a Sept. 25 report an internal short-circuit "was probably" at fault though it was impossible to say what prompted it.
• As part of that design, Boeing installed two lithium-ion batteries, which hold more energy and last longer than older technology. Those factors also make them potentially more dangerous because they are made with flammable chemicals and contain enough energy to self-ignite if they malfunction.
• Boeing had estimated that the chances of a single cell on one of its 787 batteries failing and venting flammable chemicals was one in 10 million. When the second failure occurred in Japan, the aircraft had flown just 52,000 hours, according to the NTSB.
• This miscalculation was part of a cascading series of failures in the design and certification process, the safety board concluded.
• The battery tested for possible failure by GS Yuasa wasn't the same as the ones installed on the Dreamliner fleet and the tests didn't anticipate the most severe conditions seen in service, the investigation found.
• An inspection of GS Yuasa's manufacturing plant by the NTSB found evidence that foreign debris was allowed to contaminate batteries, "which could lead to internal short circuiting."
• The company's inspections also couldn't detect other internal defects capable of producing short circuits. The report didn't blame those issues for the fire.
• Boeing also failed to anticipate the battery's risks, the NTSB said. The company's engineers didn't even consider the potential for a single cell overheating and igniting adjoining cells, according to the report.
• The FAA didn't give its inspectors sufficient guidance on overseeing the battery design and the agency lacked expertise, according to the NTSB.
• The safety board has no regulatory authority and must rely on non-biding recommendations to improve safety.
• In response to earlier recommendations, FAA Administrator Michael Huerta told the NTSB that the agency is studying additional battery test requirements, according to an Aug. 19 letter. The agency is working with RTCA Inc., a Washington-based nonprofit that advises the FAA on technology."With assistance from Julie Johnsson in Chicago.

Boeing has narrowed the voltage regulation parameter of power entering the battery. Power surging is mitigated, allowing only a power stream within safe limits. Boeing has gone to the battery maker requiring a tighter inspection and testing of the battery construction. Special monitoring is enacted for foreign debris within the cells, and its detection of extremely small battery faults found during manufacturing. Boeing has taken extra measures for catastrophic battery failure during operation, protecting customers and crew from any battery failure. Since batteries are primarily used on the ground under static configuration, the 787 flies with direct power from its engines without battery backup. During a catastrophic failure of engine power or battery failure, the 787 can apply fly with RAT air power or auxiliary electrical engine power, supplying electrical power to its systems until a crises resolution is found. Aircraft today have redundancy making the battery obsolete during flight and final approach. The current Boeing battery protection is an overbuilt mitigation of its underestimated engineering faults now under review and implementation of redesign.

The Road To The 777X Is Paved With Creative Options

The 777X will be coming none too soon after its announcement of its inception in November of 2013. The problem Boeing has is the eager anticipation for the 777X, and what to do with selling a seemly dull prospect of a brand new 777-300-ER, an airline might add to its airline inventory in the interim of time. "Time", once again is biting Boeing in the foot. Make an announcement on an exciting all-new airplane, and your customers await impatiently. The old stuff ordered two years ago now seems older before it arrives. The important item Boeing is trying to address is how do you satisfy a customers impatience of needing new stuff for its own customers. Delta Airline when it double reversed Boeing through ordering the A330 NEO and A350's before Boeing's 777X arrives in 2020. Airbus will start delivering now with the A350, and later with the A330 NEO to its customers while the 777X project is still on the computer graphics card.

Boeing needs to recognize its predicament with both the 777X and 787-10 projects. The 777-300-ER is a great machine but it's not new. A Customer's sensibility, which needs to be addressed by Boeing in more transitional tones. The sales and PR team need to huddle on this one. Neither is the 777X coming soon nor is the 787-10 coming soon. Even if a customer orders a 787-10 now as a bridge to the 777X, before it can even get a 777X, the customer is stuck waiting for just the same. However, Airbus is quick to point out they are starting to deliver A-350's in December.

"We" will start to deliver A 330 Neo's in three years, what do you think about that?"

The customer retorts, "where would I be on the order list?"

Airbus can say, "way further up front in line than you would be, if you ordered the 787-10. The 777-yawner-300-ER is available, but why would anyone even consider that, when "we" have all new technology way ahead of the 777-300-ER?"

People want the new shiny stuff over getting last decades stuff.

Boeing must tackle these perceptions in the marketplace on with the 777-300-ER as its go-to gap filler since the 787-10 has not been built or tested as a provisional Gap filler for the 777X. The wait on the 787-8 or-9 is longer than the A330-NEO. Instant gratification is a terrible beast Boeing needs to be slain, by making a better deal or a creative methodology through a purchasing plan. Boeing could bridge the 777-300-ER to the 777X with a Lease-Buy incentive program. Lease a 777-300-ER through to 777X's entry into service (in 2020), and have buy options exercised on a like numbered 777X or keeping the leased 777-300-ER when the 777X is scheduled for customer building. The lease can also build equity towards a purchase of the 777X, partnering with Boeing, and the lessor company with those leased the 777-300-ERs during 2016 and later.

The mumble jumbo of it all, It that the customer will win in the exchange of equipment, The leasing company will not have Inventory risk, as it is backed by Boeing with a set buy-back price for each unit leased by the leasing company. Boeing will then have to sell the future returned leased equipment to a secondary market, which it should cultivate during the interim lease period.

That is big picture gibberish, which in all effect there is a heavy discount for the customers leasing a 777-300-ER and an incentive for buying the 777X through options. The Lessor also does well as Boeing sells more of this generation and next generation 777 through the lessor.

Boeing needs to build its own bridge during the 777 process.