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Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Winter Doldrums Are Over Now What

It seems this winter has been a non starter with only 74 net Boeing aircraft ordered in three months. The chart below from Boeing's own website gives the impression of the winter Doldrums are not some sargasso sea kelp bed holding back the Ship of Washington State. After three robust sales order years from 2012-2013-2014 comes a seasonal pause . I wonder how Boeing handles the lull before another order storm? I do know Boeing has pending commitments in reserve clear from 2014 with nary a slip of tongue on potential orders.

Boeing.Com Charts  "Ordered"
Orders through March 24, 2015
737747767777787Total
2015 Net Orders663 7480
Alaska Airlines6    6
All Nippon Airways5    5
GECAS2    2
Korean Airlines   5 5
Ryanair3    3
Silk Way Airlines 3   3
Unidentified Customer(s)54  2561
2015 Gross Orders703 7585
Changes-4   -1-5
2015 Net Orders663 7480
 737747767777787Total
PARIS Thu Nov 6, 2014 6:43am EST

"China and that region of Asia have not got enough orders. They have missed opportunities to get new technology aircraft at close dates from the manufacturers directly," Steve Mason, vice president of CIT Aerospace, a subsidiary of U.S. commercial lender CIT Group, said in an interview."
HYDERABAD Thu Mar 13, 2014 6:12pm IST
(Reuters) - Boeing Co (BA.N) is in talks with Jet Airways (JET.NS) about the sale of 737 MAX jets, a Boeing executive said on Thursday, while two other people familiar with the matter said the company had secured the $5 billion deal.
Dinesh Keskar, senior vice president sales for Asia Pacific at Boeing, said he was also in discussion with state-owned Air India AIN.UL over sales of the MAX jets, but that these talks were not as "intensely involved" as they were with Jet.

The two other sources said the Jet deal for 50 planes had essentially been completed and the planes were already listed under Boeing's "business with undisclosed customers", in its order backlog.

Monday, March 23, 2015

No 757 Part II Study

Part II completes the discussion from the 2005 Aircraft Commerce (Link) journal. Even though much has changed in aviation technology and aircraft development, the arguments for a 757 replacement are salient for the student of Aircraft making. Does the A321 fill the gap and will Boeing address the gap? I best can summarize these questions by a single sentiment. Boeing has so much as said, "go ahead Airbus use the A321NEO on this lost leader gap". Boeing thinks the 787-800 is the ultimate gap filler since aviation travel has grown so much since 2005. Routes once assigned with up to 200 passengers each time during 2005 have grown to 250 passengers in 2015. Routes that filled with 150 single aisles passengers in 2005 have also grown with a need for 180 seats within the same regions. Boeing sees the opportunity in the Max 737-900 once it demonstrates its capabilities in real time operations. Airbus has appeased its customers with with a A321 NEO after so many years of being 2nd fiddle to the 757. Now Airbus has the lonely slot that the 757 once occupied. 

My own dream was for a twin aisle middle body aircraft with seven across seating,  totaling 200 passengers and a 6,000 mile range. The dance card at Boeing Works is full until 2025. That is when better things will come again for speculations on airplane growth. I could imagine another 787-300 type announcement at that time, as passenger seat counts continues its growth.
  

Replacement outcome
As discussed, three replacement scenarios are analysed: replacing the 757 with smaller aircraft and maintaining a daily frequency of five flights per trip; replacing it with smaller aircraft and increasing frequency to maintain daily seat capacity on a route; and replacing it with larger aircraft at the same daily frequency where traffic growth is high. The best aircraft to replace the 757 are those providing the largest trip cost saving per seat reduced, or the smallest increase in trip cost per seat added. The marginal cost per seat reduced or added should be considered against the average cost per seat of the aircraft concerned. 

Smaller aircraft, same frequency 
The effect on the total seats supplied and total trip cost for operating five daily flights with the 757-200 and the six replacement options is shown (see table,page 31). The first issue to consider is the average cost per seat for each aircraft type. Trip costs for each have already been discussed, as well as the split between cash direct operating costs (DOC) per seat and finance or lease cost per seat. 

The 757-200 has the highest cash DOC per seat of all seven aircraft types. A lease rate of $350,000 per month makes its total cost per seat relatively high compared to the other types except the 737-700 and A319, which are the smallest. Lease rates for the 757 are highly variable, however. Unsurprisingly, the largest types (the A321 and 737-900ER) have the lowest costs per seat, with an advantage of $6-8 over the 757-200. 

The A321 is the best option, since it offers a 10-seat smaller capacity and a $2,100 lower trip cost by comparison: a cost more than $214 lower per seat reduced. That is, the five flights have a $10,700 lower cost than the 757-200’s five flights, but the A321 offers just 50 seats less (see table, page 31). This saving compares to the A321’s cost per seat of $71. The 737-900ER is similar, and saves $153 per seat reduced, compared to its cost per seat of $73. These reductions in seat numbers are also likely to be accompanied by a stronger yield mix, and so higher revenue per seat. Airlines could thus benefit from both more efficient aircraft and stronger revenues. The 737-800 is the next most efficient and the A320 has a marginal advantage of $2 per seat. Despite having lower cash DOCs per seat than the 757-200, the A319 and 737-700 have total costs per seat higher than the 757-200. 

Smaller aircraft, same frequency 
If unrestricted by airport and airspace congestion, airlines may choose to replace the 757-200 with smaller narrowbodies operated at higher frequency, providing a daily seat volume close to the 950 provided by five 757-200 flights. In this case the A321 and 737-900ER have to be operated at five flights per day to provide a total number of seats as close as possible to the 950 generated by the 757-200’s five daily flights. 

The A320 and 737-800 have to be operated at six flights per day, and the 737-700 and A319 at seven flights per day. The overall effect on the number of seats provided and total trip cost is shown (see table, page 31). The 737-800, A321 and A319 provide the biggest saving per seat reduced or added. The 737-800 has a $3,640 lower trip cost operating at six flights per day and giving just 10 seats more than the 757-200 at five daily flights (see table, page 31). 

The 737-800, therefore, offers a substantial reduction in operating costs for a slightly higher seat capacity. The A321 and A320 both offer 900 seats, 50 less than the 757-200, and also have lower trip costs. Both have a large saving per seat reduced, but the A321 and 737-900ER offer the second and third most economic options. The A319 and 737-700 have lower total costs, but the reductions are small in relation to the reduction in total seat numbers. 

Larger aircraft
In this scenario the effect of operating the 787-3 and A330-200 at four and five daily frequencies compared with the 757-200’s five is analysed. This increases the number of daily seats by 200-515, or by 21-54%. The main issue is how the increase in total trip costs compares to the extra capacity. The additional cost per seat added is higher than their average cost per seat, indicating that airlines will have to increase their yield mixes and average revenue per seat to cover the higher cost of operating larger aircraft. Higher belly freight capacity may help. The option of using larger aircraft is, however, only likely to be partially adopted by airlines replacing their 757s with larger aircraft on two or three of the busier daily frequencies. 

This will be at times of the day when load factors on the 757 are so high that unacceptable levels of spill occur, and also when there is a high level of demand from business passengers paying high yielding fares. The 787-3 has a trip cost of $81 per seat, and the A330-200 a trip cost of $82 per seat, $2 and $3 more than the 757-200 respectively. 

Their modern designs give the 787-3 and A33-200, however, lower cash DOCs per seat than the 757-200. The difference in overall cost per seat is marginal, however, and remains highly sensitive to the actual lease rates of the aircraft analysed. Lease rates will be the most important factor determining if it is economic to replace the 757 with larger types. While airlines experiencing high traffic growth may have little option about introducing larger aircraft, they should at least benefit from stable passenger yields when growth rates are high. 

Summary 

Although the 757 is old, its fuel burn performance is still affordable. Its maintenance costs, although not significantly increased with age, are higher than those of the narrowbody aircraft offered by Airbus and Boeing. The Blended Winglet system may prolong the 757’s operating life with original operators. The conversion-to-freighter modifications for the 757 are likely to provide an attractive exit strategy for some airlines. Replacement with the A321 or 737-900ER in an environment of strong competition and weak yields are among the most attractive options. These aircraft are of lighter designs, have lower maintenance costs, particularly engine reserves, and have lower fuel burns. The A320 and 737-800 also provide economic solutions in some circumstances. Although not analysed, airlines can of course finely adjust their capacity requirements by replacing 757s with mixed A321/320 or 737-900/-800 fleets as required. This is the main purpose of three- and four-aircraft families, which is to provide airlines with seat capacity flexibility and match supply more closely with demand Replacement with larger aircraft in strong passenger markets is most likely to be economic when 757s are replaced on busier flights. This is because high yield mixes will be required to cover the higher costs of operating these aircraft. This will be at peak periods when demand from business passengers is high. 


 AIRCRAFT ANALYSIS & FLEET PLANNING

ISSUE NO. 42 • AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2005 AIRCRAFT COMMERCE

Sunday, March 22, 2015

I Repeat There Will Be No 757 Replacement: Homework Reading Assignment Below:

Sometimes in a bloggers life ,there comes that time where a blogger must face the reality of where a corporation is heading. First a corporation canceled the 787-300 model line. Here is a copy paste prospectus on the 757/787-300 case and A321 as it stood in 2005. Missing are import charts and graph looking at options. Boeing has this data and so does Airbus yet they opted for an A321Neo

When this report was made in 2005, Boeing had announced making the 787-300 and was making its last 757's. The MAX hadn't even been a conceptual footnote during this moment. The A321 NEO hadn't even had a champion with Airbus Now the status has changed.

2015 Boeing summary:

  • No 757
  • No 787-300
  • Yes with Airbus A321 NEO is hoping for replacing the 757
  • Boeing's Business Case Is found in other Airframes  

I believe Boeing is doing more with the 737-900 than advertised at this point. First it must roll out the 737-800 Max, then 737-700 MAX, and going forward the 737-200c Max for Ryanair. Its ongoing slight enthusiasm for its 737 MAX 900 becomes more of a mystery until the A321 NEO debuts. Could this remain becoming a future Boeing announcement in the next two years for an 737-900 ER for 220 passengers? Two hundred passengers is the Max load for a single aisle. After that its a mini twin aisle for seven across with about 31 rows. A mini twin aisle is not a 787 width nor is it too long for more seats, but it would borrow from every program in making this a special airplane. Below is the 757 eulogy from back in 2005.


Aircraft Commerce: Important click when thinking the 757 Boeing decision not to replace:

Analysing the options for 757 replacement
Page 25  AIRCRAFT ANALYSIS & FLEET PLANNING

"The 757 has had an impressive history. It has been in a class of its own and offered airlines some of the lowest seat-mile costs possible for narrowbody aircraft. Weakened yields and traffic volumes and more efficient alternatives mean its now time to consider the 757’s replacement." 

Below is the quoted article for your convenience please link  to article above for complete analysis.

"The 757 has been in operation for 23 years, and a large number of aircraft are now of an age when operators are considering their replacement. The problem is that the 757 is in a class of its own as the largest narrowbody, so there are no direct replacement candidates. The narrowbodies with the closest seat capacities are the A321 and 737-900ER. The 787-3 and A330-200 are 100 seats larger, but are the smallest widebodies that could be considered. Airlines will therefore have to consider replacing the 757 with smaller or larger aircraft, operating at similar, lower or higher frequencies than they currently use on their route networks.

Before considering which aircraft is a suitable substitute for the 757, the need for replacement must be examined, including the 757’s operating cost trend and disposal options.

757 profile: 
The 757-200 is mainly used on short and medium-range routes, with seat numbers typically totalling between 178 and 208 in various arrangements. While seat arrangements vary, a typical two class configuration is 190 seats. American Airlines, is the biggest operator, with an average stage length of 1,178nm, and configured with 186 seats.

This is close to the average for many 757 operations. Overall, a 1,000nm sector length and annual utilisation of about 2,700 flight hours (FH), 3,000 block hours (BH) and 1,050 flight cycles (FC) is representative of how many 757s are used. Despite being about 33% bigger than the 727-200, the 757-200 consumes up to 43% less fuel per seat. The 757-300 is a stretch version of the -200, carrying about 245 passengers. The 757-300’s maximum take-off weight (MTOW) was increased to 272,500lbs.

There are 986 757-200s in service with 98 airlines, most of them in North America and Europe. Only 55 757-300s were acquired by seven airlines, including Northwest, Condor Flugdienst and ATA Airlines. The 757-300’s poor sales performance is partially due to the A321. The 757-300 is also a very long aircraft. So, despite being very efficient and having attractive seat-mile costs, it takes a long time to load and off-load passengers. The majority of 757s fly short- and medium-haul trunk routes in the US domestic market.

It has proved popular with European charter carriers, since it can operate across all of Europe, as well as to the US East coast. The 757’s largest operators are American, Delta, Northwest and United. America West, Continental, National and US Airways also have large fleets, as do British Airways, Iberia, and various European charter airlines. China is also an important market, with Air China and China Southern operating 42 757-200s.

Case for 757 replacement:
Many 757 operators are split between those that may benefit from downsizing and those that require higher capacity aircraft. This needs careful consideration, since new aircraft will offer operating efficiencies and lower cash operating costs, but will also have high capital and financing charges. This raises the issue of whether the 757’s maintenance costs are increasing at a high rate, and if its fuel burn is high in relation to the aircraft that could potentially replace it. Besides the 787-3, A330-200, A321 and 737-900, the smaller A320, A319, 737-800 and 737-700 are all replacement candidates.

Maintenance costs:
The 757’s maintenance programme includes a base check cycle based on four C checks. The basic interval for 1C tasks is 6,000 FH or 18 months. There are multiples of the basic 1C tasks, and the heavy check at the end of the cycle is the C4 check with an interval of 24,000FH and 72 months. In practice, most airlines utilise about 85% of this interval. With an annual utilisation of about 2,700 FH and 1,050 FCs, the C check will be about every 15 months and 3,375 FH, suggesting that the C check cycle will be completed about every 13,500FH and five years.

The youngest aircraft will still be in their first base check cycle, but many older ones will be in their third and fourth. They will have reached maintenance maturity, and their man-hour (MH) and material expenditure could increase with age. “The MH used for routine tasks in the C1, C2, C3 and C4 checks during the first base check cycle are about 1,500MH, 2,400MH, 1,600MH and 5,000MH,” explains Patrick Ryan, head of engineering and planning at Shannon Aerospace. “The non-routine ratio for C1 and C2 checks is 0.4 and for C3 and C4 increases to 0.5.

The MH for modifications, service bulletins (SBs) and airworthiness directives (ADs) in C1, C2 and C3 checks are 200, but increase to about 1,000 in the C4. Interior work requires about 200 MH in the C1, C2 and C3 checks, and about 1,500 MH in C4 checks. The total MH for the first C check cycle therefore reach 19,060 MH.” Given a labour rate of $50 per MH, labour cost for the base check cycle is about $950,000. This has to be amortised over the interval of about 13,500FH, and results in a reserve of $70 per FH for the labour portion. “Routine MH increase in the second C check cycle, as does the non-routine ratio. MH for modifications, SBs and ADs and interior work in the second C check cycle are similar to the first C check cycle,” says Ryan. Total labour for the second base check cycle totals about 23,360MH, which is equal to a cost of about $1.2 million, 22.5% higher than the first C check cycle. “MH for routine job cards increase again slightly in the third base check cycle, while the non-routine ratio, however, increases to about 1.0 in the C4 check.

Total MH climbs to about 28,100,” says Ryan. Labour cost thus reaches about $1.4 million, a 20% increase over the second cycle. The reserve for labour therefore increases to about $104 per FH, a $34 increase over the first cycle. This is equal to about an increase in $90 per average flight, and is small when all other costs are considered. The consumption of materials increases with each base check cycle, however. In general, although the 757’s airframe maintenance cost steadily increases with age, it will not impose an unexpected and heavy maintenance burden on operators. The 757’s engines, however, have high costs compared to narrowbodies that could replace it. In the case of the RB211- 535E4, reserves for life limited parts are in the region of $85 per engine flight cycle (EFC), while reserves for shop visits are about $160 per engine flight hour (EFH).

Fuel burn:
With the fuel price soaring, the 757’s fuel cost has become a concern for some operators. On a typical sector of 1,000nm, the 757-200 burns about 2,805 US Gallons (USG) of fuel. At the current fuel price of $1.60 per USG, the fuel cost is about $4,500 and is equal to 2.41 cents per available seat mile (ASM) (see table, page 29). On the same route length, a 757-300 burns about 3,250 USG, equal to $5,200 and 2.13 cents per ASM (see table, page 29). Fuel burn for the A321, A320, A319, 737-900ER, 737-800, 737-700, 787-3 and A330-200 on the same sector length is summarised (see table, page 29). The 787-3 has about a 20% lower fuel burn than the 787-300, and will thus have the lowest unit fuel cost. Unit cost is 1.51 cents per ASM (see table, page 29). The A330-200 and A321 then have the next highest unit fuel cost. All other replacement candidates have lower unit fuel costs than the 757-200, but only in the order of 0.10-0.35 cents per ASM.

Blended winglet:
Modification with blended winglets is one option to be considered for continued or extended use of the 757-200. The 757-200 Blended Winglet system from Aviation Partners Boeing reduces fuel burn by about 3% on a 1,000nm sector, reducing unit fuel cost by 2.35 cents per ASM. This translates into a saving of 99,651 USG and $160,000 per year at current fuel prices. With a list price of $1.05 million for a winglet system, it will pay for itself in about seven years. The fuel saving is improved to 4.4% on longer routes of 3,000nm. In this case the saving equals 196,259 USG and about $314,000 per year at current fuel prices, generating a return for the operator after about four years.

Freighter conversion:
Lessors and some 757 operators can consider passenger-to-freighter conversion programmes as an exit strategy. The two independent passenger to-freighter conversions for the 757-200 are offered by Precision Conversions and Alcoa-SIE. Precision Conversions has a 15-pallet conversion, which has been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and by China’s aviation regulator. The aircraft has maximum structural payload of 67,000-71,000lbs, and up to 6,600 cubic feet of cargo space on the main deck, with an additional 1,790 cubic feet on the lower deck. Alcoa-SIE is still developing its 14.5- pallet conversion. The aircraft will have a gross structural payload of 66,000lbs, and a lower total container volume on the main deck than aircraft modified with the Precision Conversions’ programme. Conversion is dependent on various factors. The first is lessors’ concern about whether the lease rate of 757-200SFs will be high enough to generate a return on the book value or investment in the aircraft and the cost of freight conversion.

The current market value for 757s built before 1989 is less than $8 million. Including the conversion and probable maintenance expenses, the total cost of acquiring a converted 757 is about $13 million. Given a lease factor of 1.5%, a monthly lease rate of about $195,000 for the 757-200SF is necessary to make conversion economic, which is similar to the expected market lease rate for converted aircraft. This suggests that lessors are only likely to be interested in converting the 757 when its market or book value has declined to $8 million or less. Airlines that own the 757 might also be interested in the conversion if they have dedicated freight operations. This is likely to be when the aircraft reach a low or zero book value.

Airlines therefore only need to pay for conversion and maintenance costs, which will total about $5 million, but will depend heavily on the need for engine shop visits. China’s airlines, such as Shanghai Airlines, are more active in converting their 757s to meet strong cargo growth.

Replacement strategy:
There are three options for replacing the 757-200. The first, for airlines experiencing weaker passenger volumes and yields, is to replace the 757 with smaller aircraft and operate them at the same frequency. This will reduce capacity offered on a route, resulting in operating cost savings and an improved yield mix.

The second option is to replace the 757 with smaller narrowbodies and increase frequencies to maintain total capacity on each route.

The third is for airlines experiencing high load factors and traffic growth, and examines replacing the 757 with bigger aircraft, thereby increasing capacity on each route. China Southern Airlines, for example, has ordered 10 787s to replace its 757s. Its 757s are flown on busy routes, such as Guangzhou-Beijing, which have been recording double-digit growth rates.

A321/A320/A319 
In a similar cabin configuration to the 757-200, the A321 has about 10 fewer seats, putting the A321’s capacity at 180 in this analysis. A high MTOW variant of 205,000lbs gives the A321-200 a range of up to 3,000nm, which enables it to operate a number of important US transcontinental routes, as well as some of the longer European intercontinental sectors. The A320 has a typical two-class seat size of 150. There are various MTOW variants, and the aircraft can operate the 1,000nm sectors operated by the 757 without any payload restrictions. This is true for the A319, which has a seat count of about 124 on this comparative basis. The A321, A320 and A319 have the same pilot type rating, share many system rotables, and can all be powered by the same variants of the CFM56-5B or V.2500 engine, thereby providing attractive commonality benefits.

737-900ER/737-800/737-700.
Over the past several years the 737- 900 has posed a threat to the 757-200 and A321. A new higher gross weight and longer range version, the -900ER, has now been launched. The 737-900ER can carry up to 26 more passengers, or fly about 500nm further than the 737-900. An additional pair of exit doors and a flat rear pressure bulkhead allow room for up to 215 passengers in the same fuselage. Other changes, which include optional Blended Winglets and auxiliary fuel tanks, increase range to 3,205nm. The 737-900ER connects distant city pairs across continents, such as San Francisco-Boston, in a general two-class configuration of 177 seats. It has two other smaller family members.

The 737-800 has a seat capacity of 160, and is larger than the A320. The 737-700 has a seat capacity of 128, and the performance capability to operate 1,000nm sectors without payload or performance restrictions. The 737-700/-800/-900ER are powered by the CFM56-7B set at different thrust ratings between 24,000lbs and 27,300lbs. Like the A320 family, the 737NG has a single pilot type rating and common system components, offering airlines attractive commonality benefits.

787-3 
The new 787-3 is expected to have a two-class capacity of 289 seats. Its 3,500nm range capacity will allow it to operate most city-pairs in the Asia Pacific region, and many of the same routes where the 757-200/-300 is deployed. The 787-3 will be powered by the General Electric GENX or the RollsRoyce Trent 1000. Both have wide intake fans and high bypass ratios. One main result will be a 20% lower fuel burn than the 767-300. The 787 will also have a carbon fibre content exceeding 80%, whose main benefit will be resistance to structural damage and corrosion. This should contribute to lower base-check-related maintenance costs, and also result in a low rate of increase in MH consumption for these checks as the aircraft ages.

A330-200
The A330-200 is similar in size to the 787-3, with a seat capacity of 293. The older design and use of Trent 700, PW4000-100 or CF6-80E1 engines means it has higher fuel burn than the 787-3. This aircraft is already used by Dragonair for high-density routes into mainland China from Hong Kong. The A350-800 could possibly be used to replace the 757 on similar routes, but the A350 has been designed for ultra longhaul missions.

Economic analysis.
The three 757-200 replacement options have each been analysed. The first two options consider replacing the 757 with one of three A320 family types and three 737NG variants either at the same or higher frequencies as the 757-200 on a 1,000nm route. This examines the difference in total aircraft trip costs and seat capacities between the 757 and six narrowbody replacement candidates to identify the most economic option.

The third option considers replacing the 757 with larger aircraft, by examining the quantity of additional seats supplied by either the 787-3 or A330-200, the net increase in aircraft trip costs, and the incremental revenue required by additional passengers to cover this. All three options are analysed on a 1,000nm sector length. The flight time for a 1,000nm sector is 152-160 minutes, and a taxi time of 20 minutes has been applied. This will result in annual utilisations already described. The 757-200 is also assumed to operate at a frequency of five flights per day. This generates a daily capacity of 950 seats each way. All aircraft have been analysed in two classes, with seat numbers as previously described (see table, page 29). The MTOWs used for each aircraft are also summarised. The trip costs analysed for these aircraft include: maintenance; navigation and landing fees; fuel; annual flight crew and flight attendant employment costs; and lease charges. These are summarised on table provided.

Fuel burns and costs have been discussed. The 787’s carbon fibre content of more than 80%, and resulting resistance to structural damage and corrosion to reduce the ratio of non-routine maintenance, is expected to give it 15% lower base check costs than the 767. The 787-3’s fuselage maintenance cost will be $480 per FH. The engine reserve is expected to be $260 per engine flight hour for an average FC time of about 2.5FH. This takes into consideration the probable reserves for life limited parts, shop visit costs and removal interval. The cost for rotables and heavy components is expected to be $250 per FH and $165 per FH, respectively.

Hence the 787-3’s total maintenance cost per FH is about $1,275 (see table, this page). The 757’s total maintenance costs are $1,140 per FH (see table, this page), which is high in relation to the A320 family and 737NG variants. These smaller narrowbodies benefit from the long average cycle time that results in a low engine reserves for EFH, as well as having airframe related-costs that are $200 per FH lower than the 757.

All aircraft types have two-man flightcrews, with gross salaries, allowances and annual productivity as shown (see table, this page). Gross salaries are escalated by 25% to account for the additional costs of insurance and pension contributions, subsistence, uniforms and training. This does not allow, however, for possible advantages some types may have over others with respect to commonality that would result in long-term reductions in training costs.

Pilot commonality may have the effect of improving pilot productivity and reducing training costs, with the overall effect of lower employment costs and fewer crews required per aircraft and so lower costs per trip. The actual benefits of pilot commonality depend on fleet mix and airline policy. Landing and navigation charges for each type relate to the MTOW. Catering charge is assumed to be $8 per seat.

Typical current monthly lease rates have been used for the A321/320/319, 737NG members, and A330-200. These are summarised (see table, this page). A monthly finance charge for the 787-3 is based on the list price of $120 million for the 787-3, a 25% purchase discount, and lease factor of 0.9%. This results in a monthly rate of $810,000. Monthly lease rates for the 757-200 are highly variable. Over the past four years leases have been renegotiated for many aircraft, and have come down to $180,000-220,000 per month in many cases. Moreover, rates for newly signed leases for older aircraft have approached levels as low as $160,000 per month. Long-term rates for financings signed prior to 2001 for a large number of aircraft are in the region of $350,000- 450,000. For this reason, a lease rate of $350,000 has been used for the 757-200.

Overall, this results in the trip and unit ASM costs shown for the seven aircraft types operated at higher frequency, providing a daily seat volume close to the 950 provided by five 757-200 flights. In this case the A321 and 737-900ER have to be operated at five flights per day to provide a total number of seats as close as possible to the 950 generated by the 757-200’s five daily flights. The A320 and 737-800 have to be operated at six flights per day, and the 737-700 and A319 at seven flights per day. The overall effect on the number of seats provided and total trip cost is shown (see table, page 31). The 737-800, A321 and A319 provide the biggest saving per seat reduced or added.


Continue Reading in linked website:

Handing Over An Airplane A Best Read Feature

Part of the function of this blog is to point out information found within the world of aviation. Recently a feature article was written detailing in journal format, the process of American Airlines taking delivery on its latest 777-300ER. What happens before money and airplanes are exchanged? This is brief introduction for you to consider for future reference if you are a follower of this blog.

Link:

Best of Airways Magazine: Handing Over the Keys

 

Friday, March 20, 2015

757 Is At It Again

So much speculation so little time. The 757 is used in an aerodynamic efficiency testing program. The aviation speculators are ravished over the 757 doing anything at all. It is a dead design? However, Boeing pulls another rabbit out of engineering bag. Everything thats makes a plane fly better in a concept bag. The 757 may as well been a brick from the back lot given to the engineers and R&D with this one task. Make it fly more efficient!

People like me continue to fascinate over the the 757, and then they do a tease like this using the 757 as a flying test bed.  It gives the blog world a day of some kind of relevance. What is Boeing up to with its 757 test bed? Is really seeing what flying benchmarks, it could establish for a follow-on 757, or is it really testing independent concepts for data collection for any new improvement on airline advancement for all types? Only the VP's know for sure. 

The blog tease is out in the forefront now time for the follow-up from someone who also has been stung by the 757 gap filling and needed Boeing aircraft dream.


Aerodynamic efficiency target of Boeing ecoDemonstrator 757 flight tests


March 20, 2015

The Boeing Airplane Company's ecoDemonstrator 757 (Photo: Boeing)


















"Boeing is at it again, continuing its on-going ecoDemonstrator test program by ramping up a series of flight tests with a modified 757 airliner. The lengthy tests will assess new methods to advance efficiency, cut noise and lower carbon emissions.
The flight tests, a continuing part of Boeing's ecoDemonstrator series, are being conducted in collaboration with the TUI Group and NASA using the ecoDemonstrator 757 for the tests. Boeing is actually using the single aircraft to conduct three separate tests simultaneously, on three separate aerodynamic surfaces. The experiments being conducted with TUI focus on aerodynamic efficiency. The two other investigations in conjunction with NASA will focus reduced fuel use and carbon emissions."
  • The aircraft's left wing is being used by Boeing to evaluate technologies to reduce the environmental effects on natural laminar flow. Anything that disrupts the smooth flow of air across the plane is bad, and doubly so if this flow disruption occurs on the wing. 
  • The right wing is also concerned with lessening the effects of insect fragments. Working in conjunction with NASA's Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) Project, Boeing will evaluate two technologies on the ecoDemonstrator 757.
  • The third test is happening at the same time, but this one is up on the vertical tail. Active flow control is being evaluated by NASA and Boeing to improve airflow over the rudder and maximize its aerodynamic efficiency." 

The NASA play, starts to confuse the 757 play for the future. Is this a military science project or for getting the bugs out, or is it a commercial expansion project, maximization for laminar flow technology?  The wing area is Boeing's play ground. Perhaps a new 757 wing will come out of this joint testing with Nasa. Perhaps both will gain some data for well , who knows?




The fuel for speculation has caught fire within the realm of Winging It. This is not a 757 stepping stone, but it is an integral part for finding a gap filler carrying 200 plus passengers for transoceanic and trans continental hauling of passengers and freight from hubs.



  • New Plastic wings, yes
  • New Engines, Yes
  • Bugs and more bugs, No
  • 220 Max seats yes
  • Exceeds A321 expectations , yes
  • All Plastic, yes (See Charleston's plant layout and plastic body making)
  • Bleed Air By-pass, No
  • All electric, yes
Its the best of Max and the Dreamliner at the same time. Its wider than a Max smaller narrower an 787-800. It flies somewhere in between a Max 9 and 787-800 in distance. It will give Airbus a severe wedgie in its flight-line. Its the next Boeing announcement at some airshow near England or Paris. The 757 is not dead! Just metamorphic, like a butterfly. What does Boeing number it or call it is the tougher question at this point. I dubbed it the Goldenliner 797.





Thursday, March 19, 2015

Not So Fast My Friends The Board Wants Time To Consider Ryanair Expansion

Counter Point

It's a direct acknowledgement for Norwegian Air's loss during its expansion period, the board of Ryanair has backed off it's own CEO O'Leary's enthusiasm with a "Not So Fast" curve ball on any delusions of grandeur during wide body talks. Oh I know they said on Monday the words "Transatlantic", and "wide body assessment" in the same sentence. It matched O'Leary's assault forward banter on all engines of aviation. However, another meeting and another twenty cigars later Ryanair had not aligned its stars and planets or for that matter. Even the moon is out of phase with the board's sentiment. O'leary said it like a CEO, "they F***-*p.



What is actually in play, is all of the above during this executive storming period. It's a good thing too, a good storming session leads to norming and later great teamwork for all players in the meeting. Ryanair has five years for the Transatlantic gambit. It has another year of order pondering at its own pacing for the expense of it all. It already has the 170 Max spigot turned on for the flight line. Ryanair just took the ice bucket challenge and dumped the whole thing on its head. Even O'Leary is enjoying his run as CEO just the same. If he is to gain more clarity on the expansion concept he needs to get his ducks all in a row for the board to light its cigars again.

  • First, the Norwegian Air business model must play it out with its wide bodies.
  • 2nd, get those Max's flowing to Ireland.
  • 3rd Generate increased revenue and increased profits (A board preference)
  • 4th  Find a viable sweet spot for ordering when all these other items are on track.
  • Finally, Boeing make us an offer we can't refuse.
The "not so fast pitch" won out in the board room. O'Leary is the right leader at the right time, but the board is  keeping the corporate head honcho watching for the "whites of their eyes". It is more important than charging the smoke and flash and incoming competition. Ryanair wants to counter punch the market after the market shifting is complete. In five years it will have a proven track record of its strategy. They will have more purchase power in two years for a wide body booking. Boeing will have a smaller backlog squeezing against its own sales team. In 2018 let's turn O'Leary loose and attack the Transatlantic market. Hear Hear, its a grand green day!

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

Ryan Air Ponders The Pond (Motley Fool Update)

Atlantic travel is a becoming idea for Ryanair. Transatlantic voyages are just a beck and call away from passengers if using Ryanair new equipment. Boeing has already built half its 787-8 backlog. Jet Star and Norwegian have shown how to place 331 and 291 seats in a 787-8 respectively. O'Leary knows what the second half of Boeing's 787-8 backlog will look like at the end of  his own five year plan. If Boeing builds just 50 787-8's a year, Ryanair could be at the head of the 787-8 line in 2019 if it orders this year.

If they wait another year before ordering 787-8's, they may get jumped by others adding to the 2019 backlog scramble. The 787-9 is a big seller and will gain orders each year keeping its pacing with a larger backlog than the 787-8. The 787-10 will come on in Charleston in 2020. Boeing needs more 787-8 orders for the year 2020 booked, sooner rather than later. Ryanair knows this and will be looking for a special incentive deals from Boeing for some 787-8's for that time slot. The question is always how many do you want from Boeing? The reply is always what kind of of a deal can you put together if we order 20,40 or 50 787-8's.

The problem for O'Leary is knowing that waiting too long may increase a new Boeing 787-8 backlog before he can pull the order trigger. Hurrying up may cause him to lose out on a pricing deal. The answer is found when other airlines make market orders. If someone places a 787-8 in a large number, during 2015, Ryanair will jump-in with its order soon after another first big order announcement. I will now guess O'Leary will buy 25 787-8's to start with and then option for 25 later on before the market fills Boeing's backlog. It will make sense for its European network and North America connections when crossing the Atlantic pond.

Five Days After Winging It Blog Comes this from Motley Fool

Look Out American Airlines, Ryanair is Entering Your Airspace!


"For the business case to make sense, Ryanair must buy planes that are fuel-efficient but also reasonably priced. Ryanair operates an all-Boeing fleet today, and CEO Michael O'Leary has expressed interest in Boeing's Dreamliner for long-haul operations -- just not at the going price!"

Monday, March 16, 2015

Airplane Wars Reflect The Production of Liberty Ships From WWII

Finding a way for the introduction of ships in an airplane blog is enjoyable. Ships are my second major love when considering the human race of achievement. Liberty Ships from World War II are a marvel almost forgotten. I boarded one in the summer of 1994 while in San Diego Harbour, before it was to travel to San Francisco Bay as a permanent display. The more I scrambled about the ship the more I was amazed at its capacity for a smallish ship compared with today's modern cargo ship that takes months to build.



The American industrial muscle built 2,710 ships during the four years from 1941 to 1945. The ship I went on was built in 1945, the last generation Liberty. There were flaws in any Liberty ship when plates buckled or cracked. Wartime causes precision to flee, requiring a more generous tolerance for its engines from direct steam power to a steam turbine configuration. The whole point was to build so many of these expendable ships as possible, before the Germans could sink them. What emerged was the Swiss Army Knife of Cargo carrying ships and a victory during WWII.


Only One of Two remaining Liberty Ship at Age 70
SS John W. Brown is one of only two surviving operational Liberty ships.


My San Diego Liberty Ship Tour Example: SS John W Brown

WWII Float Line of Liberty Ships

Boeing has begun its own Wartime Effort with its production map, supply chain, and workforce. They plan to increase the 737 line to 52 a month while introducing the MAX simultaneously. The plan is to ramp up 777X production during testing phase while building the 777 300 ER production at full speed. Boeing plans for the 787 coming out its ears in Everett, and Charleston. I am guessing without knowledge on hand, but just guessing that Boeing will Build the 787-8 in Everett with the 787-9. I am also thinking Charleston will have both the 787-9 and -10 on its hands until further orders are obtained. Boeing is in a production fight with its strategic production numbers continuing during model transition from old to new.   

The Boeing Liberty Ship equivalent is in the 737 Max with some incredible differences. Boeing has time for 737 precision and state of the art accessories, where the Liberty goal was make it float and sail it. The 737 has the advantage of innovation over its competitor. However, time is the combatant in this case. It needs a wartime effort to do all things to all airplanes, and do it well beyond the call of duty. 

Here are the time fronts of this war:
  • 737NG - MAX Transition
  • 777 300ER- 777X Transition
  • 787-8 through 787-10 production integration
  • Every Ship Counts/ no losses... 
  • Continuous production without pause/no stops
Tactics:
  • Congruent delivery pace
  • Stable Supply Chain
  • No Testing Show Stoppers
  • Always Exceeding Customer Expectations
So the Liberty Ship example was not lost in history's back pages. Boeing is using the production mentality as if it were a wartime paradigm in today's marketplace.

The 737NG "Liberty" Production Line Renton, Wa
Image result for Renton production floor 737 MAX 

The Everett 777 Production Line


The Everett 787 Production Line
Image result for everett 787 production Line

Last But Not Surely Not The Least: The Charleston 787 Production Pace

Sunday, March 15, 2015

The Game Of Chicken After The Max/Neo

Who will go first Boeing or Airbus when it comes to single aisle aspiration. The risk identified is on the table is "a stagnation for single aisle ordering" as the market matures by 2024. A clear risk is hanging on today's technology with today's frame could make added value advances not enough when those advances are plugged in for buying a competitive airframes. Boeing is probably considering a possibility for the Max follow-on model, but it must be a significant change, and exciting for the market place. The real game of chicken starts with the secret places each frame maker in storing. If Airbus goes first or tries to extend the NEO theme beyond ten years they may give Boeing a window of opportunity for its next market buster after the Max's market consolidates. The current Boeing consensus is "Dreamlining" the MAX will not be an efficient use of plastic on a single aisle form. Airbus stole the march on Boeing introducing the NEO when Boeing thought NG was good enough for another 8-10 years, but the Neo changed the single aisle market dynamics, for Boeing as it had to react quickly with the Max advances.

Everything has now settled in on norming with this current NEO/Max standards after the last four years of Corporate storming over the single aisle market. This sets the stage for the next game of "Airplane Chicken", who will go first and who should go first on the next evolution? Before we get into that, some bullet point considerations will guide the General Decision Making (GDM) before the Strategic Decision Making (SDM). These points will evolve and develop soon or if it has already been developed for the GDM realm.

GDM "The What" Phase 2014- 2024


  • What the Market wants most?
  • What the market needs most?
  • What are the competition's capabilities?
  • What are this corporation's capabilities?
  • What Engineering aspects can't or won't be duplicated?
  • What changes aviation or shifts the paradigm most to this Corporate advantage?
Then comes the game of Chicken phase from the SDM Bucket.

SDM "The When" Phase


  • When going forward for next single aisle go first, identify this risk and reward?
  • When going forward go second, identify this risk and reward?
  • When will the aviation paradigm shift, and if so is will this corporation be the catalyst for the shift?
  • When are all development options on the table?
  • When going second with the MAX how did that work out in the long run?
  • When going first with 787 how did that work against the competition?

The game of chicken is complicated and corporate heads will roll if they get the next game wrong. Going first on the next single aisle reinvention will have the risk of copycat issues coming from competitors. The corporation could also be a central item in press for another slew of wrong reasons (ie. 787 project). Going second makes no new friends and catching up is high risk too. Either way having no guts gives you no glory, and playing it safe is just second place. Boeing must steal the march on Airbus in this game of chicken after the Max run reaches its completeness, and then it must go first with an all new single aisle remake.

The argument against just adding on new advances on a base concept is a risk in itself at many levels. An all new single aisle is a matter of when not if for each maker. Airbus has a good position of leveraging its technology into a revolutionary single aisle but does not have the risk neve in its nature. Explained another way. Airbus doesn't do anything within its design inspiration that can be incorporated into any new new airplane model unless its an older retired risk advancement.

Boeing has developed a maturation process for retiring risks for completely new technology where it will take its new technology off of its shelf (its wing) from R&D and make it work in all new designs. It has positioned itself going further on each succeeding generation. The Max program is an anomaly out of forced play from Airbus Neo program. The Max program needed to match the Neo and many cases exceeded it through the 787 program spin-offs. The Next Boeing single aisle is on track to astound the market and stump Airbus. The question is what will Boeing develop that Airbus can't copy without years of effort and billions spent?

The next Boeing single aisle will need three areas of attention they are as follows:


  • Weight Breakthrough
  • Power Breakthrough
  • Aero Design Breakthrough
Boeing will be looking for a single aisle "Moon shot". Starting with weight is an interesting proposition. Every part on the aircraft has weight. Including the dirt in the upholstery and carpet. Airlines have to compensate with what a passenger puts in its luggage or the diet a passenger isn't on. I am surprised airlines don't put a passenger on a scale when buying a travel ticket. 

"Stand here on this square with your carry-on, purse-backpack and luggage. You weigh 110 kilos. Our rate is $3.89 per Kilo for this 3,000 mile trip, your ticket price. is..." message received, go on a diet wear light shoes  and brush your teeth. Also buy cheap clothing at your destination. That is if you weigh about an overall 242 lbs of travel weight. You have 60 lbs travel accessories! Actually passengers become, is flying weight.

This means airlines who can strip the most weight off from the airframe and its customers are a leg up on the competition. My leg weighs about 34 lbs or 15 kilos or having a portion cost of $58.35USD for this flight. The airline who builds the lightest airplane will save its customers an arm and a leg buying a ticket. Boeing will come out using a new composite material before committing to an all new single aisle plastic body project.

Power Breakthrough is happening now, and will continue forward as new innovations parts materials and and engineered solutions for optimization of an engine performance. Currently GE is testing a ceramic material that can withstand extreme temperatures.

Dayton Daily News:

"Specifically, GE is developing jet engine components made from ceramic matrix composites containing silicon carbide ceramic fibers and ceramic resin that are lighter weight, more durable and can withstand hotter temperatures than their metal substitutes, said Jon Blank, chief of engineering for GE Aviation’s CMC laboratory in Evendale."

In fact the MAX engine, a CFM will be a direct beneficiary from GE mastery of its advancements. This engine will go beyond the CFM Leap horizon. The power is fluxing towards a better engine for a lighter airplane fully loaded. The When strategic deadline is about ten years from now. with a remarkable 10% over today's latest engines. The Quality Management model of "Always Improving" has lit the eternal flame in the engine world. Not only will  it incorporate less weight, but more tolerant parts with heat and stress. The jet engine is far from done improving. It's about halfway there from the first applied German engine in 1944 to the last GE or Rolls in the year 2100. By then a new power may emerge which could be neither rocket or jet. I look


Aero design is Boeing's strong suite. Airbus has figured out pop sickle stick wings can be improved. Japan is on the same page with Boeing and is an exciting partner building special wings. How deep has wing building gone? Try reading about laminar flow technology and you find very little. Boeing has most of the data on these physics. Its the birds natural secrets found within its flight feathers. Long ago, in the middle ages, science pictured a flapping wing frame driven by a man. The human race has learned it doesn't need to flap to fly. It needs to glide as if weightless. Airplanes fly like the albatross who are adverse to any kind of flapping. An Albatross glides for days on wind currents. Science has also exposed laminar flow dynamics. Boeing has scoped this science and technology and it is expanding laminar flow onto its next bird and during 777X testing or 787-9 operations. The next single aisle will out with some laminar flow technology on the frame which is not currently found on the Max.

Body, nose and tail doctors are in the house. Boeing is known for doing CAD magic on body efficiency. The 747 iconic nose is a part of history books. The new 787 tail is raw raw draft of what's next, and is receiving step changes in the lab. Coming to the body I will insert this question and I have mentioned this before,  somewhere last year. What about golf balls? I mean all those little tiny dimples on golf balls? Why can't Boeing test using micro dimples on one side of the wing or all sides of the body, making a single aisle slip through the air by 5% better with dimples? It comes down to these kind of questions. I am sure Boeing has tested this physics eccentricity, and knows what it will do with this application. One paint job could mess up dimple effectiveness. The answer might be in the paint gun itself giving the aircraft an aerodynamic texture with dimples? Who Knows anyway? The answers are being added onto a single aisle "Best Generation" aircraft. One that will be hard to copy by others.