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Thursday, December 18, 2014

Before Confusion-Seeking Alpha Part II

Boeing: How The 777X Will Beat The Brand New Airbus A350 (Part 2)


Opening with Seeking Alpha 777X vs the A350-1000 report part II. The article whether it is speculative from Airbus development claims or actual supported data, demonstrates that Boeing wouldn't put out billions of $dollars  on an aircraft, after going second in the design mode when Airbus freezes the A350 design. It is a correct conclusion taking current information as presented by what is known on the 777-8 and 777-9. 

It will fall into a conservative estimate, and even in fact, as both the A350 and777X "paper" starting points will acheive significant improvements over the evolution of its individual development. Whatever Airbus acheives with its Aircraft proposal, Boeing has set itself to not only match but exceed the Airbus proposal with improved effciency, sieze, and scope that may even impede the survival of the A380 and 747-8i. 

In order for Boeing making a program killing stamp on Airbus, they must narrow the 747-8F as the only super Boeing Jumbo, and replace passenger service with th 777-9 in that class. It just fits where the 777-300-ER fits.

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By:

LinkedIn (71 clicks)
Long only, airlines, industrials, aerospace

Summary

  • Boeing 777X concept seems to be slightly better than the A350.
  • To compete with the lower segment of the 777-9X market, Airbus has to stretch the A350.
  • In the end both aircraft are good fleet members.
In my previous article, I compared the Airbus (OTCPK:OTCPK:EADSF/OTCPK:OTCPK:EADSY) A350-1000 and Boeing (NYSE:BA) 777-9X and concluded that although the Boeing 777-9X is more fuel efficient, the difference in capacity does not justify the 2 aircraft to be compared to each other.
In this article, I will compare the Boeing 777-8X that can transport similar passenger numbers as the Airbus A350-1000, but has a far bigger range.
The Boeing 777-8X features the same optimizations as lined out in part 1 of this series.
The empty weight for the Boeing 777-8X is not yet known, so has been estimated. I expect the empty weight to decrease due to the use of lighter engines and wings. The folding wing tip system probably will add some weight. With the wings being considerably bigger, but lighter overall, I expect that the weight of the Boeing 777-8X will be close to that of the Airbus A350-1000.

Figure 8: Comparison general characteristics Boeing 777-8X and Airbus A350-1000 (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
Figure 8 shows that the general characteristics are similar to that of the Boeing 777-9X, with the only differences being that the Boeing 777-8X transports about 1% more passengers compared to the Airbus A350-1000 and has about equal weight.
For a 4000 nm trip, this gives the following results:
Figure 8: Results for a 4000 nm trip for Boeing 777-8X compared to the Airbus A350-1000 (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
The figure quite clearly shows that also the Boeing 777-8X has an advantage over the Airbus A350-1000. The fuel costs per seat-mile are $0.042 for the Airbus A350-1000 and $0.038 for the Boeing 777-8X, both in 3-class maximum configuration.
Looking at the performance over a wider range also shows superiority of the Boeing 777-8X:
Figure 9: Comparing the Boeing 777-8X and Airbus A350-1000 on a wider range (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
Boeing claimed 12% lower fuel consumption than the competition. Although the Boeing 777-8X has a significant advantage, it does not get anywhere near the 12% in my analysis. On the longer routes, the advantage tends to be about 10%, which still is significant when comparing an all new aircraft family with an optimized airframe.
Since part of my analysis is based on an assumed weight I will also include numbers for a higher empty weight for the Boeing 777-8X:
165 tonnes gives an advantage between 1 and 6%.
When more accurate numbers become available, this analysis will be enhanced or an update will be published. This article features a very preliminary and should be treated as such.

Conclusions

  • Both members of the 777X Family beat the Airbus A350-1000 in terms of efficiency
  • The Boeing 777X offers airlines the highest efficiency from 2020, obsoleting the all-new Airbus A350-1000
  • Boeing squeezed the Airbus A350-1000 in a difficult position, making a stretched A350 necessary
  • This stretched version will have lower range, but can compete with the Boeing 777-9X on the shorter routes
  • The Boeing 777-8X is superior while the Boeing 777-9X does not have any competitor at all
Editor's Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.

Before Confusion Comes From The Airbus Take, The 777X8 or 777X-9, Has Been Analyzed


Full Credit goes to Seeking Alpha Please visit its web site linked below:

Boeing: How The 777X Will Beat The Brand New Airbus A350 (Part 1)

LiftnDrag commentary for one paragraph before reading "The Seeking Alpha Homework Assignment". 

After going through this article, the author has come to the same conclusions I have when reading Airbus data. It's hard to clear-up facts using Airbus-Boeing comparisons! One may quote the A350 is 25% more efficient than its competitor without qualifying where they got that "number". The Boeing company firmly stated, that it compared the 767 model with its own 787 model, arriving at 20% better efficiency with fuel. However, after much research, I came across this nugget. Airbus plays loose with statistics, and they are not held accountable for its statements. Everyone is left to assume the A350 is 25% more efficient than the 787 when they say "The A350 is 25% more efficient than its competitor!" The digging-up of information comes later with this baseline note. Airbus was comparing an old or first built 777-200 with its base line A350-900. I don't know what version of the 777-200 configuration other than it must of been a 1990's model, Maybe extracting a comparison before all those engine changes and upgrades come later to the 777-200. On the other hand, Boeing was talking about its latest 767 as compared with the 787. There were no A350's flying at the time, Boeing made the 20% fuel improvement for the 787 over its own modeled wide-body. 

Without further ado here is the the Seeking  Alpha article by:





Please Link Above on "Seeking Alpha" for the full article, and gratiously give a web impression for its advertisers, Thank you.

Summary

·       "Boeing 777-9X is more fuel efficient even in a conservative comparison.
·       Airbus claim of 5% lower costs per seat seem to be based on nothing.
·       Boeing 777 concept is proving itself once again.
In this analysis I will compare the Boeing (NYSE:BA) 777-9X that will enter service in 2020 with the Airbus (OTCPK:OTCPK:EADSF/OTCPK:OTCPK:EADSY) A350-1000. It has to be noted though that this is not the most logical comparison to make since the Boeing 777-9X is bigger, but since Airbus made this comparison to show how 'light weight' their Airbus A350-100 is I will go ahead and make this comparison as well.
In the second part of this small study I will compare the Boeing 777-8X with the Airbus A350-1000.
The Boeing 777X is the successor of the Boeing 777 and features:
·       Wing made out of CFRP which reduced the weight of the wing component
·       Slightly wider cabin, which allows for wider seats in dense configuration
·       Bigger wings that increase aerodynamic efficiency by 12% compared to the Boeing 777-300ER
·       New GE9X engines will be 6-8% more efficient than the engines on the Boeing 777-300ER
During Airbus' investors days last year Airbus showed the following chart:(click to enlarge)

Figure 1: Comparison between the Airbus A350-1000 and the Boeing 777-9X (Source: airbus.com)

Airbus made the comparison between the A350-1000 and 777-9X to show they have the lighter air frame. Another reason is because the A350-1000 and Boeing 777-9X have similar range capability. Below I will outline why the comparison between an Airbus A350-1000 and Boeing 777-9X is not a reasonable one to make, I will do so by going ahead and make the comparison anyways. This will show that Airbus merely made the comparison to compare weights, rather than efficiencies.
It has to be noted that the figures used for the SFC are making the difference in the comparisons. Rolls Royce is not clearly specifying the SFC advantage the Trent XWB has. For now I calculated a value close to 0.49 lb/lbf/hr. GE claimed the GE9X engine one the Boeing 777X to be 8% more efficient, which gives a figure similar to that of the Trent XWB engines. At the same time GE claims their engine will be 5% more efficient than any competing engines in 2020. For now I will be using the 8% figure provided for the calculations, which might be seen as a conservative estimate.
Using the numbers available gives the following results:

Figure 2: Comparison general characteristics Boeing 777-9X and Airbus A350-1000 (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
Looking at the general characteristics it becomes immediately clear that Airbus is comparing a far larger aircraft with the Airbus A350-1000. The Boeing 777-9X has a higher weight, due to the fact that is has a far higher capacity and therefore needs a heavier structure. The Boeing 777-9X has better aerodynamics and seems to be having similar propulsive efficiency.
For a 4000 nautical mile trip this yields the following results:

Figure 3: Results for a 4000 nm trip for Boeing 777-9X compared to the Airbus A350-1000 (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
The figure shows that profit is mainly driven by the increased capacity. Fuel costs per seat-mile are $0.040 for the Airbus A350-1000 and $0.039 for the Boeing 777-9X.

Figure 4: Advantage of the Airbus A350-1000 as presented by Airbus (Source:airbus.com)
As can be seen Airbus claims 15% lower costs per trip and 5% lower costs per seat, but does this by comparing a bigger aircraft in 3-class configuration, with an aircraft in 2-class configuration.
The total operating costs might indeed be 15% better, my analysis showed a 16% higher fuel burn for the Boeing 777-9X. Translating this to a per seat figure the fuel costs per seat are marginally lower for the Boeing 777-9X.
Comparing both aircraft on a wider range shows that differences are minimal:

Figure 5: Comparing the Boeing 777-9X and Airbus A350-1000 on a wider range (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
Figure 5 quite clearly shows differences are small, but that the Boeing 777-9X has the advantage (even when using a conservative estimate on the specific fuel consumption of the aircraft).
As I pointed out earlier it is not quite clear how much fuel the Trent XWB engines consume, therefore estimated a value that came pretty close to the SFC of the GE9X engine.
Using the claim that the GE90X engine will be 5% more efficient, which is not weird to assume since the engine is slightly bigger (for every inch that is added in fan size the fuel consumption drops by 0.5%) the figure change a bit:

Figure 6: Comparing the Boeing 777-9X and Airbus A350-1000 on a wider range (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
For a 4000 nm trip this translates to:

Figure 7: Results for a 4000 nm trip for Boeing 777-9X compared to the Airbus A350-1000 (Source: Dhierin-Perkash Bechai)
In terms of fuel costs per nautical seat-mile this translates to: $0.042 for the Airbus A350-1000 and $0.040 for the Boeing 777-9X.
So in both comparisons the Boeing 777-9X ends up on top. I think that the second analysis, assuming a higher fuel consumption for the Trent XWB, is more credible. This quite clearly shows that the bigger and heavier Boeing 777-9X is still more efficient, although Airbus tries to convince customers as well as investors this is not the case.
In my next article I will compare the Boeing 777-8X and the Airbus A350-1000, since both aircraft transport equal numbers of passengers. I will also draw conclusions for the comparisons made and look which aircraft family will eventually be the winner.
Editor's Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.


Monday, December 15, 2014

The 767 KC-46 Tanker Is Rushing To The Christmas Tree

Okay, its the tanker under the tree official Christmas Report. Straight from the "Island of Misfits"  $1.5 Billion Boeing Dollars later it supposed to fly out of the hole it dug.

"Music interlude with Carolers"

·       Re-wired bundles of Joy, re-wired bundles of joy…
·       Black Friday Black Electrical Tape Blow-out the bundle Sale
·       Four Frames Awaiting
·       Two Frames without stuffing
·       One getting Ready to fly
·       Five Golden Radar Arrays

The interview revealed several more points. Panic in the Boeing Elf shop as team members run to and frow with magnify glasses, tweezers and screw drivers driver in hand.

The shop steward yells through the Bull-horn, ”Everybody, don’t run with screw driver in hand, walk!”

On the Wall a big, big, clock ticks off the days. Right now it’s on twelve whole days from first flight or December 27, 2014. “Don’t install the toilet seat, we only have 12 whole days. Leave the toilet paper out”, scream the engineers. The Christmas pandemonium is my own happy Christmas thought as really, the Boeing elves are working late and long, getting it right for flight. So what’s the real scoop?

As below reported: Seattle Times

"Air Force: Boeing cost overrun on tanker project jumps to $1.5 billion

Boeing is working feverishly to get the 767-based platform for the Air Force’s new KC-46 refueling tanker into the air by year end, six months later than planned. Estimated costs have ballooned to $1.5 billion above the contract ceiling.

Seattle Times aerospace reporter
Boeing engineers and mechanics are scrambling to meet an already stretched-out schedule and get the 767-based platform for the Air Force’s new KC-46 refueling tanker into the air by year end, with an internal target date of Dec. 27.
That’s six months later than projected at the beginning of this year.
And the cost of the effort is mounting steeply for Boeing, which is responsible for cost overruns above a contract ceiling of $4.9 billion in this initial development phase.
The goverment’s latest projection for the cost of tanker development has ballooned to $1.5 billion above that contract ceiling, Brig. General Duke Richardson, who heads the Air Force tanker program, said Monday.
The Air Force’s previous estimate had been for a $1 billion overrun.
Richardson said in an interview that the new estimate is based on Boeing’s performance on the work completed thus far, and factors in manufacturing delays due to wiring issues this year as well as potential risks ahead, including possible surprises once flight tests begin.
Boeing spokesman Chick Ramey declined to comment on the Air Force’s cost figure. He said the tanker team is “aggressively working our plans to mitigate risk and lower costs.”
He noted that because it’s a fixed-price contract, “there won’t be any additional costs to the U.S. government.”
Two Boeing insiders with knowledge of the program said the tanker team in Everett is working feverishly to resolve remaining systems problems and is under orders to prep the first plane “with the minimum capability to make it fly.”
Richardson indicated the Air Force’s priorities are much the same.
“At this point we need Boeing to get Number One in the air,” he said.
The flight from Paine Field is the first public milestone for the program, which is set to earn Boeing $51 billion for delivering a total of 179 tankers to the Air Force.
The plane’s take-off will mark the beginning of flight tests that will eventually involve four test aircraft.
The first plane is not outfitted with the military systems that would make it a tanker, such as the air-to-air refueling boom.
It’s just the basic airplane platform, designated a 767-2C model. This is a modified commercial 767 with a 787-style cockpit, a strengthened airframe, four extra fuel tanks in the cargo bay, and the plumbing and wiring to support the tanker mission.
The runup to first flight hasn’t gone smoothly.
After the airframes for all four test aircraft were completed this year, Boeing had to repeatedly remove and reinstall complex wiring systems in the first airplane.
Richardson said the wiring had to be redesigned because the various redundant wire bundles that independently control critical systems were not sufficiently separated.
Once that was corrected, he said, Boeing had to further adjust the design so that the the wires would still physically fit into the various bends and crevices in the airframe.
The painstaking unwiring and then rewiring of the first airplane delayed this initial flight by months, and added an extra $425 million in unplanned expenses to the cost overrun that Boeing must swallow.
Because of the delays, Boeing has committed to submit a detailed revised schedule to the Air Force in February.
Even if the cost overrun is as high as the government forecasts, Boeing could potentially make up for the loss in the later stages of the program.
Boeing vice chairman and chief operating officer Dennis Muilenburg said earlier this month that the company anticipates follow-on orders from both the Air Force and from international customers such as South Korea.
He said Boeing expects to build in total “probably closer to 400 to 500 aircraft.”
Among the fairly routine issues being tackled this week is a problem in starting the engines using the Auxiliary Power Unit in the tail of the airplane.
A person with knowledge of the details said a fix is ready.
However, some lower priority matters that don’t affect the safety of flight will be left until later.
Richardson said that some 23 functional testswill be left undone until after first flight.
That’s because crucial parts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification process cannot proceed until flight tests begin.
“Reducing the risk on the airworthiness certification paperwork is more important than finishing some of the jobs that could have been done,” said Richardson.
Despite the delays to first flight, Boeing continues to insist that it remains on track to fulfill its contract requirement of having 18 operational tankers built and ready to deploy by late 2017.
Richardson declared himself “pretty confident” that the 767-2C will fly by month-end.
The first airplane fully equipped as a KC-46 tanker will be the second airplane to roll off the line, which is scheduled to fly in April.
Richardson said that second plane has more wiring that the base airplane, and the wiring on airplane Number Two is now 78 percent complete.
He said he feels “very good” about the wiring fix on the first plane and that he’ll feel “really, really good” once the wiring on the second is completed.
Two of the four test planes will be baseline 767-2Cs that will focus on achieving FAA certification.
The other two will be fully equipped KC-46 tankers and will be used to test the military systems and to certify that the tanker is ready to refuel a variety of receiver airplanes.
The KC-46 design includes an advanced refueling boom that is hooked up to a jet fighter by an operator who sits at a station behind the cockpit.
Using a 3D video-display monitor, the boom operator remotely navigates the telescopic tip of this refueling tube toward the receiving fighter’s fuel receptacle.
Integration of the complex software systems that control this military hardware is a major challenge.
One potential risk ahead, according to Richardson, is the possibility of finding problems in controling the boom in flight once the KC-46 flight tests start.
Next summer, after the FAA completes initial flight test inspections, Boeing will have to demonstrate the ability to pass fuel in flight to a variety of fighter aircraft.
Only if that’s successful will the Pentagon in September give the go-ahead for Boeing to begin building the first production tankers.
At this stage, any further delays or unexpected problems could push that target date out.
“Most of the margin ... is gone” said Richardson.
To keep on track for 18 tankers ready to deploy in 2017, Boeing must hand over the first tanker for the Air Force to test and evaluate in the fall of 2016.
Yet despite the program glitches this year, Muilenburg said Boeing management is “feeling very good about where that program is at now.”
“We’ve got some of those technical issues behind us,” Muilenburg said in New York. “We’ll now focus on executing the flight test program under development, and then getting the program into production.”

The Boeing Moon Shot Changed Its Manufacturing Scenario


Before the Boeing Moonshot, Boeing Aircraft were individually crafted aircraft like the 737, 757 and 767. Each with its own unique avionic suite. Airbus pioneered commonality with its family of aircraft. Boeing lacked an industrial common denominator, which would underscore each new model and stop the variability in aircraft building as Airbus had done. The variability between Boeing models and costumers who fly its models for different missions, cost customers training for different aircraft behaviors, additional ground crew with a broader service scope. It meant more cost invested in the service and operation of its fleet.

Boeing needed a moon shot for any hopes of leading its competitor. The 787 was a wild and expensive development ride with little hope of instant financial gratification. It was really banking on its impact for all its airplane programs, and not just making a profit on the 787 model. It was a Strategic Air Command performance or could be said, “SAC”. The 787 was the central core-Sea Change at Boeing. It brought all its resources to bear in on the 787 for the sake of Boeing’s future. Part of this capitalization investment was written-off directly against the 787 project. The future SAC programs are now drawing on the 787 well of technology. These 787 benchmarks are ready for an additional thirty years of Boeing’s Aircraft development.

So far the Max has drawn in its new wing development, engine refinements, and avionics to its aircraft. It has taken lessons learned on plastics forward from the 787 project. Software improvement are included in its electronic flight bags, and a host of other maintenance improving tools. The totality of the Max program can owe its advancements from the 787 project. In that, the cost of the 787 project will share R& D with the follow-on projects.

The 777X has reached a milestone with selecting the GE core module system from the 787 project. It is going with its Michigan operations, supplying the central core architecture; saving hundreds of pounds in wiring, and gaining more efficiency when it operates. It also will borrow wing technology from the 787. Boeing is building an adjunct wing plant next to the current 777 assembly building. A question came to me why the 777X doesn’t use more plastics with an all plastic hull. I can only speculate or get an answer by doing an interview. However, the aluminum used is heavier than the plastic body option, but over-all fuel burn is tackled with a composite picture of aircraft weight, body size and lift and drag ratios. All these items add up in negating the difference between aluminum weight compare to all composite weight. The 777X will beat the all plastic A350-1000 by a “country” mile or more.

The year 2030 is Y1 time for Boeing. Y1 will be defined as a segue way for its family of aircraft. The single aisle, currently flows to the dual aisle with an awkward gap in passengers and range. The 757 and 767 had continuity in its offering. The 787-8 tries reaching down to the 737-900 while competing with the A321 Airbus. It has become an awkward fit at best. Plans are in engineering with an undefined y1 model meeting all the requirements for the market while using the 787 Moon Shot Pot draw down. 

It is an easy projection from this time to say they will come up with new plastic application in the next fifteen years and the evolution of engine will remain with a raging competition. Boeing will come out with a dedicated 200-220 seat super aisle plastic airplane filling the 737-900 to 767 gap. The super aisles is a concept where more space for seats and more aisle space for passenger movement or service access. Rather than WB’d it, as a 18 foot wide interior (787 style) with two aisles, go 15 feet wide and make two aisles with a 2-2-2 layout. The 737 family is about 11.9 wide on the interior.  What makes this work is 35 total rows at 210 seats and giving it a 6,000 mile range. It’s a mini WB with plenty of room. It can hop the Atlantic or cover a continent. Name it the 757 clipper going mach .85 of the speed of sound. This would be a competent family member.

Reference Article: Seeking Alpha

Boeing: What The Boeing Y1 Might Look Like


Summary
·       Boeing Y1 will be revolutionary in its market segment.

·       Boeing quality engineering is key to financial success.

·       The Boeing Y1 should regain market share Boeing lost to Airbus over the years.

Aspire Aviation's Talking Points (Research Article)

Boeing stretches 777-9X fuselage from 76.5m to 76.7m: exclusive
Airlines, most likely Emirates, asking for more seats on 777X: sources
Boeing to announce more seats on 777-9X in Q2 2015: sources
777X de-icing can only take place at Code F stands with FWT down
787-9 OEW 277,000lbs is 11,000lbs lighter than A330-900neo’s 288,000lbs
787-8 OEW 260,000lbs versus A330-800neo’s 280,000lbs
787-8 is 9% more fuel efficient per seat than -800neo on 6,000nm missions
Using 253t 787-9 in A330neo comparison pushes up -9’s landing & overflight fee, DMC
787-9 carries 13 tonnes more revenue cargo than A330-900neo
A330neo Mach 0.81 means 25 mins longer flying time on 6,000nm missions
Virgin Atlantic 787-9 has 9-abreast economy seats at 18.9-inch width
Boeing sees A330neo 9-10% more fuel efficient than A330: sources
777-300ER carries 23t of cargo, A380 only 8t: Emirates


Delta Dithers An Airbus Order Forward


Delta claims Boeing couldn’t put slots together soon enough suiting its growth mapping. Boeing could conversely say options exists and slot did exists where Delta could of planned better, taking advantage of optimum opportunity for new equipment. The argument continues from Delta, they are exacting on five year plan time-lines, where by happen chance, Delta was out of phase with Boeing’s own production timing, and Boeing could not supply Delta during its window of buying. No matter what happened Delta bought Airbus’ less preforming A330 and the not quite equivalent A350 in place of either the 787-9 or 7779X.

Whatever the Delta reason, they were bent on its own plans no matter what the airline manufacturer had in play at that moment. That to me smells of poor planning when you have years of managing a buy. Delta did not manage its buy, and got stuck with an inferior Airbus package under the guise with its A330 and A350 package.

Why do I say that! Because the metrics aren’t there when comparing aircraft performance. The A330 NEO is a knee jerk golf lay-up when comparing it with the 787. The 787 family flies further carries more people even if you have to wait eight years for delivery. Delta should have split the strategy by leasing the A330 NEO, until it obtained the 787. It should have ordered the 777X’s in number while there is still a front of the line. They have put themselves 20 years back on even considering the 777X with its A350 order, as it attempted a lay-up shot against the “on the green Boeing shot”. 

Conservative, and oh so clever financial minds prevailed in the board-room. The ”we can get by with the order, and on time with Airbus”, committee prevailed. Airbus said, “We are just better”, one more time, even though it was another defaulted order from Boeings large order book. Order book parity is approaching between Airbus and Boeing. Boeing productivity is running the roost, however. Boeing may get to delivery slots sooner rather rathr than later inspite of what Airbus says.


Airbus has yet to ramp up A350 production. It has yet to build the A330-NEO. Airbus is confident on the NEO since it just an airplane make-over. That will take two years at least. In the meantime, Boeing will have produced and delivered 240 more 787’s, dropping its order book backlog lower than the Airbus A350 backlog. It will be producing its first 777X prototypes by 2017. Delta knew these conditions. They looked at Boeing order book sequence. It was aware of 12 available 787 slots, where in two more years more slots could develop. It seemed like Delta bent its vision anyways, with board-room momentum of self-assurance. A decision like this is not for the next five years, but the next twenty years before a board would consider any fleet reversals towards another manufacturer. Airbus strategy is one of flipping fleets guaranteeing follow-on orders for years to come. Boeing is aware of this and was caught with its production slot pants down. This happens at times, during the normal course of all moving parts from R&D, production and sales, Boeing was caught short. 

Unfortunately it was Delta this time. Airbus gained crowing points when it essentially had a slower order book to merit this order, and not better aircraft.