Boeing's Horrible Week, The 777 200 ER, 787/GE and Wing Cracks

The temptation remains on edge, as each explicit aircraft happening  over Boeing's most advanced aircraft and its customers suffer a blight of events. First the 777 200ER disappears off the flight route with the last communication abruptly ending in mystery over the South China Sea.  The speculations rises and the facts are slowly coming forward, sort of!  Pieces and oil are found in an area right  near the last interrupted communication.

WRAPUP 10-Missing Malaysian jet may have disintegrated in mid-air - source

Bad headline #1 this last week.

To make attention getting news really aweful there is the GE engine on the 787 shut down in the area of Hawaii, of which it safely landed for repairs, study and a solution. A new GE engine goes to Hawaii sequel is now starring in "787 Production in the "Islands".

GE-powered JAL 787 has in-flight shutdown

Bad Headline #2:

If that isn't a monkey on ones, back Boeing just was tapped on the shoulder during an FAA audit. Presumably the FAA was there on a tip to audit processes in assembling the 787. What they found were fastener insets that cracked with the Carbon Fiber wing. The Japan wing maker changed processes that overlooked extensive application testing and the next 42 production aircraft are now under scrutiny and subject to cracking in the affected areas of up to a half inch for each occurrence. Boeing is taken a back and regroups on the problem with a face saving Harrumph to the press. Its a doable fix and will not affect our 2014 production forecast.

Boeing: 43 Dreamliners need inspection for wing cracks

Bad Headline #3:

The horrible week of Boeing is at last over where it can embark on a new crises. I greatly feel for the people on-baord the fateful unaccounted for flight. The early evidence indicates an instantaneous catastrophic hull loss, suggesting foul play over pilot error or manufacturing defect. 

The second case is of the engine shut down en route, The failure falls within planned for events. The aircraft landed safety in Hawaii as ETOPS would predict and is planned for in a crises situation. This isn't the first time an engine has failed, but since it is a new engine type and new aircraft type it is an important  and noteworthy event. I hope both Japan Airline and Boeing can derive a mishap cure with GE's guidance. Boeing has had a boatload of problems with its far more complex 787 aircraft. Since safety was built-in, every step of the way, it has brought everyone home so far to date. The 787 is rapidly becoming safer as each progression is installed in its over-all performance regimen. It is meeting all safety bench marks as each incident plays out. I hope this track record continues. If it does, then the 787 becomes truly more remarkable than imagined. 

The cracks that have developed as a result of new manufacturing applications are easily re mediated and fixed. It is not another problem in a long succession of glitches, it is a failure of trail and error attempts on smoothing the plastic building process. Boeing should have more over-sight on its new wing or parts building suppliers when changes are made on new parts shipped. It should have gone under an engineering review by Boeing when messing with the wings. Bad week for everyone home and abroad, This week should be far bettter over-all.

The Moving Average Of Production-Delivery: March 2014

The monthly moving average is a broader scope of production which takes into consideration both Boeing's production and the customers position for delivery. The customer often adds its own standard before delivery such as interiors, special electronics and other customer standards. Boeing additionally pushes fully assembled aircraft with traveled work, which represents extended periods of time in the EMC or the flight line before delivery. This 90 day moving average is an attempt to reflect a better financial prediction based off delivery per month rather than proposed production counts that contain traveled work to be completed or Customer extended time on the flight line awaiting customer standards installed. The 90 day production delivery moving average is a more realistic view of meeting Boeing's 10 production goal as it struggles to implement production change , customer inputs before delivery and 787 completeness testing before that same delivery. In other words, Production completeness bench mark is captured on day of delivery and customer acceptance.

A moving average smooths those Boeing bumps and customers delays into an average number which incorporates months of high numbers and low numbers from actual production flow out the big doors. It engulfs those EMC and Flight line contributions. Finally any customer delay is incorporate with a more representative production to delivery number.

The below numbers are a quick and efficient view, representing the complexity of a production number that Boeing could  use in over-all performance from inception of parts to delivery. The 10 a month goal for 787 must have all the various time flows through a final delivery number per month, rather than factory production in units. Boeing doesn't get paid until the 787 is delivered. That is the investors point of view. This handy chart below is just a reference point for time valuation of money based on production and delivery benchmarks.


Goal +/-                   12/2013   01/2014 02/2014  *03/2014  *Projected Mo
Month Deliveries            11               4               4              10
3 M-M-avg                       8.7            8.0              6.3           6.0
Production Goal             10             10               10            10
Production Trend (+/- ) -1.3        - 2.0               -3.7        -4.0

The production/Delivery  trend indicates Boeing is currently falling downhill in the first part of the year. My expectation, Boeing is holding a backlog of production examples, through its decisions that it has in the works at South Carolina, and is regrouping the mid-section unit in Charleston. Boeing is also doing some regrouping of effort  in both Everett and Charleston during this part of the year. By third quarter when the 787-9 starts delivery Boeing and its customers begin a strong march towards a + 10 a month number in sucession. The minus  numbers (production trend) a month will evaporate by May and begin a solid position at the 10 level of production and delivery reign, until the backlog is caught up.  By years end Boeing will have 200 flying copies in customer hands. That coincidentally will shadow the A350 entry into service.

Boeing needed a five year head start with its technology leap over the A350. Airbus took the low road to catch up with Boeing on an all new plastic airplane. But it did not catch-up at all with Boeing's overly complex and efficient aircraft. The Airbus fails by using dumbed down hydraulics and not using something similar to Boeing's robust core systems as found on the 787. When Boeing flies its 200+ 787 by years end, its leap in technology will have a completely smoothed out "Technological Gap" over Airbus from glitching. The only change that I can see coming from Boeing is testing and installing a new type of LI-Ion battery as science stabilises the L-I from  labs. That effort is on track at this time with new battery substrates at the molecular level absolutely calming any heat problems.

Suppliers, The Risk Absorbing Shocks For Boeing

Every bump on the road to success with the 787 has been absorbed by Boeing's suppliers. From landing gears to Plastic manufacturing down to the nuts and bolts (fasteners), the suppliers have been leaned on by Boeing in epic proportions. Across the waters its the same thing for Airbus. They even use the same suppliers in many cases with different applications, or  engineered designs having a similar purpose driven part for its intended aircraft. In Boeing's case it was part of its "new way" of building aircraft. Spread the risk shock to supplying partners of structures down to the fastners.

The "new way", needed every "part" to wind itself through the process at a just-in-time pace. Hundreds of partners are fighting the same battle of arriving at the precise piece at the right moment as engineered. It sounds like a virtuoso performance at the Philharmonic. Pressure is on the tuba section to get it right. The Boeing conductor takes the baton and increases the assembly pace. Airbus reaches out for a production crescendo. The battle of the bands have sometimes the same band members, a Rolls Royce trumpet section play in both concerts at the same time. Both conductors cry for more music at the same time.

Mean while back at practice, the composure's or engineers remake a part and want the suppliers to "forget about it" and now make a zillion parts that look like this, "exactly"! Not much fun but the supplier has to absorb a Boeing sock on the road to progress. A second look is the unexpected failure of a battery. Too much science is wrapped in that one part alone. The FAA, battery maker, customers and Boeing are all involved without end finding a doable solution. The shock goes to the supplier as Boeing is not a battery maker. They are trying feverishly to keep the FAA happy and leans hard on its battery maker while going around that corner on Boeing's epic journey of the 787. Boeing calls Ted, as in "Ted's Most Excellent Adventure", and gets Ted's answering machine in the phone booth, "Party on dudes, most excellently".

The parts guys are going to take another one for the Boeing Team. Fastners, body structures, batteries, and so forth. Boeing would now like a ten a month of each part please, hold the defects and add the special farings, Until Engineers have discovered a new deficiency or a better improvement. These are all possibilities happening behind the scenes. The supplier's job is to keep  up with just-in-time pace, and absorb the development shocks as they occur along the way.

There is big money in being part of Boeing's layered approach to airplane development and manufacturing, but the wear and tear on that supplier is not unfamiliar, as found on the shocks of your own vehicle when giving a smoother ride down a bumpy road for your car. Eventually those shocks wear out. Boeing's bet it gets off that bumpy road before its suppliers wear out. The goal is to get off the 787 development road during this next period of time during the next 18 months. Before your eyes, a completed concept for the 787 will emerge. It is the emerging aircraft, bristled with technology that its competitors cannot offer or will not offer because they are climbing from behind and must make up ground where it can. Airbus does not want fasteners, batteries and barrels that requires more development risk. It shocks are set for a soft ride, but lack the higher end performance of that of which Boeing has acheived in  technological applications.

All electric stuff is a steep climb for Airbus as is the central core technology. Many aspects of the 787 that have not been mentioned much for some years, are not included on the A350. The Boeing Dream story falls back in memory as just a very complex aircraft. Air India continues with 139 stand downs on malfunctions. Maybe the most of any airline operating with the 787. Boeing will put a team on Air India for damping the press releases on faults. I don't think Boeing purposefully produces those Air India faults.  It suggests an East Coast issue at this time. The SC plant is under a review by audit, and Boeing's own team is doing a plant reshuffling. The suppliers cannot take the SC shocks any longer. Boeing is in there replacing things that don't work with new process stuctures. Suppliers stand-by ready to reload when the mess is cleaned up.

Once the shock phase is over, Boeing and its suppliers can get on with the awe phase and a good road trip with its customers.

Boeing's Fixed Ethiopian 787 Has Airbus Over A Barrel

Ethiopian Airlines had a shock when  its new 787 caught fire last year at London Heathrow as it burned a large hole in the the airframe ceiling, where the vertical stabilizer is attached. The incident rendered the 787 destroyed, and Airbus calmly reasserted that a frame with attaching plastic panels is the way to fly. Airbus could simply remove and replace panels in a simple process anywhere in the world if something like that happened to an A-350 design. Boeing had a very expensive or an undo-able reply concerning a 787 repair job even if it was less than what occurred at London Heathrow on the Ethiopian's  787 locator beacon fire, near the tail section.

Boeing had a plan long before this incident that Airbus could only imagine. In contingency plans it had worked out on what to do in the event of tail drags, equipment collisions and other strike events against the 787 plastic hull. It never envisioned the need for a plastic fix near the rear crown of the 787, a very critical and highly engineered area where many join functions with flight surfaces occur and other technical systems surge through the aircraft, A fire in that spot was not a high probability event that would ever occur. Airbus eagerly awaited a Boeing fix on its barrel section design over the Airbus' plug and replace panel repair. In silence they high -fived that non injury incident, as for now the Airbus panel case wins over the barrel.

It appears that a well written Aviation Week article has outlined the case that many thought would not hapen, but Boeing's travel A-team made a repair in London right near where it caught fire.

Must Read Link Below:

787 Fire Repair Boosts Composites Confidence

By Guy Norris

Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology

Key Quotes from Aviation Week

"The job was also handled in a routine and confident way thanks to almost a decade of development, test and manufacturing experience on the 787, in addition to earlier structural composite work on the 777 and other smaller components, he says.

“We've been working with a much bigger scale of composites in the factory and in flight test. It's analogous to when we went from analog to digital aircraft,” Fleming says. “There was a skill set of mechanics around analog, and that changed with the 747-400 and 777. The skill set changed as you went to fly-by-wire, and you see a similar evolution taking place on the materials side.”

The repaired 787 flew on a test flight from Heathrow on Dec. 21, and returned to service shortly after. Aside from this major event, Fleming says “the real success has been composites.” He notes that “there was a lot of anxiety in the industry about lightning strikes and 'ramp rash,'” the day-to-day damage caused by impact with ground vehicles and airport stands and ramps. “There were concerns about lightning strikes particularly from Japanese customers, but I quit counting after 20 lightning strikes,” Fleming says. Composites have proved very durable, he points out."

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 Read the full article to gain an appreciation for all the questions asked at the beginning of the 787 program that is now is answered. Lightning strikes, major repairs and minor patching have been answered when the Ethiopian 787 lifted off from London- Heathrow leaving the Airbus position, a moot point in aviation annals, over the barrel. 

Question To The Press, Is Boeing Poised To Produce Ten 787 A Month In Everett?

Looking at Boeing's production slots 1-4 they have 2 each of the 787 on the production list in Everett,WA from station one through four. I noticed this as a anomoly, or is this what Boeing really is doing towards the ten a month pace it has just launched since the first of the year. The surge line is primed with four in its production as well as the the main production sequence in building 40-24.  However, building 40-26 (surge)  same like number of 4 787 in its final assemby line. Theroetically, Boeing could push ten units a month down final assembly in the Everett production scheme. That is my Big news observation. They don't need Charleston for the time being, until Boeing works out the Charleston kinks. Please "news" do a follow up on this idea, it has legs.

The Dirty Little Airplane Wars By Marquess Of Queensberry. Airbus Keeps Its Dukes Up!

"Taking aim at Airbus's flexibility over pricing of the A330, whose development was paid for long ago, a Boeing executive said it would be a "losing proposition" against the smaller 737 in China, even if Airbus gave up any gap in price.

An Airbus official retorted curtly, saying Boeing's own data was "veracity-challenged".

Rueters reference see link below.

Combine that with John Leahy's, " Dogs Breakfast", at Singapore Air Show. You are beginning to see a pattern that Boeing has really, really  an irritating new Zip Code under Airbus' central nervous systems spine. Everywhere Airbus turns, is a sales pitch from Boeing, that is blocking Airbus' attempt on world dominance. Its begins to show-up with the 747-8i, in that dwindling Fat Body market for the A-380 and is encroached upon by a cheaper and more efficient by seat count, 747-8i. Currently, Boeing is nipping at Airbus' below its own A380 break even point. With the A-380 order count at 304 total booked, it can't reach its break-even number due to time valuation for money as it will take another 10 years of production.  Cost increases and money devalues on locked prices. The break-even point varies over time upward in units, and Airbus is doomed to that outcome, as order numbers grow quiet. Even though Airbus has just received a large order for the A-380, (two years of sales work) that profit dog won't hunt in the upcoming years. It will lay on the Airbus' front porch by 2016. Everybody who wants one will have its orders up. 2016 and Airbus will be in a mid afternoon restaurant slump for the A-380. While the little dog, 747-8i may continue to nip at Airbus' heals.

Rueters: Article Reference for Context

Wikipedia Unofficial Count

Customer	Entry into service	Firm Orders	Options	Deliveries	EA	RR	Press Release
Air Austral	2014	2			*
Air France	2009	12	2	9	*		[2]
Asiana Airlines	2014	6				*	[3][4]
British Airways	2013	12	7	4		*	[5]
China Southern Airlines	2011	5		5		*	[6]
Emirates	2008	140		44	90		[7]
Etihad Airways	2014	10	5		*		[8]
Hong Kong Airlines	2015	10
Kingdom Holding Company	2013	1				*
Korean Air	2011	10		8	*		[9]
Lufthansa	2010	14	2	10		*	[10]
Malaysia Airlines	2012	6		6		*	[11]
Qantas	2008	20	4	12		*	[12]
Qatar Airways	2014	10	3		*		[13][14]
Singapore Airlines	2007	24	1	19		*	[15]
Skymark Airlines	2014	6				*	[16]
Thai Airways International	2012	6		6		*	[17]
Transaero Airlines	2015	4			*		[18]
Virgin Atlantic	2018	6	6			*	[19][20]
Totals		304	31	123	148	106

304 orders with  123 deliveries tells the tale after a many year leap (2007) on Boeing's next offering, the 787 (2012). Even though they are not in the same same class, they represent the same type of gigantic capitalization poured out during a R&D and production of a type change aircraft. Boeing will surpass  the Airbus A-380 break even point on the 787 from its own investment hole. Before Airbus can get it "there", as in making money they will languish since the A380 is inflexible for route changing. In fact the order book will shrink before Airbus can make its money on the aircraft, where Boeing continues to bring in, its 787 sales order book, well beyond break even. Boeing now has enough 787 on the books to make a profit by 2017. That is my own sensible projection for writing down a profit for the project, when everyone else says sometime in 2015 for the 787. Sometime in 2015 will also be the follow-on sales years for current owners of the aircraft. The A-350 will have its splash during that time and the comparisons will have been made. A second look for the 787 after 2015, will be at an epic period for the 787. All airlines will want to know who did the best. The 787 or the A-350.

If Boeing fixes everything in a permanent fashion by then, "they really need to do that little thing",  it will come down to bottom lines of commercial carriers and the flying reach of such aircraft in its business plans. The A-330 is already marked for niche duty, and will have a graduation ceremony of rotating out to those niche routes, as airlines resupply  the A-330 with the "new premier generation of aircraft". This includes the MAX and the 777X models coming on, later in the decade.

So the Dog's breakfast is now seved in South East Asia by Leahy. The stakes are high, and becomes the tipping point for the duopoly. Winner takes the domination award. "The Veracity (or lack thereof) Challenge Award" should be awarded to Airbus rather than Boeing. The old school yard adage is in play at high levels, as Boeing is tempted to say, "it takes one to know one". Since they brought it up, they will receive the "Veracity Award Of Acheivement". They somehow explain how the A-350 works better than a 787, before customers even take delivery, using old technology with a plastic bodies. Meanwhile these so called  "untruthful competitors", have over 120 airlplanes for its customers flying every day, every hour and every second. After-all, Airbus sweeps the "Hydraulics" award, and the "My Extra Wide Body is Not Enough Award" (77X). Plus they receive a medallion for "No New Breakthrough Technogoly On The A-350 Award. They just barrowed from 787 suppliers, its new stuff to plug and play on the A-350.

I haven't mentioned the Neo and single isle dominance. Unfortunately no one has produced its single isle champion to the market, as of yet, and we have bloated order books for both sides. The veracity remains with its actual operational numbers. The spin of the roulette wheel will tell who wins and who loses. The Max has made the case it beats the NEO. The Neo claims order book numbers and proclaims,"customer's know best, look at our sales numbers". Boeing retorts, "we are gaining on you NEO because we are better." ... And so forth and so forth!

This battle will be solved by the veracity of flight test numbers of the MAX. Then the table will turn when those actual numbers come out and play in the minds of airline analyst and CEO's. If the Max has more seats than the comparable Neo and flies cheaper, then the single isle market does not move aircraft for its amenities, but for the the cheaper ticket prices. On board passenger gizmo's are not as important on a three hour flight as on a 15 hour 787 flight. Customers want to hop on and hop off with value and efficiency. The MAX has a leg up on that matter as its ticket prices could trend lower than the NEO's  tickets could do, because of MAX value is imputed within the airframe. Why fly on an American Airlines NEO when you can fly on a SW Max for those hours spending $20 dollars cheaper for the ticket, savy!

That would also take Boeing to get that message out after its two years in service. Then you will see aircraft NEO models orders, flipping from Airbus to Boeing in the third year during the NEO vs MAX war.

Veracity of a Dog's Breakfast is Airbus' war cry, as it pains its way through South East Asia's market. A better war cry from Boeing is the "The Silence of Victory is Our Engine, Our Wings and Our Design".