The much talked about 797 is a lady in waiting as Boeing refines its newly installed 777X manufacturing and assembly center in Everett, Wa. Last summer was a glimpse of Boeing's vision when it hinted about the 797 program but it had unfinished business to attend to, the 777X program. It is clear Boeing is learning lessons on the 777X program and that will shape the 797 program for a NMA airplane.
Boeing is making giant carbon wings in its massive Everett location. It is automating the build process eliminating the mechanics rule of thumb on installation of fasteners and various processes. The bugs it encounters are legend. The reward is a change in how humanity builds massive things. The things from Sci-Fi is becoming a reality at this juncture. Boeing has a to-do list before announcing its next venture. The 777X program has already sunk billions into its life form as its a massive replacement of the 777-300-ER. The importance of the production transformation envisions a 777-300-ER in one position and a 777-9X directly behind it coming through the process.
All that needs to done on the factory floor is switch the software for its assembly machines for the types of 777 coming through its process. At this time it was reported that Boeing had over 12,000 corrections needing fixing within the processes. The schedule it attempts has managements full attention and full confidence it will meet the challenge. The 777X is on course for a 2020 deadline.
However, another step remaining for the emergence of the 797 is the completion of 777X process. The 797 is awaiting validation for processes it will use during its build. It will be built differently, but will be built on lessons learned from all its current programs combined. It will have a remarkable wing coming from the lessons on both the 787 and 777X wings manufacture.
The body pieces will have a new process for formation and assembly but it will also borrow from the 777X process and suggests the 797 may become a mix process in assembly with some other type of Boeing aircraft. The 777-300 and 777X is going to be a mixed process in the same factory space. The 797 could share space in Charleston, SC, or where the 787-9 is built in Everett.
The known attributes for the 797: it has is duo aisle, 5,500 mile range and up to 270 passengers. That suggest it will be closer to a 787 size than a Max size. The 797 may not have carbon fiber barrels flown around the world or will the wings come from Japan. The 797 may be built and supplied at home locations. IT could be a rail option or a barge option in play. A large single part barrel could float or rail IT to the assembly location or all Carbon Fiber body part could be made onsite of the assembly location.
Charleston comes to mind for that kind of flexibility where a 797 could be made and assembled on location without using dream lifters. That kind of out of the box thinking would require Charleston to build only the 787-10 and the 797 as the same time. This would leave Everett to its 787-9 and 777-9X programs.
Boeing will produce a clean sheet small airplane design after the 797 would enter service in five plus years from now. The year 2030 is ripe for such an announcement for having a new single aisle for 2035. If Boeing can reduce costs on all its processes then a carbon fiber single aisle is logical in 2035.
The hardest decision is coming up for a Boeing numbering convention since the 797 exhausts the sequence. Boeing may have to go back to the 757 number and add NSA to the number meaning New Single Aisle. Boeing asked Airbus if NSA was already taken.
Monday, October 23, 2017
Boeing's Old News: Now Becomes Singapore's New "News"
The heads of state sat in and participated on the signing of 20 777-9X and 19 787-10's thus bolstering Boeing's order book and was signed into a Singapore Airline order recognition. Boeing can identify a previous order "intent" from Singapore for these wide body during the signing.
The real news is why Boeing booked this "unidentified" order before today's ceremony at the White House in the USA. Boeing's book now stands unchanged from yesterday's documentation except 39 orders previously recorded as unidentified earlier this year are now identified as a Singapore order. The average aviation follower who does a cursory scan of aviation articles may be confused but this is an attempt to untangle how following big transactions are crazy.
Going back to Paris Airshow 2017, a reader following the events comes up with a hundred different scenarios reported by the press. First there was 200 737-10 Max announced, then there was 361 737 Max-10's having LOI's, MOU's and firm purchases for its press release. Another take said there were conversion's from the Max 8 into the Max 10's. Trying to make sense out of it all is an idiots pursuit. What really did happen at Paris?
Now comes just one simple order for 20 777-9X and 19 787-10's from Singapore Airlines. It was long ago announced in the press Singapore ordered 39 wide bodied aircraft in a major deal which shifted the battle away from Airbus and gave victory to Boeing. It was reported as an order win for the 777-9X program. Boeing had a big 777X order dry spell for a long time and Singapore shifted the paradigm for wide body aircraft towards Boeing.
However, a funny thing happened on the order book. Boeing reported it as 39 unidentified wide body orders. Singapore today signed with the President of The United States completing 39 firm orders of wide body aircraft. Boeing updates its order book by changing 39 unidentified order units into Singapore Airlines. The bottom line; order count does not change at this point in time as Boeing still show's 177 787-10's and 326 777X's, the same number for each type at the end of September 2017.
Did Boeing violate its own policy of not announcing a deal until the deal is done and when the customer wants it announced? Did the customer announce a transaction twice in the same year while wanting to remain unannounced? This is a very difficult situation for any airplane counter to deal with and report about. That is why Winging IT charts and graphs from Boeing's own un-audited report updates from its website before trying to say something accurate about what has happened. On another note, the Paris Airshow numbers have been a nightmare to track when trying to reconcile press reports to Boeing's own order book it publishes.
What is known is that Singapore Airlines and its Prime Minister, in a ceremony with the President of the United States, signed some documents saying they are buying 39 wide body aircraft with six options for each type of aircraft ordered.
This already "done deal" is now officially becomes a "done deal" and Boeing can now change its unidentified orders that "hadn't happened until today" by 20 777-9X and 19 787-10 over to the Singapore Air account. The order book gross number for both those programs does not change only the word "unidentified" changes over to "Singapore Airlines", but you already knew that since Boeing and the press reported it a long time ago.
The real news is why Boeing booked this "unidentified" order before today's ceremony at the White House in the USA. Boeing's book now stands unchanged from yesterday's documentation except 39 orders previously recorded as unidentified earlier this year are now identified as a Singapore order. The average aviation follower who does a cursory scan of aviation articles may be confused but this is an attempt to untangle how following big transactions are crazy.
Going back to Paris Airshow 2017, a reader following the events comes up with a hundred different scenarios reported by the press. First there was 200 737-10 Max announced, then there was 361 737 Max-10's having LOI's, MOU's and firm purchases for its press release. Another take said there were conversion's from the Max 8 into the Max 10's. Trying to make sense out of it all is an idiots pursuit. What really did happen at Paris?
Now comes just one simple order for 20 777-9X and 19 787-10's from Singapore Airlines. It was long ago announced in the press Singapore ordered 39 wide bodied aircraft in a major deal which shifted the battle away from Airbus and gave victory to Boeing. It was reported as an order win for the 777-9X program. Boeing had a big 777X order dry spell for a long time and Singapore shifted the paradigm for wide body aircraft towards Boeing.
However, a funny thing happened on the order book. Boeing reported it as 39 unidentified wide body orders. Singapore today signed with the President of The United States completing 39 firm orders of wide body aircraft. Boeing updates its order book by changing 39 unidentified order units into Singapore Airlines. The bottom line; order count does not change at this point in time as Boeing still show's 177 787-10's and 326 777X's, the same number for each type at the end of September 2017.
Did Boeing violate its own policy of not announcing a deal until the deal is done and when the customer wants it announced? Did the customer announce a transaction twice in the same year while wanting to remain unannounced? This is a very difficult situation for any airplane counter to deal with and report about. That is why Winging IT charts and graphs from Boeing's own un-audited report updates from its website before trying to say something accurate about what has happened. On another note, the Paris Airshow numbers have been a nightmare to track when trying to reconcile press reports to Boeing's own order book it publishes.
What is known is that Singapore Airlines and its Prime Minister, in a ceremony with the President of the United States, signed some documents saying they are buying 39 wide body aircraft with six options for each type of aircraft ordered.
This already "done deal" is now officially becomes a "done deal" and Boeing can now change its unidentified orders that "hadn't happened until today" by 20 777-9X and 19 787-10 over to the Singapore Air account. The order book gross number for both those programs does not change only the word "unidentified" changes over to "Singapore Airlines", but you already knew that since Boeing and the press reported it a long time ago.
Sunday, October 22, 2017
Erratic Airbus Behavior Fuels Its Flat Spin
Just last week Airbus bought the Bombardier C series for a Canadian Buck. On the surface it seemed like made a Boeing 737 backdoor stopper but it also caused disarray in Toulouse. Its ill selling A-319 has a plan B and its a Bombardier's C series take-over.
Disarray is a symptom of a faltering leadership paradigm at Airbus. Top end program manager types at Airbus wonder what's next. John Leahy, the Airbus sales wizard, is leaving without an announced replacement in sight. Leahy is busy picking out the color of his Airbus retirement parachute and not coping with a C Series invasion. Optimistically, Airbus positions its customers with broad and expansive statements. There is a 6,000 unit market for the 100-150 seat where Airbus says it will get 50% of that market.
Boeing is taking a "what the huh" position and wonders where those sales will come from after that statement. Its own 150 seat 737-Max 7 and it has tepid sales at this time and the 100 seat market is a special interurban footprint in most markets. Embraer will continue its wedged in position with its 75-130 seat configuration. Airbus has some dogged issues with the A-319, no orders since 2012, even with the NEO stamp on its side. The question becomes how can Airbus be so dismissive of the C series in 2016 and then turn around and buy the company in 2017? Unless it knows something no one else knows about its own airplane program strategy. This last statement is shadowed by the Airbus disarray at home.
Bombardier is taking a "what the eh" position as it feels relieved Airbus will now take responsibility for the C Series introduction into the market place. When Boeing knows it can sell 10,000 narrow bodies in 20 years, Bombardier thinks it can sell 2,000 narrower bodies in 20 years, while Embraer will do the same or more in that segment of the market.
If Boeing's single aisle bottom eventually becomes the 737 Max 8 it means the Max 7 is no longer making Boeing money. It too will go the way of the 300-400-500 and so forth. Bombardier can have the very thin 737 Max 7 market slot of about 30 units a year delivered. The flexibility of the Max 8 can dip down to hauling 130 passengers on each flight easily and it can expand its passenger traffic upward to 180 seats.
The C series can't do that even if it could hold 150 passengers. Airbus is in disarray making this decision unless it has a grander scheme in mind. This is definitely a grasping at straws move going forward and Bombardier got caught up in the Airbus grandeur scheme.
Disarray is a symptom of a faltering leadership paradigm at Airbus. Top end program manager types at Airbus wonder what's next. John Leahy, the Airbus sales wizard, is leaving without an announced replacement in sight. Leahy is busy picking out the color of his Airbus retirement parachute and not coping with a C Series invasion. Optimistically, Airbus positions its customers with broad and expansive statements. There is a 6,000 unit market for the 100-150 seat where Airbus says it will get 50% of that market.
Boeing is taking a "what the huh" position and wonders where those sales will come from after that statement. Its own 150 seat 737-Max 7 and it has tepid sales at this time and the 100 seat market is a special interurban footprint in most markets. Embraer will continue its wedged in position with its 75-130 seat configuration. Airbus has some dogged issues with the A-319, no orders since 2012, even with the NEO stamp on its side. The question becomes how can Airbus be so dismissive of the C series in 2016 and then turn around and buy the company in 2017? Unless it knows something no one else knows about its own airplane program strategy. This last statement is shadowed by the Airbus disarray at home.
Bombardier is taking a "what the eh" position as it feels relieved Airbus will now take responsibility for the C Series introduction into the market place. When Boeing knows it can sell 10,000 narrow bodies in 20 years, Bombardier thinks it can sell 2,000 narrower bodies in 20 years, while Embraer will do the same or more in that segment of the market.
If Boeing's single aisle bottom eventually becomes the 737 Max 8 it means the Max 7 is no longer making Boeing money. It too will go the way of the 300-400-500 and so forth. Bombardier can have the very thin 737 Max 7 market slot of about 30 units a year delivered. The flexibility of the Max 8 can dip down to hauling 130 passengers on each flight easily and it can expand its passenger traffic upward to 180 seats.
The C series can't do that even if it could hold 150 passengers. Airbus is in disarray making this decision unless it has a grander scheme in mind. This is definitely a grasping at straws move going forward and Bombardier got caught up in the Airbus grandeur scheme.
Saturday, October 21, 2017
The Airline and The Jockey
The airline configures its seats for horse racing's Jockey because "Economy" is the ultimate space allowed for 300 paying passengers. The airline starts its business case for how much it costs to fly one mile which could be the distance around a horse racing track. This all starts with selling the most number of tickets for lowest price in order to drive this aviation horse across the sky.
An airline assumes every passenger is a Jockey, fitting into a 30" x 17" x 48" cube. An airline can haul 340 dormitory sized refrigerators on every flight in that space, because that is number of tickets it needs to sell while sucking up the average passenger's expense account. The passenger can't complain because the flight is so expensive and they are so "average".
Aviation builds a wide body aircraft for eight across seating, but airlines need nine across seating for its own purposes. A proposed airplane is built for ten across seating but the airlines push back wanting eleven across seating. The airplane maker comes up with a blended wing body for 20 across seating but the airline insists 17.2" inches across is needed for each seat.
The airplane maker goes 300 feet long and the airlines insists it needs 10 more rows of additional length for its needs. Passengers are heavier and taller than the average Jockey. It becomes the passenger's problem they were born an average human.
The airline does a study and the findings are astonishing from Wikipedia:
"Jockeys must be light to ride at the weights which are assigned to their mounts. There are horse carrying weight limits, that are set by racing authorities. The Kentucky Derby, for example, has a weight limit of 126 lb (57 kg) including the jockey's equipment. The weight of a jockey usually ranges from 108 to 118 lb (49 to 54 kg).[3] Despite their light weight, they must be able to control a horse that is moving at 40 mph (64 km/h) and weighs 1,200 lb (540 kg).[citation needed] Though there is no height limit for jockeys, they are usually fairly short due to the weight limits. Jockeys typically stand around 4 ft 10 in (147 cm) to 5 ft 6 in (168 cm).[3]"
Airlines dig deeper and find that Jockeys make up only .000001 (340 Jockeys is the answer) of the traveling public's US population and prefer 1st class when they travel.
1st class has a 80" pitch by 24 inches wide across the seat. The cabin ceiling is a full 10" inches higher in first class. The seat cost $1,200 compared with $199 in economy. The pizza eating economy passengers loves its Jockey sized seat as they fold-in at the shoulders making room for another pizza eating football fan going to Pittsburgh, PA.
The airline makes room for 16 Jockeys in first class just in case, while increasing the number of seats in economy by making each economy row with only a 30" pitch and thus it adds two more rows. The airline could carry 290 passengers after-all while having a first class for Jockeys only.
A second study comes out and reveals wealth is not correlated to the human size. In fact economy passengers eat more calories than first class passengers. The airlines business team insist on 30.5" pitch recognizing this study has a valid point and is doing everything it can for the profit/loss team at the airline.
The new airline commercial features an excited high school age female cheer-leader type sipping on a sippy cup in economy featuring a big smile. There are no 200 pound plus people in the scene. The actors guild only sent Jockeys and family members for the photo shoot.
The viewing public response was "immense". The commercial earned a "CLIO" (caps off) at the annual show. The airline promptly filled 240 economy seats and 16 first class seats for the aspiring ATM models or Average Types with Money.
The engineers at the airline said the airplane was tail heavy and couldn't take-off! An airline board meeting was quickly called and they reconfigured first class to the tail area and economy over the wing. The front of the airplane was delegated for its sippy cup storage.
An airline assumes every passenger is a Jockey, fitting into a 30" x 17" x 48" cube. An airline can haul 340 dormitory sized refrigerators on every flight in that space, because that is number of tickets it needs to sell while sucking up the average passenger's expense account. The passenger can't complain because the flight is so expensive and they are so "average".
Aviation builds a wide body aircraft for eight across seating, but airlines need nine across seating for its own purposes. A proposed airplane is built for ten across seating but the airlines push back wanting eleven across seating. The airplane maker comes up with a blended wing body for 20 across seating but the airline insists 17.2" inches across is needed for each seat.
The airplane maker goes 300 feet long and the airlines insists it needs 10 more rows of additional length for its needs. Passengers are heavier and taller than the average Jockey. It becomes the passenger's problem they were born an average human.
The airline does a study and the findings are astonishing from Wikipedia:
"Jockeys must be light to ride at the weights which are assigned to their mounts. There are horse carrying weight limits, that are set by racing authorities. The Kentucky Derby, for example, has a weight limit of 126 lb (57 kg) including the jockey's equipment. The weight of a jockey usually ranges from 108 to 118 lb (49 to 54 kg).[3] Despite their light weight, they must be able to control a horse that is moving at 40 mph (64 km/h) and weighs 1,200 lb (540 kg).[citation needed] Though there is no height limit for jockeys, they are usually fairly short due to the weight limits. Jockeys typically stand around 4 ft 10 in (147 cm) to 5 ft 6 in (168 cm).[3]"
Airlines dig deeper and find that Jockeys make up only .000001 (340 Jockeys is the answer) of the traveling public's US population and prefer 1st class when they travel.
1st class has a 80" pitch by 24 inches wide across the seat. The cabin ceiling is a full 10" inches higher in first class. The seat cost $1,200 compared with $199 in economy. The pizza eating economy passengers loves its Jockey sized seat as they fold-in at the shoulders making room for another pizza eating football fan going to Pittsburgh, PA.
The airline makes room for 16 Jockeys in first class just in case, while increasing the number of seats in economy by making each economy row with only a 30" pitch and thus it adds two more rows. The airline could carry 290 passengers after-all while having a first class for Jockeys only.
A second study comes out and reveals wealth is not correlated to the human size. In fact economy passengers eat more calories than first class passengers. The airlines business team insist on 30.5" pitch recognizing this study has a valid point and is doing everything it can for the profit/loss team at the airline.
The new airline commercial features an excited high school age female cheer-leader type sipping on a sippy cup in economy featuring a big smile. There are no 200 pound plus people in the scene. The actors guild only sent Jockeys and family members for the photo shoot.
The viewing public response was "immense". The commercial earned a "CLIO" (caps off) at the annual show. The airline promptly filled 240 economy seats and 16 first class seats for the aspiring ATM models or Average Types with Money.
The engineers at the airline said the airplane was tail heavy and couldn't take-off! An airline board meeting was quickly called and they reconfigured first class to the tail area and economy over the wing. The front of the airplane was delegated for its sippy cup storage.
Friday, October 20, 2017
Airline Cost Of Goods Purchased (COGP)
Price + Efficiency+ Cost Of Change = Deal
A long time ago an accounting office far far away there was Cost Of Goods Sold (COGS). The COGS book was fat with definitions, calculations, and documentation for transactions going out the doors from a business. But what about goods coming in the door, what is its costs?
The COGS model had variable and fixed costs, break-even points and a vast sundry of accounting adjustments to arrive at what it cost when a product is sold. The balance purchase price of a product sold minis the COGS can be summarized as raw profit. The profit at this point is just a starting number for all other accounting manipulations from that profit dollar.
This story is not about Cost of Goods Sold but about airline fleet building and its operational success. There are two manufacturers pursuing an airline for business. Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B from this point forward noted as MA and MB. The customer is a dual fleet operator for 80% of its fleet comprising its larger aircraft. The airline customer also ties up 95% of its resources servicing, buying, and operating the larger aircraftfor its own flying customer base.
The marketing team of both manufacturers have set its bottom line price for its sales team. Bottom line price includes service support and added value product offerings. Some airline customers operate a dual brand fleet strategy buying both MA and MB aircraft in an effort for leveraging the manufacturer into lower prices on future purchases. However, dual fleets have a cost added to its operation when separate resources are required for having MA and MB in its fleet. The most efficient airlines often seek a strategy of one using manufacturer only for its fleet, reducing operational redundancies found in a two fleet scheme.
Therefore, an airline must make up those inefficiencies found in dual fleet operation from leveraging a low ball purchase price from each competing manufacturer. The low purchase price would support having a dual fleet brand inefficiency. Costs are found when hiring dual trained employees and carrying two parts bins for its fleet of aircraft. It get messy doing two fleet types under the best of conditions and requires manufacturer involvement to keep the airline's ball rolling. Price and operational efficiency must balance one another. Being a more efficient airplane than the competing maker is sometimes not enough of a reason for buying product "MA" or "MB"
The cost of change can be illustrated by the degree of change management required when making its fleet either into a dual manufacturer fleet or going to a one manufacturer fleet. The selling manufacturer wanting an exclusive take-over of a dual manufacturer airline must make a deal "the airline can't refuse", and then it must assist that airline during its phase of gaining expertise with the aircraft for a period of time, Otherwise the cost of change becomes too expensive and risky for the airline customer.
The final balance from a COGP is the deal, as the deal must address each of the the above categories of price, efficiency and change. The cost of passenger retention is a big issue for an airline whether it can keep its own paying customers happy with a newly delivered aircraft. Both manufacturers have to attack the Passenger Quotient (PQ is a passenger preference for travel) of this problem differently in order to overcome airplane preference. There are those who love MA and then there are those who love MB. It must sell to the airline how its Passenger Quotient is better than the other.
Sometimes Price, Efficiency and Change outweigh any PQ considerations. The airline can fill airplanes with the locations it can go to rather than having 30" of pitch vs. 31" of pitch. Passengers will go where the airline can take them and the price of added inches is too expensive for the average passenger seeking a $199 ticket.
An airline has a lot to think about before buying its next great airplane.
20 Hrs Is Easily Possible Until...
You add luggage and passengers. Boeing did it when it tested the 787 going around the world during December 2011 with its ZA006. The round the world flight had a crew of twelve pilots and engineers. It took a total time of 42 hours and 27 minutes including the two hour refuel stop at Dhaka Bangladesh.
Boeing demonstrated it could fly for twenty hours and 10,337 miles on one 787-8 configured aircraft having 12 people on-board.
Remember it was 2011 before the next improved GE or Rolls were hung on its 787 wings. It was long before the first 787-9 dropped in and don't forget the proposed 777-8X long range flyer was only a pipe dream at that time.
Qantas has thrown down the gauntlet in front of Boeing and Airbus who are expected to come up with a 20 hr flying time solution with its 7** and A350 offering. Boeing responded with a "we are working on it" response. Airbus is also doing the same, but without any public proclamation.
Wikipedia: Boeing was also studying an ultra long-range replacement for the 777-200LR, conceptually dubbed the 777-8LX, which would share the −9X's fuel capacity and gross weight. Its range will be 9,480 nmi (10,910 mi; 17,560 km) compared to 9,395 nmi (10,812 mi; 17,400 km) for the −200LR.
However, there are other quotes for the 777X's range of 8,960 miles stated for the 777-8X and the 777-9X comes in within the 7,550 mile range.
The Qantas Challenge:
A fuel sipping flight may not fly at mach .85 as that translates into 566 knots per hour. However, in an expected 20 hr flight with 300 passengers on board,the fuel sipping could be achieved traveling around mach .80 range or 534 knots per hour. Once again Boeing will look at tweaking a 777-8X engine performance using lean burn techniques with optimal engine output for a twenty hour flight. The Mach .80 version could or should go 10,068 nautical miles in twenty hours.
The 777-8X is listed with having a 365 passenger capability, but a Qantas super long range type from Boeing may only require around 300 seats thus diminishing its take-off weight significantly as any formula constraining distance includes fuel weight and passenger weights determining how long and how far an aircraft can fly.
Having Airbus competing in the Qantas throw-down for a twenty hour flyer, Boeing may not have to sacrifice Jet engine performance where GE may already have a rabbit to pull out of its engine development hat. It could propose a tweaked GE9X engine as a one-off specialty engine offered as a Boeing package to Qantas for the long haul it proposes.
What does Boeing have to over come? Airbus punching out another ULR A-350 for one. Going back to the Boeing, it starts with engine, folding wings extensions and then its own off-the-shelf technology for making a ready to deliver a 777QX passing within the Boeing assembly line. It can fly 20 hours as the 787 demonstrated in December 2011. Now it must find a way for flying 20 hrs with its passengers, additional fuel and luggage.
Boeing demonstrated it could fly for twenty hours and 10,337 miles on one 787-8 configured aircraft having 12 people on-board.
Remember it was 2011 before the next improved GE or Rolls were hung on its 787 wings. It was long before the first 787-9 dropped in and don't forget the proposed 777-8X long range flyer was only a pipe dream at that time.
Qantas has thrown down the gauntlet in front of Boeing and Airbus who are expected to come up with a 20 hr flying time solution with its 7** and A350 offering. Boeing responded with a "we are working on it" response. Airbus is also doing the same, but without any public proclamation.
Wikipedia: Boeing was also studying an ultra long-range replacement for the 777-200LR, conceptually dubbed the 777-8LX, which would share the −9X's fuel capacity and gross weight. Its range will be 9,480 nmi (10,910 mi; 17,560 km) compared to 9,395 nmi (10,812 mi; 17,400 km) for the −200LR.
However, there are other quotes for the 777X's range of 8,960 miles stated for the 777-8X and the 777-9X comes in within the 7,550 mile range.
The Qantas Challenge:
A fuel sipping flight may not fly at mach .85 as that translates into 566 knots per hour. However, in an expected 20 hr flight with 300 passengers on board,the fuel sipping could be achieved traveling around mach .80 range or 534 knots per hour. Once again Boeing will look at tweaking a 777-8X engine performance using lean burn techniques with optimal engine output for a twenty hour flight. The Mach .80 version could or should go 10,068 nautical miles in twenty hours.
The 777-8X is listed with having a 365 passenger capability, but a Qantas super long range type from Boeing may only require around 300 seats thus diminishing its take-off weight significantly as any formula constraining distance includes fuel weight and passenger weights determining how long and how far an aircraft can fly.
Having Airbus competing in the Qantas throw-down for a twenty hour flyer, Boeing may not have to sacrifice Jet engine performance where GE may already have a rabbit to pull out of its engine development hat. It could propose a tweaked GE9X engine as a one-off specialty engine offered as a Boeing package to Qantas for the long haul it proposes.
What does Boeing have to over come? Airbus punching out another ULR A-350 for one. Going back to the Boeing, it starts with engine, folding wings extensions and then its own off-the-shelf technology for making a ready to deliver a 777QX passing within the Boeing assembly line. It can fly 20 hours as the 787 demonstrated in December 2011. Now it must find a way for flying 20 hrs with its passengers, additional fuel and luggage.
Thursday, October 19, 2017
Airbus and Bombardier Didn't See It Coming
Boeing can go against the Airbus battle forward as it combines with a Bombardier C series on its wing.
The Airbus-Bombardier consortium does pose new problems for Boeing in the new world order of things. What Boeing can be doing is thinking way out of the box in a counter move. Give Embraer a big corporate hug. Boeing could form an alliance with Embraer with selected airplane types in the market place.
When Boeing talks to a potential customer relating to a fleet renewal order it could by agreement allow Embraer a share at the sales table as a "partner". The alliance would have conditions of course allowing both corporations autonomy much like an airline code share compact that exists today.
In this arrangement Boeing makes a 787-737 deal with a customer but allows an Embraer offer in on the talks only for regional aircraft. If Embraer goes it alone it would not be eligible for any Boeing sweeteners surrounding a potential deal. If Embraer has established a sales lead where bigger aircraft could be included with its regional Embraer order offer, then Boeing would be included for offering anything larger the Embraer's current line of aircraft.
The details of an alliance would fill reams of paper bundles within-the-making, but the legal dance would maintain corporate autonomy and allow each builder to operate in its own realm of airplane making.
Embraer should align with Boeing as Airbus will now make Boeing pay in areas where it does not even make an airplane for commercial sale or operation.
Additionally Embraer will have to battle Airbus sponsored programs alone. Simple as it seems, it is a complex arrangement for either maker which will enable both to efficiently negotiate with different customers' operational needs throughout the regional and intercontinental spaces each maker services.
The Airbus-Bombardier consortium does pose new problems for Boeing in the new world order of things. What Boeing can be doing is thinking way out of the box in a counter move. Give Embraer a big corporate hug. Boeing could form an alliance with Embraer with selected airplane types in the market place.
When Boeing talks to a potential customer relating to a fleet renewal order it could by agreement allow Embraer a share at the sales table as a "partner". The alliance would have conditions of course allowing both corporations autonomy much like an airline code share compact that exists today.
In this arrangement Boeing makes a 787-737 deal with a customer but allows an Embraer offer in on the talks only for regional aircraft. If Embraer goes it alone it would not be eligible for any Boeing sweeteners surrounding a potential deal. If Embraer has established a sales lead where bigger aircraft could be included with its regional Embraer order offer, then Boeing would be included for offering anything larger the Embraer's current line of aircraft.
The details of an alliance would fill reams of paper bundles within-the-making, but the legal dance would maintain corporate autonomy and allow each builder to operate in its own realm of airplane making.
Embraer should align with Boeing as Airbus will now make Boeing pay in areas where it does not even make an airplane for commercial sale or operation.
Additionally Embraer will have to battle Airbus sponsored programs alone. Simple as it seems, it is a complex arrangement for either maker which will enable both to efficiently negotiate with different customers' operational needs throughout the regional and intercontinental spaces each maker services.
Can 6,550 Miles and 287 Seats Do It For A-330 NEO Customers?
A big question for Airbus customers looms large for those who have already ordered 206 A-330-900 NEO's. The NEO is an under cut for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner as the NEO offers a cheaper per unit buy price. The program itself is teetering at this time as the many financial types weigh-in if selling the A330-NEO can make money.
Going forward, Airbus hopes to make money with this program but only 212 orders seem a bit tepid for those aspirations.
One of its major NEO customers who ordered 66 of the A330-900 NEO is taking a reality check on that order when it announced it was talking with Boeing about its Dreamliner suggesting a dumping of its order. When quickly doing the math, a cancellation this late in its developmental process would be a major blow to the NEO program and leave it with only 146 A330-900 "firmed" orders. The question then becomes why build it if after these last five years there are only 146 booked orders?
The Airbus A330-900 NEO is fighting for its life with the Air Asia renegotiation and mentioning Boeing in its latest re-think. Hawaiian Airline had ordered some (6) of its A-330-800 NEO, and is now worried that so few ordered for this type it will be a no show production and delivery for the Airline. It also is in talks with the Boeing 787 people. Hence, only 212 A-330 NEO's for both types have been ordered.
Today is a victory for Airbus that it lifted off on its first flight during 3 hours of flight testing and landed successfully. Much fanfare was made in the press for something that may be doomed if more Airbus orders are not acquired for the A-330 NEO and cancellations from both Air Asia and Hawaii Airlines occur.
Going forward, Airbus hopes to make money with this program but only 212 orders seem a bit tepid for those aspirations.
One of its major NEO customers who ordered 66 of the A330-900 NEO is taking a reality check on that order when it announced it was talking with Boeing about its Dreamliner suggesting a dumping of its order. When quickly doing the math, a cancellation this late in its developmental process would be a major blow to the NEO program and leave it with only 146 A330-900 "firmed" orders. The question then becomes why build it if after these last five years there are only 146 booked orders?
The Airbus A330-900 NEO is fighting for its life with the Air Asia renegotiation and mentioning Boeing in its latest re-think. Hawaiian Airline had ordered some (6) of its A-330-800 NEO, and is now worried that so few ordered for this type it will be a no show production and delivery for the Airline. It also is in talks with the Boeing 787 people. Hence, only 212 A-330 NEO's for both types have been ordered.
Today is a victory for Airbus that it lifted off on its first flight during 3 hours of flight testing and landed successfully. Much fanfare was made in the press for something that may be doomed if more Airbus orders are not acquired for the A-330 NEO and cancellations from both Air Asia and Hawaii Airlines occur.
Wednesday, October 18, 2017
The Boeing 2017 Orders Including Tentative
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Below in Fig 1: CAPA source data Paris Airshow Order,LOI and MOU total where some unfinished business remains.
Fig. 1
Fig. 2 Winging It Boeing Order Tally including recent news reports for pending orders using Boeing data and Winging It researching.
Tuesday, October 17, 2017
Does No One Play Chess At Boeing?
Can't help but think Boeing strategist saw the Airbus move as it swept in for a buck and bought another share of Bombardier thus taking control of its 6 billion Canadian dollar investment. Did Airbus just "Castle" Bombardier's King. Or did Airbus slide its Queen across the board and Checkmate's Boeing's King?
Most good chess players think in moves three plays ahead and always consider an opponent's counter moves for each thought scenario during this process. Therefore, either Boeing is just plain slow or it has already considered this move and is just smiling.
Airbus was forced to make its bishop take Boeing's queen just as it did when Boeing played its Queen of the skies move on the Airbus A-380 causing a decades long tie up of Airbus resources over its mega wide-body 500 passenger elephant.
Airbus was forced to make its bishop take Boeing's queen just as it did when Boeing played its Queen of the skies move on the Airbus A-380 causing a decades long tie up of Airbus resources over its mega wide-body 500 passenger elephant.
So what just happened? Airbus is trying to undercut the Boeing 737 Max 700 model of aircraft so Boeing just lost a pawn for a buck. If the C series goes any larger than the 737 Max 700 it will infringe upon its own A-320 NEO. Boeing just lost the market for a an airplane class it doesn't even consider or build. Bombardier could have eroded Max sales at the bottom end and now Airbus can only trap the 737 Max 700 in this game unless Airbus needs Bombardier concepts of airplanes for making another NEO/NEO type for its for A-318-319's.
The news today says Airbus has made a move putting Boeing into checkmate danger. Boeing should be going four moves ahead in the "board game" against Airbus using its own data. Boeing won't down size its models to compete with the Bombardier/Airbus consortium. It will just reinvent for 2030 with an all new single aisle type.
After-all, the Max was just a stop gap/knee jerk adjustment until it could conceive a whole new paper airplane using its vast secrets to do so. The next Boeing clean sheet single aisle is twelve years away from announcing and another 5-10 years after that from delivery. Boeing should deliver its first follow-on upscale after the Max by about the span of time during 2030-2040. Airbus will have dithered its $1 dollar investment for another 20 years, by then (i.e. 2040), the Airbus cadre of Boeing watchers, will have come up with another plan "B" in its play book of tripping up Boeing.
Boeing will have parlayed its "what the wide body really means" with its wing body project by 2040. Boeing has accomplished what it wanted with all this fuss it made over Bombardier, it moved Airbus to the skinny aisle class making Embraer nervous in the process with a loss of 7 points on the stock exchange in one day.
Airbus will make Bombardier wider while "borrowing it secret sauce" for its own purpose because that's what Airbus does is plan "B's" very well.
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