My Blog List

Saturday, August 16, 2014

Is the A 380 Too Big To Fail

Giant Airbus A380 finds sales not so big

Seattle Times Link

Recently, The Seattle Times has thrown down the gauntlet on the A-380's survival. Adding in on this article are additional observations on the two strategies that  both Boeing and Airbus settled in on. This article is a reflection on who was right on those strategies. Boeing went with the smaller any airport in the world 787 plan. Airbus went for a super airplane only for super hubs. LiftnDrag has written often on those two paths taken. The summary comment bent towards Boeing direction of aircraft flexibility when airport traffic increases, take-off from anywhere to go anywhere without changing airplanes through a super hub. Most people seem to be reacting positively towards that money saving and convenient idea. I don't want to fly clear to LAX on a single aisle people mover just to board the A380, then get off in Frankfort to board another wide body jet to fly to Athens Greece. Maybe I could just do a direct on a 787 from Seattle,WA to Athens Greece, in one shot.

Airlines have had time to digest both the A380, A350 and additionally the 787. More importantly, the 777X proposition is a crushing defeat for Airbus. Below are a magazine load of bullets from AR press, shredding the A-380 25 Billion dollar blunder.

  •  Bullet Point Presentation Below


New York Times News Service

  • The A380 has a list price of $400 million, but Airbus has cut prices as much as 50 percent. So far, Airbus has received 318 orders and delivered 138 planes to just 11 airlines — a disappointing tally given forecasts that the plane would be a flagship aircraft for carriers worldwide.
  • To get a sense of the Airbus A380’s size and ambition, walk up the grand staircase of an Emirates version of the aircraft, go past the showers and the first-class suites, then pass by endless rows in business class to reach the bar at the back of the upper deck.


  • This sleek semicircle, alluringly underlit and fully stocked with pricey spirits like Grey Goose vodka, is undoubtedly one of the defining features of this aircraft, which can hold more than 500 passengers. The plane dwarfs every commercial jet in the skies.
  • Since it started flying commercially seven years ago, the A380 has caught the imagination of travelers. Its two full-length decks total 6,000 square feet, 50 percent more than the original jumbo jet, the Boeing 747. Its wingspan barely fits inside a football field.


  • Its four engines take this 560-ton airplane to a cruising altitude of 39,000 feet in less than 15 minutes, a surprisingly smooth ascent for such a bulky plane. Passengers love it because it’s quiet and more reminiscent of a cruise ship than an airplane.


  • The A380 was also Airbus’ answer to a problematic trend: More and more passengers meant more flights and increasingly congested tarmacs. Airbus figured the future of air travel belonged to big planes flying between major hubs.


  • “More than simply a big airplane,” one industry analyst wrote when the first A380 was delivered to Singapore Airlines in 2007, “the newest industry flagship will change forever the way the industry operates.”


  • The prediction hasn’t exactly come true.


  • Airbus has struggled to sell the planes. Orders have been slow, and not a single buyer has been found in the United States, South America, Africa or India. Only one airline in China has ordered it, and its only customer in Japan has canceled. Even existing customers are paring down orders.


  • The A380 has a list price of $400 million, but the pressure has forced Airbus to cut prices as much as 50 percent, according to industry analysts. So far, Airbus has received 318 orders and delivered 138 planes to just 11 airlines — a disappointing tally given forecasts that the plane would be a flagship aircraft for carriers worldwide.


  • Only Emirates has made the A380 a central element of its global strategy, ordering 140 as it built a major hub in Dubai. But Emirates is unique. No one else has bet on the plane with quite the same confidence.


  • The A380 hasn’t done so well for a number of reasons, some merely cyclical. The plane was introduced amid a deep downturn in the airline business. Airline executives were wary of expanding their fleets aggressively, especially for a costly, four-engine fuel hog.


  • But critics like Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst at the Teal Group, an aviation-consulting firm in Fairfax, Va., say the main problem is more fundamental: Airbus made the wrong prediction about travel preferences.


  • He said people would rather take direct flights on smaller airplanes than get on big ones — no matter their feats of engineering — that make connections through huge hubs.


  • “It’s a commercial disaster,” Aboulafia says. “Every conceivably bad idea that anyone’s ever had about the aviation industry is embodied in this airplane.”


  • Airbus spent roughly $25 billion to develop the aircraft. The A380 was delayed for years because of manufacturing problems while Airbus struggled to keep the weight down and coordinate its complex design among dozens of suppliers across Europe.


  • In 2012, Airbus discovered small cracks in supporting ribs inside the wings, an embarrassing and costly design error being corrected.


  • While the A380 program has been a boon for the European aerospace industry, Airbus is unlikely to recover its research-and-development costs. The best it can expect is to break even on production costs, according to analysts, provided that it can keep orders going.


  • Steven Udvar-Hazy, chief executive of the Air Lease Corp., which leases aircraft, calls the lack of interest in the planes “a very unusual situation,” especially among U.S. airlines. “I’ve never seen this before in a big program,” he says.


Competing conclusions (Click Reload) 
  • A little more than a decade ago, Boeing and Airbus looked at where their businesses were headed and saw similar facts: air traffic doubling every 15 years and estimates that the number of travelers would hit 4 billion by 2030. They came to radically different conclusions about what those numbers meant for their future.


  • Boeing figured traffic would move away from big hubs and toward secondary airports. So it started to build a smaller, more fuel-efficient long-range aircraft, which became known as the 787 Dreamliner.


  • Airbus, on the other hand, saw the rise of international traffic through major hubs and decided to bet on a big plane to connect those big airports.


  • “The A380 is not made for every route, but it is ideal for high-traffic routes, high-volume routes that are congested or where there are flying constraints,” says Antonio Da Costa, Airbus’ head of A380 marketing.


  • And there are a fair number of those routes. Around 15 of the 20 largest long-haul routes by passenger volume in the world today are slot-constrained, meaning they face some restrictions on the number of daily takeoff or landings, says John E. Thomas, managing director at LEK Consulting, a transportation advisory firm.


  • Here is one example of how the Airbus theory works in practice: This summer, British Airways plans to replace three Boeing 747s flying each day between London and Los Angeles with two A380s, freeing one slot at Heathrow Airport for another flight.


  • Yet despite the congestion at hubs like Heathrow and the growth of megacities like New York, New Delhi and Beijing, the market for large planes remains small.


  • Airbus predicts that in the next 20 years, airlines will order more than 29,000 planes from Airbus, Boeing and other makers. But the bulk of those, or roughly 20,000, will be smaller, single-aisle planes that fly routes like New York to Chicago, or London to Frankfurt, Germany.


  • Airbus estimates that the market for the biggest long-range airplanes will be about 1,700.


  • Boeing, too, is facing lukewarm demand for its latest jumbo-jet upgrade, the 747-8. It has received just 51 orders for this big plane, which can seat about 460 passengers and lists at $357 million.


  • By contrast, it has sold more than 1,200 twin-engine 777s, which sell for as much as $320 million. (Airlines typically get discounts on the listed prices.)

  • More worrisome for Airbus is that it has struggled to find new customers for the A380 after a flurry of initial orders. Just three new carriers — Etihad Airways, Qatar Airways and Asiana Airlines — are getting A380 planes this year.


  • And last month, Airbus canceled an order for six A380s destined for Skymark Airlines, a low-cost carrier in Japan that has been losing money.


  • Garuda of Indonesia recently dropped plans to buy the A380, deciding that the plane was too big for its markets.


  • And Virgin Atlantic, which has options for six A380s, remains undecided about whether to proceed. The airline was partly acquired by Delta Air Lines in 2012; Delta CEO Richard Anderson has said the A380 is “by definition an uneconomic airplane unless you’re a state-owned enterprise with subsidies.”


  • Current customers, too, are cutting back their orders, including the major carriers in France and Germany, where the plane is assembled. Air France postponed the last two of 12 planes it had ordered. Lufthansa has scaled back its order to 14 from 17.


  • Bruno Delile, Air France’s senior vice president for fleet management, says there are a limited number of routes in its network with enough daily traffic to justify the expense of such a big plane.


  • “The forecasts about traffic growth and market saturation haven’t exactly panned out,” he says.


  • Airlines also have to gain the cooperation of airports to modify gates and widen taxiways to make room for the plane. Apart from the main global hubs, few airports have made these investments.


  • No airport in Brazil, for instance, can handle an A380. The plane was only recently allowed in Mumbai.


  • “Airports haven’t really been rushing to welcome the A380,” Delile says.
The A-380 is on Target For Fewer Airports and Routes
Bad Timing (Click Reload)
  • Airbus may have mistimed the market in a more fundamental way. While European engineers were developing the plane, their counterparts at Boeing were working on alternative designs. Out of this effort came the Dreamliner, with a carbon-composite fuselage, a host of electronic systems and more efficient engines that could fly longer distances while consuming less fuel.


  • That 787, which entered service in late 2011, had its share of high-profile problems; the entire fleet was grounded for three months in 2013 because of battery fires. Boeing says the problem has been resolved, and the company has orders for more than 1,000.


  • With versions that seat 210 to 330 passengers, and with a range of about 9,000 miles, the 787 allows airlines to fly pretty much anywhere in the world and connect smaller airports without going through a hub.


  • Japanese carriers are flying these planes from Tokyo to Düsseldorf, Germany, and to San Diego and Boston. This reduces the need for bigger planes to feed big hubs. And passengers are willing to pay more to avoid a connection, says Will Horton, an aviation analyst at CAPA — Centre for Aviation.


  • Recognizing the success of the 787, Airbus started developing its own version, the A350-XWB. The first should be delivered to Qatar Airways before year-end. Airlines have ordered 742 of the A350s since the program was announced in 2006.


  • “No doubt some airlines, given the opportunity to rewrite history, would not order the A380,” Horton says.


  • Unlike airlines in the United States, Emirates, which is a product of Dubai’s aviation-friendly policies, operates from a single hub. The airport handled 66 million passengers last year, rivaling Heathrow as the busiest international hub. Emirates serves more than 140 destinations, essentially connecting flows of passengers with a single stop in Dubai.


  • But for Emirates, the biggest selling point of the A380 is its ability to pack in more business-class seats and create an environment that appeals to big-spending passengers.


  • “The upper deck of the A380 is an absolute gold mine for us,” Clark says. “We elected to make it all premium. We elected to put in all the gadgets and gizmos. We were laughed at, at first.”


  • There are more first- and business-class seats on the Emirates A380 than on the 777, and they are usually 75 to 80 percent full, Clark says. On some routes, like those to Heathrow, where Emirates has five daily flights, that figure can reach 90 percent.


  • Once the whole plane is 85 percent full, its operating costs fall below those of a 777, he says.

Looking for buyers (Click Reload)
  • It’s a simple-enough recipe. But for the plane to be successful for Airbus, Emirates can’t be the only airline to make it work.


  • “United would be a great operator from San Francisco to Asia,” says Mark Lapidus, chief executive of Amedeo, an aircraft-leasing company. Last year, Lapidus announced his company would buy 20 new A380s, in a deal valued at $8.3 billion, then lease them to airlines. It was an expensive gamble, and Amedeo doesn’t have any commitments yet
.
  • The problem is that U.S. carriers aren’t interested. Wall Street analysts aren’t convinced, either. Shares of United would plunge at least 10 percent if it bought A380s, according to one analyst, because of concerns that they would bring too much capacity into the market.


  • In recent years, U.S. airlines have found the way back to profitability by cutting capacity and retiring airplanes, effectively taking seats out of the market.


  • A bigger plane, in the view of some analysts, would undo everything they’ve done.


  • Some analysts are also worried about the resale value of an A380, once the planes come off their lease and enter the secondary market. With weak sales and limited interest today, aviation experts say, the plane’s resale value could potentially depress new A380 prices even further.


  • In his aerie in Dubai, Emirates President Tim Clark appears untroubled by these considerations. He has repeatedly said he would buy more planes if Airbus could deliver them fast enough.


  • “My view is that we’ve all got to tough this out,” he says. “As I say to my friends at Airbus: ‘Don’t bottle this. The day will come again. The global economy will take care of you.’ ”


  • He has encouraged Airbus to build an even bigger version of the A380. That, even Airbus would concede, seems unlikely.

Friday, August 15, 2014

Fleet Dichotomy Watching Means 777X Is In.

What is "out" is an important trend. What is "in" , signals that event. What is "meant", falls below in the succeeding paragraphs. A little new snippet came out today, which makes one ponder about what is really happening in the airline industry. It's about BA receiving its next 777-300 ER. Good catch BA. Right there in the article is a dichotomy of fleet. An important trend for mega airlines. There are two classes of airlines in the world with subsets. One is the mega carriers, the other is everybody else. Mega carriers spawn out of the middle east like oil wells. Where national legacy airlines are that subset of mega carriers such as BA, Lufthansa and United as exampled. The "others", would include; substantial upstarts, "wanna be airlines", and emerging airlines. I won't name a few, you do the work. 

What comes from this article below are clues:
15 Aug 2014

On Wednesday night (August 13th), a new Boeing 777-300ER became a part of the British Airway fleet, as it was delivered to the airline.

The twelfth 777-300ER to join BA touched down in Heathrow on the 13th and only a few hours afterwards was on its way to Mumbai.

"I think this aircraft is vitally important for the fleet, it's a wonderful aircraft - pilots love it, it is very fuel efficient and hugely comfortable for customers," chief Boeing pilot at BA, Allister Bridger, has said.

BA now has 58 Boeing 777 planes in its fleet, more than the number of Boeing 747-400s it has (48).

BA did at one point have 57 Boeing 747-400s, yet it has now started retiring its fleet of this sort of plane, putting Boeing 777, Boeing 787 and Airbus A380 planes in the place of the aircraft it retires.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The dichotomy shift comes in the last few sentences. Boeing has shored up its right sized jumbo fleet with the 777X's family. It's twin engine as mini Jumbos, that will erode both the A380 and A350-1000 potential markets. It also spells retirement for the 747. The 777X-9 will do the job of the 747-400, only more efficiently than either the 747-8I or the A380. 

The question for most mega airlines or emerging airline is; Do you really need to fill 525 passenger every time you fly when making money? The answer is a strong no! The 747-400 that BA is retiring in an on-going scheduled event, and will be replaced by 777-300ER's, which carry about the same number of tickets sold on an average for a 747-400 flight. BA will gain extreme efficiency on the 777-300ER by doing so at this time. Bank those immediate savings for future 777-300ER purchases or later for 777X-9 acquisitions if it follows through on the 777 type. No need for super jumbos at this time when the heart of its business plan and airport compliance's are set around the 360 seat mark. The 777X will come just-in-time as populations and business grows steady in the next 20 years. 

The A-380 is that one-off dichotomy decision. A useful attention get-er and option. It doesn't have purchasing continuity, even with its own family of aircraft. Refer to the Emirates cancellation of 70 A350's. Emirates has heavily purchased both the 777's and A380's. Boeing has filled a purchasing and seating continuity with its own 787 and 777 combined with the A-380. Both are better options than the A350. The market has paused and is dithering on the A350 market preference.

BA has measured it potential market, age of equipment, and its 747's in service. It has come with an easily achievable plan, in the making, with the 787, 777 types, and A380's. The only problem is that the A380 will exhaust early its airport potentials, where the 777 will continue to fit in the airports long after the A380 has saturated its own market. Airports can't just expand on a $dime, nor do they always have the space to expand. Airport status quot is what Boeing is banking on with the 777 types. So far they guessed right on that move, where Airbus bet the farm on "if they build it, airports will expand for "it"" (being the A380). Only desert kingdoms have the space and money for "it".

Finally, the A380, is really Boeing's step child within this news report.

Thursday, August 14, 2014

AI vs Design Freeze KC-46 and The Military Procurement

Always Improving or (AI) is the poison pill of military projects. AI feeds cost overruns as it contributes to finding a better way of making something good, or best during the course of an "Idea Evolution" (IE, chasing the perfection rainbow F-35 example). How do you separate the AI in a fixed cost project? That is the question that Boeing must answer soon, as its main competitor, Airbus has announced the A330 NEO with new advanced constructs and engines that may outclass the the older 767 frame and engine, employed by the Air Force as its main tanker option. Adversarial nations may end up with a more advanced tanker at the US Air Force Expense.

Boeing gained an order for 179 tankers in a bitter competition with Airbus. Did Airbus sit still? No! The A330 NEO could make the 767's transition to an all modern air tanker obsolete, before its delivers the first one to the US Air Force. A frighting prospect to a fixed cost program  Boeing finds itself enclosed in the fix cost bid, while Airbus can upgrade a NEO A330  tanker proposal for its foreign powers customers through its extended commercial development. It could make the Boeing order a one and only with the US Military. The 767 commercial development has come to an end of its life cycle activity. The commercial side can no longer fund improved 767 advancements for the military side. The military fixed cost procurement theory assumes it takes commercial development and imbues it into a military advantage on the cheap. The F-35 program is clean sheet from bottom up, design, with all the cost and perils associated with a new invention. The 767 fixed cost bid feeds off a frozen commercial/military programs. The A330 NEO is not frozen on its commercial side and they can keep advancing innovations on  a large scale where the military can jump back in and buy those advancements. Boeing choose as did the military an end of life 767 frame, reviving it for near future into a fine tanker procurement with no future commercial value for improved developments. Boeing will have to offer the 787 frames in a future go around as it tries beating off the  A330 NEO bid in the next tanker go around in 10-20 years. Flight deck commonality will save the Boeing tanker program with a type jump to the 787.

Also,what Boeing could do is improvise the 767 techno points on its own dime. They will need to dig deep into its military/commercial play book with a revised Tanker model off its sunk R & D costs from all its family of aircraft.

Boeing must continue its AI processes behind the scenes, and outside the Fixed Cost Trap, it finds itself in. After all the US Air Force does want the best for the cheapest. Boeing probably has already taken steps to address the A330 NEO prospects with other foreign nations. The theme of the KC-46 is Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) development into its military DNA, saving both cost, and time for deploying an all new tanker. However, the fly in the ointment is Airbus taking an opportunity to improve its own tanker proposition, using company money through applying it on its own commercial A330 NEO endeavor, using its new commercial advances for installing it in future "Tanker Bids". In the meantime, an A330 NEO submission is for other national war powers, or even going back to the US Air Force looking for a follow-on Tanker upgraded bid.

Proposed Boeing internal talking points for consideration:
  • Boeing bolsters capitol reserved for future Tanker R&D. 
  • A plan to compete with a A330 NEO extended tanker Proposals as purposed from The A330 NEO commercial announcements.
  • All new Engine developments for 767 freighter upgrades( military, Fed EX, UPS or any current 767 equipment development), 
  • Or 787 Tanker Version using a 787 Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) on the fly development,
  • and Lessons Learned experiences during the last few head to head competitive bids processes shaping bidding strategies with customers outside the US military procurement processes.
  • Don't do anything outside the scope of current 767 development. 
The US Air Force lock on Boeing's current tanker bid, allows it to tender additional purchasing solicitation, once it nears its 179th tanker delivery, thus opening up the bid process for an A330 NEO tanker bid while the 767 model languishes as a frozen fixed cost project, nailed down by the Boeing tanker program. It, Boeing, must reach out with its own money, developing  future solutions from the commercial to military project bins, on the next go around in Tanker Wars, as Airbus will be ready with an on-the-fly solution, out performing the even older 767 frame design. The bottom line is that the new procurement process is a double edged sward, where winning is not always  the most desirable award with the project frozen within the tanker costs for configuration and development. Boeing must develop from its own commercial airplanes now, such as the 787, for any future non clean sheet military applications, if it where to exceed any future Airbus offerings of military applications from "its" own commercial parts bins.

The Boeing Poseidon project: Uses the 737 air frame from an AI upgraded aircraft in this Boeing example. The military sub-hunter and surveillance craft does more than just hunt and watch. It manages airspace during battle and directs both drones and fighter/bomber craft about, as it prioritizes its adversarial targets within the battle space.

The 767 is not actively upgrading its commercial aircraft where it falls out of the AI model. The money is not there in a fixed cost to always improve. The A330 NEO by name is AI through its commercial applications. That is the soft underbelly of the 767 fixed cost idea, which the military created when awarding the bid on an older commercial frame. The 767 for the most part, has closed frame development from its commercial production life cycle other than freight framing. The Military version, or Poseidon 737 is still in production on the commercial side, as well as the A330. The new MAX assures a future with AWACS , radar, and battle management type of military applications, and will be going into the future for the next 30 years. Awarding military bids using commercial foundations must also have a future commercial shelf-life going forward as an attachment of the AI model. This is fundamental for program continuity, and is an added value for both the military and the framer. Using military COTS procurement methodology while acquiring aircraft used in supporting rolls must have a future definition coming from the commercial side for this procurement method. In essence it must have a viable AI side on commercial applications. 

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Exciting Corporate Airline Bottom Line, "Or-CASM"

The 737 MAX  customers are looking at maximising the corporate bottom through the acronym known as (CASM).

Press Report:

"But, as airlines continue to look for ways to lower their Cost per Available Seat Mile, "or CASM", Boeing wants to have a high-density version of its most popular aircraft available for purchase. The Wall Street Journal notes that reducing CASM is a major goal for this high-density 737 with Boeing targeting a 5% increase in per-seat efficiency."

Before you move the family to the front of the airplane thinking its a new airline incentive for booking passengers, its really a way of looking at enhancing the revenue system. Not surprising, It starts with seat count. Further its not surprising that filling space with form fitting seats.

Gone are the days of a strato-lounger with wing tip accents on the top corners for resting your head in a snore down with other passengers. Forget those 3-4 inch thick cushions surrounding you like a 7.1 speaker system. Space is what airlines are seeking and space becomes fixed on every airline no matter the aircraft size from the 737 MAX to the A-380.

Conceptually, Boeing gives parameters on weight hauling potential for every particular model. After-all, passengers are dead weight aren't they? From the airline concessions stand in the kitchen to the storage rooms in the belly, or overheads, its all weight. Each seat represents a factor for weight, including fuel. Addressing what filling a seat means, giving a final answer found on your ticket price. I have invented my own acronym for this calculation Seat Weight Efficiency Applied Totals or (SWEAT). What SWEAT does is assign a weight performance factor per seat. Variables are then measured as potentials from typical load per seat going the distance. 

One Seat SWEAT Totals:


  • Expected customer weight, avg. 80 Kilos
  • Expected customer Luggage Weight, both carry -on and checked. 24 Kg's
  • Expected in service supplies, such as liquids and food 2.5 Kg's
  • Expected Fuel weight per seat for trip duration (airline derived number per route)
  • Total payload number divided by total seat number.

An airline can predict very accurately total TOW as a function of paid customers. It can add mail , other freight shipments or additional passengers from a fixed space of a particular model. The efficient seat configuration could add extra seat rows over the length of the passenger space without giving the passenger any discomfort. A thin line seat opens up possibilities for the airline without sacrificing customer comforts. Two more rows adds up to 12 more seats in the same space as found in the former 737 NG model..

An airplane with 150 seats will typically haul "150 passengers" as an optimal. Enter in all data from its data base, based on experience for 150 seats over the history of a particular airline model. Using this modeling, apply it against what the maximized ability from the manufacturer has established. In this example the airline has found that flying the aircraft for a particular route or in most cases maximum range, the 150 seat, always fly's within 70% of its true potential. It could easily fly with a dozen more revenue seats on-board every day. That's what the Max promises with the new seat interiors purposed and additional space provided.

Now the seat and its space becomes the issue! Not the engine, flight controls or laminar flow technology. The seat companies are on deck to make a seat fit you like a new tailored outfit. The seat becomes the fashion statement for your travels and comfort not the pitch number. A 32 inch pitch with an old lounger type seat could not even leave room for your legs and feet. Put your feet up on the bottom seat pad and curl up like a ball for the duration of the trip. However, the seat people came to the rescue, and make the most important contribution in decades. The old Pan AM Clipper seat has nothing over the new seat that are a coming! 

There are many seat offerings so I'll pick on Recaro, an easily recognizable name. Its form fitting seat allows the 32 inch seat pitch more room for its customer, at the same time more comfort than any predecessors. Magic, the seat pitch battle between air manufacturers have grown a pair of "" with the mention of pitch. Pitch now becomes a subset from the seat installed and deserves the "" around the word "pitch". These form fitting seats wear like a stylish suit, creating more space within the pitch allotment. Pitch has redefined itself by the seat itself. I would rather see on manufacturer advertisement on seat pitch we have a 32R pitch (R for Ricaro), which is significantly more than a our competitors 32Z pitch (Z for Zebras).

So the seat is now defining the Airline Model types that hold 182 passengers. 



"Using these seats, we can maximize the aircraft's revenue potential by fitting 182 people in the same space with lighter seats, giving more room in its allotted within 31-32 inches. That will add more loading weight per seat drawing it closer to the Airplane's best and efficient number for revenue, thus lowering the ticket price. After-all, its all about the passenger and its seat.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Every Great Publication has Advertisement. Since The Blog Is Not Great, But Informative...

Here is my gratuitous video for a commercial break. Its an attempt of being clever and oh so smart in presenting the only "MAX Affect" on potential airline customers, passengers and suppliers concerning that "MAX Affect".


The LiftnDrag Commercial critique for the 737 MAX Affect.

The video cover effect: it's a formal picture done in black tie. Even James Bond would appreciate its dress code for videos. It tells me its a mystery with a soft glow and silver lining. What airline wouldn't want a subliminal date in this MAX attire? 

Opening the video has a thirty-something voice model effect. Sounding like an upward mobile yuppie type from the 80's, while reading a clever script about fuel and more fuel not burned on this aircraft. The fifty percent cost of flying any aircraft is fuel. The revenue stream pays for that cost, hence 12 more seats in this commercial version per Max arriving. I didn't research out how that compares to the NEO across the seat count, but I do know that the ultimate MAX-900 could hold two hundred, but will be set for 199, thus saving the cost of one extra flight attendant if the MAX had seated 200. This advertised Max (stated as an 800) will hold 182, counting 12 more seats over the NG configuration of 170. Twelve more tickets sold while burning more than 14% less fuel (wordplay, sorry).

  • Fuel Economy
  • Reliable
  • Eco Friendly

If I watch this commercial advertisement again, I might go out and buy one from petty cash.

The most important thing for me is that it didn't stump me on the words Laminar Flow Technology. I went to wordsmith school and did a paper on Laminar Flow. My paper had this quote, 

"Laminar Flow Technology is found on a sledding hill around Christmas.  Take one fifty gallon plastic leaf bag and insert a truck inner tube. Hop on it, and hope no radar gun is pointed in your direction, because laminar flow technology has arrived, and it will take you down the sledding hill faster than a sled runner." 

No pushing needed. That would be my Laminar Flow Technology Advertising Commercial. But since I don't have a petty cash account large enough to buy a MAX, I 'll just go sledding with inner tubes until I hit a tree or something.

My Laminar Flow Tube Technology Points For Tubing down hills in winter:
  • No pushing needed
  • Unreliable directional inputs from trip to trip
  • Eco Friendly, when bouncing off trees and not scaring the bark. 


Monday, August 11, 2014

I came Across An A380 Posts Written By An A380 Debbie Downer

I don't spend my day hunting for online stuff of this nature. However sometimes it just falls out of the sky in front of my feet. William Tell Isaac Newton had it correct about apples, objects, and gravity. I am not lazy nor short of words, but sometimes it's just better when others write how I think for the most part. So it's important to relay that message forward as a re-post of a just discovered story that may be of interest to anyone who hasn't drunk the Airbus Kool-Aid! Now its time to give over my blog from another by re-posting of great "Non-Boeing Article."


Why Airbus’ A380 Failed


Bidness Etc investigates the reasons behind the failure of Airbus’ A380, which was once anticipated to break all air-travel normsBy: Sam QuestClick Ticker to See live coverage AIRBUS GROUP (EADSY) hoped to change the face of the global air transport industry with the A-380. The company thought of the new aircraft as a solution to congested tarmacs, which are a result of higher demand for air travel. However, with only 11 airlines having ordered the A380 in initial years, and orders stagnating thereafter, it is evident that the aircraft has not taken off very well in the industry. What The A380 Hoped To Achieve? Airbus predicted that aircraft with greater passenger capacity would eventually dominate the market. The A-380 was deemed ideal for high volume and high traffic routes. 75% of the largest long-haul routes are slot-constrained, meaning the number of flights taking off or landing at a certain airport is restricted; 

hence, greater passenger volumes could be achieved with a larger carrier. British Airways, the national carrier for Britain, is an airline that might implement such a strategy. It plans on replacing the three Boeing 747s flying on the London-Los Angeles route with two A380s. This would decrease traffic at Heathrow Airport by one aircraft.

What Went Wrong?


The A380 is just too big for the industry to handle, having a wingspan that exceeds the length of a football field and taking up an area of 6,000 square feet. Four engines power the massive jet, bringing it to an altitude of 39,000 feet in under 15 minutes. However, the massive engines of the jet consume greater quantities of fuel and increase the overall costs of airlines that have the A380 as a part of their fleet.


Most airports in the world cannot accommodate the A380 owing to its large wingspan. Therefore, it is necessary to gain cooperation from airports to modify their gates in order to make the accommodation of the aircraft possible. For example, the aircraft cannot fly to Brazil as airports there cannot handle the A380.


The limited routes that the A380 can fly on, along with the higher costs attached to the aircraft, have made airlines pessimistic about adding it to their fleet. Only 11 airlines have ordered the A380 so far. Emirates Airlines has been the only one to have based its fleet around the plane, having ordered 140 planes and currently operating 50 of them.

Boeing’s Strategy:


The Boeing Company (BA), the largest competitor for Airbus’ aircraft-manufacturing business, had predicted that traffic would slow down between large hubs in the world and domestic air-traffic would drive growth in the aviation industry. As a result, the company developed the smaller wide-body, fuel-efficient Boeing 787 Dreamliner family of commercial jets, which was a big success. 

(The newest addition to the lineup, the 787-10, has a capacity of seating 323 passengers, compared to over 500 for the A380.)

Boeing’s prediction about the future of the aviation industry and drivers of growth seems to have hit the bulls-eye, whereas Airbus’ prediction has missed the target by a mile.

Boeing was up 0.66% during trading on Friday, while Airbus closed in the red after falling 0.14%.

Airbus has fallen 26.26% over the year, while Boeing has fallen 11.25%.
  

Flying As Promised Even With Engine Failure

The next to the worse thing for the 787-8 is engine failure over the Ocean. The worst thing is two engines failing over the ocean or a meteor strike. Last spring, a JAL had an engine oil failure near Hawaii and landed with grace. Worth noting: are the 288 passengers on board making it an extremely "Heavy" flying on one engine. Second time in history a 787 shuts down and going on one engine with paying passengers. The passengers were safe but scared. The 787 proving ground becomes a time in operation, as all its anomalies are worked out. All new models will have their moments, even the A380 blew up an engine in flight, and it will for the A350. It is hoped by each manufacturer, weakness is caught in development not on a revenue flight. GE has its work cut out for them, by developing an improved fix either in the engine assembly or with the design. Statistically, it may not constitute an emergency, but engine research and change are required quickly in a few areas. A million passengers and 20 million miles and only two occurrences have happened. However it's two, too many.

On March 9th, 2014, CNN reported:


On August 11, 2014 it was reported by the pressing multitude, and "Seeking Alpha" the following event.


Alpha's bullet point report:
Boeing Dreamliner engine fails over the Atlantic