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Friday, September 30, 2016

The 737 Landing Gear Is A NASCAR Restrictor Plate


The super speedways existing for stock car racing are too fast for the engineered race car. Rules came where the fuel would be governed by a restrictor plate, thus keeping the speed limit within race car's design limits for keeping the drivers and fans safer than if they didn't impose a restrictor plate. 

Image result for super speedway crashes


The landing gear on the 737 gives the airplane a ground hugging stance where Boeing has painted itself into a development hole from the Seventies. Boeing needs to break this restriction of engine size in order to compete with Airbus since they are limited by ground clearance on its 737. It has a restrictor plate of sorts from the landing gear back to the engines and it has reached its limits on the top end of performance from a Max engineered configuration.

Boeing must “go long” with a landing gear. They must build a Middle of the Market follow-on for its 737 family and having a 737-10 won't do with the current 737 landing gears. However, implementing bigger engines or a taller landing gear will take too long and too much money for meeting the Airbus challenge of its A-321 market dominance. Additionally, the market capacity is shrinking as the A-321 grows its customers and market routes are filled for this class of aircraft. It's a dilemma Boeing has long recognized and has done little addressing it when building its wide body examples, and while depending on the 757 to hold off the Airbus onslaught. 

The time has come to bite the bullet and address the market segment of the middle of the market even without a plethora of order commitments, it must have confidence to move forward not with a four year delivery window from this point forward, but maybe in six years going forward. 

A four year window says, 737-10 as its “Hail Mary” throw when it needs a robust offering with foundational aspects built for the future. It needs to address a middle of the market aircraft without regard towards any hurried 737-10 response, but instead plug the market gap with a responsible 757 replacement having a range of up to 5,000 miles. It must go white paper with a taller landing gear, bigger engines, and all new technology completing an aircraft by 2022. The Boeing parts bin and suppliers can do it once the bullet announcement is fired sooner rather than later.

A 737-10 offering is just lame with a short landing gear restricting its possibilities.


Thursday, September 29, 2016

September 2016 787 Program Numbers




Here comes September with a solid performance. As Boeing reaches deeper into backlog it will definitely need more orders before years end. There are a multiple sources of customers pondering 787 orders which may spill into 2017 before an impact is felt. Qatar and Emirates are to name a few.

Fig. 1


Fig 1A.

Third Quarter 2016 snapshot orders and deliveries.


Production remains at 12 a month over ninety days supporting Boeing's guidance for 2016.

Fig 2.

Program Progress:

Fig. 3





Fig. 4 787-9 has taken over the YoY 787 production pace.



Fig 5. Production efficiency shows low WIP backlog and high delivery pace.




Tuesday, September 27, 2016

Boeing May Reach 777 Order Goal During 2016

Boeing needs about 40 777 classics a year ordered until the 777X reaches its delivery state. Today marks a step in that direction where it seems fifteen 777's will be ordered from an Arab client thus making for a total of 30 777's in process for order additions. The Saudi order for fifteen 777's is awaiting signatures and the Iran Order for fifteen awaits further negotiation expected to be completed before the end of 2016. After adding the already booked 777's for eight during 2016, brings the totals together for thirty-eight aircraft as a Boeing possibility. 

Last week it was a gloomy outlook. This week is has become a week of possibilities pointing towards the end of the year. If there are other orders out there pending as Boeing usually has and it posts by year's end, numbers may end up with a few added surprises before 2017 begins. Boeing has the potential for up to fifty 777's reaching its planning goal for 2016. Its more likely they will reach thirty-eight and certainly twenty-three. The game is afoot where the numbers could be from twenty-three to fifty 777's ordered for 2016

However, things can get off track very easy, especially with Iran while maintaining a "don't count your chickens before they hatch" condition. A cautious optimist would include those already booked at eight and the fifteen from the Saudi's as it closes a deal during the next month or so. 


Sunday, September 25, 2016

Boeing 787 Reading Assignment "Eight Years Later"

Borrowing from HeraldNet.com  comes the 500th Boeing 787 entering the factory with its swagger. This 500th body is destine for Air France in the form of a 787-9. Having this segway for a good 787 read while going forward without pause, is my humble space offered to do so. Without further ado, here is the Herald Net offering for a reading assignment.


500th 787 at the back of the line depiction 
Image result for 500th 787

"...The airplane is in pieces, now, but it’s in the factory: the 500th Boeing 787.
Workers loaded the Air France 787-9 onto the Everett plant’s final assembly line earlier this month, putting the program on track to be the fastest to crank out 500 twin-aisle jetliners. Boeing’s plant here and in North Charleston, South Carolina, are steadily delivering Dreamliners — nearly 12 a month. And the 787s are making good on what matters most to airlines: the company’s big claims to make an airplane that slashes operating costs and opens new markets.
Boeing is working on further upgrades to the jetliner’s cabin, which has already set new standards for passenger comfort. No aerodynamic improvements are planned for now. However, Rolls-Royce’s improved Trent 1000 TEN engine is expected to be online in late 2017 — more than a year late — offering operators even better performance, said Bob Whittington, Boeing vice president and chief program engineer for the 787.

After the plane’s problem-plagued beginning, “the view is great” at 500, he said. It’s been five years today since Boeing delivered the first 787 to All Nippon Airways of Japan. The delivery was more than three years late. But the program’s early headaches — reliability issues, production backups, an emergency grounding due to smoking batteries, spiraling development and production costs — are almost distant memories now. “We’re out of the dark days,” he said. ‘Boeing magic’. The 787’s far-flung supply chain relied heavily on outsourcing to cut development time and costs. However, the aggressive strategy created logistical and financial migraines for the Dreamliner program. Boeing committed huge resources to solving the issues, including buying out its joint-venture partners in South Carolina. That opened the door for the company to put a second final assembly line there in 2011.

Boeing matched its desire to drastically reshape how modern jetliners come together with its ambition to make the most advanced passenger plane. The 787 is the first jetliner with an all-composite material body, whereas conventional airplane bodies rely on aluminum alloys. The plane would be just as strong as an aluminum one, yet much lighter. That, along with improved aerodynamics, more sophisticated software, powerful new engines and other innovations, would make the plane much more efficient than ones of similar size and range, Boeing promised.

But early 787s rolled out overweight and customers were underwhelmed. Several airlines refused to take delivery of the earliest Dreamliners, which started stacking up around Paine Field.

Boeing poured money and people on the problems, and steadily worked through them.

“I call it the ‘Boeing Magic’ — how people come together and take on problems and come up with solutions,” said Michael Griego, a senior manager for the 787 supply chain. “It was amazing to see” on the Dreamliner.

During those early days, Griego spent long hours walking the production line with engineers and mechanics addressing problem parts — what went wrong, where did it occur, and how best to fix it now and stop it from happening again? “It was intense” work — and important, too, she said. 

“Those were good days.”

“When I remember the early days and how hard we struggled, I almost can’t believe where we are now,” Griego said.
 Almost there in 2012, Boeing delivered 46 787s, its first full production year. It delivered three times that many last year, and is on pace to do so again this year. The current production rate is 12 airplanes a month. Actual deliveries are slightly fewer.

The company plans to turn out 14 Dreamliners a month by the end of the decade, and the program is already gearing up for the increase, although a Boeing exec said last month that there might not be orders to support that pace.

“We’re not quite a turnkey operation, but we’re almost there,” Griego said.

The company continues to smooth out production. The 787’s use of automated machines required for making its composite material airframe has flattened the production learning curve. That helped the program rapidly increase production. But the cost of making an airplane has not fallen at a similar pace.

That has many industry experts skeptical about Boeing’s ability to get production so efficient that it can make big enough profits off future deliveries to make up the nearly $28 billion it has lost up to now. The company makes enough money from other programs and services that it can absorb the 787 losses. The airplane maker keeps those losses from bogging down its balance sheets through an accounting method called deferred production cost. That has Boeing spread costs from today across the hundreds of Dreamliners it plans to sell in years to come, while counting future expected profits now. That approach helps buoy share price and, proponents say, gives investors a more accurate view of the company over time. Critics say it is using financial tricks to obscure reality.

Regardless, it also means Boeing has less cash now to spend developing new, even shinier airplanes. Earlier this month, it closed one 787 stall on its flight line at Paine Field, where customers inspect the planes and mechanics make last-minute fixes. At the height of the production problems, dozens of 787s not ready for delivery were parked around the airport. Now, the program has only eight dedicated flight line stalls. It closed a second assembly line in Everett in 2015 as the South Carolina plant’s efficiency improved.

In 2012, 16,800 people worked on the 787 program in Washington, according to a state commissioned study.

The number is considerably less now. Boeing does not publicly comment on how many people work on a specific airplane program.

Put the coals to it in the factory, “there are a lot of projects in the works for 2016 and 2017” to further improve production and reduce costs, said John Barnfather, a senior manager for 787 manufacturing. He helps run the last spot on the assembly line in the factory.

“We put the coals to it right here,” to finish any jobs that are behind schedule — something called “traveled work” — before the plane moves outside, he said.

The amount of traveled work spiked in 2014 after Boeing stepped up 787 production rate to 10 a month. It reached a point that the company stopped loading new planes onto the assembly line here for about two weeks in August of that year in order to catch up. The flight line was crowded with factory crews and contractors tackling overdue tasks. That amount is dramatically down these days, according to mechanics on the program.

Boeing heavily tweaked the 787’s design, as the first 787-8s out of factory were too heavy to make good on the company’s performance promises. Early planes were dogged with part problems and other headaches for airlines. Then there were the smoking batteries, which led to all in-service 787s being temporarily grounded in early 2013, while Boeing and partners worked on a fix, which came a few weeks later.

“Planes always start heavy and get lighter,” said Edmund Greenslet, an aviation industry analyst and publisher of Airline Monitor. “Planes are the opposite of people, who start light and get heavier.”

Engineers typically make design improvements after a new plane starts performing in the real world. “You’re looking to cut pounds wherever you can find them,” he said.

With more than 450 Dreamliners in operation, the plane “is delivering so far on what was promised,” Greenslet said.

The 787-9, which was first delivered in mid-2014, is showing about 15 percent efficiency gains — measured in fuel consumption per seat — over similar airplanes, such as 767-300ERs. The smaller 787-8 is posting single-digit gains in fuel efficiency, he said.

The first 787-10, the biggest Dreamliner, is slated to be delivered in 2018. It will be assembled only in South Carolina.

Performance also is improving the more airlines fly the 787 and learn how to get the most out of the planes, he said.

Airlines have used the 787 to open more than 100 new routes between distant cities that would have been money-losers with older, less efficient jets.

For airlines, Dreamliners are now almost as dependable as 777s, the gold standard for dispatch reliability — a key metric in commercial aviation that tracks how often an airplane type leaves the airport gates within 15 minutes of schedule. The 777 is well above 99 percent. The 787 stumbled early on, but now is about 0.2 percentage points behind the 777, said Whittington, the 787’s chief engineer.

So far, in-service 787s have backed up Boeing’s promise to build a hardier, more problem-free plane. More than 30 Dreamliners have had their first major scheduled maintenance, called a C check. The findings are in line with the company’s expectations for wear and tear, he said.

During the checkup, mechanics scour the airplane, pulling it apart to inspect major systems and components. A 767 is supposed to have a C check, which can take nearly two weeks and cost about $700,000, every 18 months. It should have a D check — the most intense inspection — every six years. Dreamliners can go twice as long between inspections, saving airlines millions of dollars during a plane’s lifespan.

So far, 787 is on track to realize Boeing’s promise to cut maintenance costs by as much as 30 percent. “The amount of unscheduled work at the C check point is dramatically less than for a 767 or 777,” he said.

“We took risks on technology, and we took risks on a new supply base and production system. And we took risks on schedule,” Whittington said. “And the airplane turned out to be great. The risks we took on the airplane turned out to be all worth it.

“If I had something I would say do differently, we might have not taken so many stretches on the supply base at the same time that we were trying to compress our schedules,” he said. “It’s just too much risk all at one time and taking too many giant leaps.”
To change aviation, “you have to take bold steps,” and Boeing has proven its ability to deliver on bold steps time and again, Whittington said. “It’s just built into our DNA.”...


Dan Catchpole: 425-339-3454; dcatchpole@heraldnet.com; Twitter:@dcatchpole.





Friday, September 23, 2016

China: Boom, Sleep, and Dreamliners

China's economic boom has successfully come to rest without a complete global airline expansion. It lags behind what happened in China during its last decade of business. The Chinese market place is in a deep slumber soon to awaken. It has sweet dreams of buying the 787 Dreamliner as the new wealth left behind during its current nap are still traveling everywhere. Plans are in place for global expansion via the Dreamliner. It dreams of wide bodies filling the Chinese sky with 787-9's. There are a bevy of subsidiary airlines in hot pursuit before the next economic expansion arrives. 

CAPA report:

"Hainan Airlines Group reported (18-Sep-2016) the following traffic* highlights in Aug-2016:

  • Passenger numbers: 4.3 million, +28.7% year-on-year;·        
    • Domestic: 4.0 million, +27.9%;
    • International: 256,530, +46.8%;
    • Regional: 25,260, +4.5%;
  • Passenger load factor: 89.8%, -0.9 ppt;·     
    • Domestic: 91.2%, -0.3 ppt;
    • International: 85.9%, -2.7 ppts;
    • Regional: 77.0%, -8.6 ppts;
  • Cargo volume: 31,070 tonnes, +6.0% 
    • Domestic: 25,800 tonnes, +1.0%;
    • International: 5220 tonnes, +39.8%;
    • Regional: 50 tonnes, +18.8%. [more - original PR]

*Includes traffic for Hainan AirlinesChina , Xinhua AirlinesChang’an AirlinesShanxi AirlinesLucky Air Company LimitedFuzhou Airlines and Urumqi Airlines."

Hainan is the test bed for Lucky Air’s march forward in the wide body market with its 787's currently moving passengers to and fro across continents. The plethora of airlines above is just scratching the Chinese commercial aviation surface and only coming from just one airline group! Boeing currently leads the Hainan pack.

Then of course there is a Chinese rebuttal to Hainan's aggressive 787 behavior.

Aviation Week:


Even though Boeing is bemoaning a difficult 787 sales year showing only nineteen 787 yet booked for 2016, it will announce many more sales before year's end, principally coming from China. The potential for Boeing is a strong upside as players are lining up for a market move towards the 787. The pilot hole is exampled by the above statistic is from the Hainan "Airline Group".




The group is but a smaller player for China's wide body aspirations. The question before them at this time is to go wide or narrow as the above link will indicate. The airlines, Ruili and Donghai are actively pursuing Boeing 787's over the 737. This has been a back and forth debate for those airlines and it sounds like they have settled in on wide body aircraft for its final decision as reported in the link above.



Boeing should make forty 787 orders by year's end, judging by the on-the-surface Sales-in-progress currently reported since the first of the year.

Thursday, September 22, 2016

Common Customers Boeing 787 Beats the A-350 Soundly

Have you ever wondered why airlines split its fleet between makers within the same types? Winging It has, and a startling realization emerges where Boeing 787's common customers with the Airbus A-350 reveals an interesting image. The Boeing 787 beats the A-350 with over 100 more 787's ordered since both offered its wide body aircraft. Below is a "Winging It" unofficial chart demonstrating where the battle is being fought between the two aircraft framing giants.
Fig. 1

Above is a list of the mid-wide bodied aircraft serving customers in common. The pink shows an Airbus advantage over Boeing with that particular customer.  Boeing has a 2-1 customer advantage over Airbus common customers where they have documented fifteen customer having a greater fleet order than Airbus. The inverse for Airbus shows an advantage over Boeing having only seven customers with larger A-350 orders.


The actual count for the makers show Boeing with 652-787 orders in common with Airbus showing a total of 550-A350's. The market is divided by a 54% 46% split with customers in common. Boeing sold 102 more wide bodies than Airbus having customers in common. The gap with common customers for both giants may increase for Boeing if Emirates splits its order currently under consideration.

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

Is Boeing Leaning Out Operations For The MOM announcement??

Along time ago, there was the book referring to operation "Market Garden" during World War II. Boeing has learned a lesson from operation "Market Garden" turned into the classic book, "A Bridge Too Far", and then on to the silver screen using the same book title.

Operation Market Garden "In a Bridge Too Far" Nijmegen Bridge, Holland
Image result for rhine river bridge a bridge too far



Image result for Nijmegen Bridge, Holland


A quick synopsis for the deeper meaning for Boeing, and a pending announcement by year's end concerning the "Middle of the Market" (MOM) aircraft. It’s plain to see the A-321 is stealing away from Boeing's 757 and 737-9 Max. Boeing must launch a counter offensive called operation "Market Garden", but first a historical perspective.

"Prior to Ryan's book, Market Garden had been a classic example of victors writing the history. Popular histories of World War II of the time usually tended to not mention the battle at all, mentioned it in passing or put Montgomery's spin on it as being a "partial success".[1]
A Bridge Too Far was responsible for bringing to the general public's attention the full extent of this massive operation, including a catalogue of errors and miscalculations, whilst highlighting the bravery of the participants." (Wikipedia)

Boeing is keenly aware of its resources and far reaching goals and is helpless to do something about it when it failed to address a 757 replacement five years ago. However, cooler minds had to prevail over the enormous sunk costs with three different programs. The 737 Max, 777X, and 787 Dreamliner while putting away the 757 Boeing replacement MOM into a box for further considerations of its family placement. It could only watch the erosion of its MOM market while surrendering to Airbus because of its over extended supply, personnel, and other over-arching resources (Financial) after developing the above named three programs.
The key components for a “New Market Garden for the MOM” has to go through an exhaustive check list before the European invasion of a 757 replacement patches together its family of aircraft:

  • Must have a design
  • Must have the Resources
  • Must have the analysis of the Market
  • Must have early commitments
  • Must have new productions plan in hand

On the other hand, Boeing has marched forward with many of the checklist items already completed.
  • It has a design
  • It has market analysis
  • It may have production space
  • It is currently sourcing (supply chain, personnel, and its production plan)
  • and... Is not a "Moon Shot"
The main thing Boeing is currently over extended until all programs are in hand.
  • The 737 Max
  • The 777 X
  • The 787 

Boeing is six months away from diverting engineering resources away from various programs as they progress forward. The 787 program has had an immense release of developing personnel with a mature supply chain and production capability. The 777X program has a new wing plant in Everett which can unleash current 777 300-ER production workers in phases while concurrently building the 777X's within the same house.

Finally, the 737 Max program is almost a slam dunk at this time as Renton, WA "got it handled". The Max is nearing the start of full production rate and having success without any engineering mishaps. Boeing is poised for a December 2016 announcement for the MOM (757 replacement) or AKA: "Operation Market Place" going past the bridge too far between the single aisle and the 787 aircraft types as it crosses over the Rhine River going over Airbus.


Monday, September 19, 2016

Technology Risk and Reward Started With The 787

A long time ago the Business class expressed the concept of risk and reward. The higher the risk the higher the reward. A great model is the 787 program. The myriad amount of technological implements on the 787 provided a breeding ground for risk from its technology. Its counterpart, Airbus, brought forward a lower risk A-350 than the 787. It did not have the Li-ion Battery nor did it replicates Boeing's core electrical technology. Who know how short Airbus came in duplicating the Boeing 787 risk model. Both are made of Carbon fiber and perhaps that is where the commonality ends when researching the technological advancements spawned by Boeing.

Back to the Risk and Reward model. Boeing has had a proportionally higher amount of risk by the exampled events such as the battery melt down, engine issues and "teething woes without a hull loss. Airbus on the other hand has had fairly respectable clear sailing with a less endowed technological machine thus side-stepping the expectation from risk  but having a significantly lower reward compared with the 787 since Boeing reaches towards 1,161 787 sold compared with Airbus' 810 sold as of 2016 sales notes. The 350 units lead Boeing has over Airbus is a significant number illustrating the risk and reward thesis.

The stage is risk reduction for Boeing ending with a superior Aircraft. Customers are inherently risk adverse so sales recently for both makers are slumping in 2016. However, Boeing's 787 seems to not have reached its full technological maturation. The measure of this stage will be signaled when all issues on advanced systems are validated by many service cycles, pealing back any design or innovative risks when implemented within its frame.

A perfected 787 will exceed the perfected A-350 from the customer point of view. This is occurring as each model is tweaking its technological bundle towards perfection. Since Boeing chose the very risky high ground it will end up on top while validating its risk within the reward model. Boeing took a chance on high risk technology knowing it would have severe teething woes with that same technology, but will end up far ahead of Airbus once it emerges out of the "Risk" period. The reward is coming in the next five years as Boeing expands its world footprint with its sound and advanced proven technology. Airbus has some work yet to do in the wide body arena.


Sunday, September 18, 2016

How The 787 Moves In Asia?

This is an update for the delivered region of East Asia's domain where it includes air space from China to New Zealand, not including any other South Pacific Islands. The Below Chart indicates the 787 Asian Footprint with potential seats on order and in service considering 100% occupancy. Today Boeing move about 37,000 passengers each day out of it current sales potential of about 82,000 seats currently held for or delivered through production. Boeing has about 46,000 more seats to go with the 787 models in its family of aircraft as the passenger market expands its reach and imprint with the 787.


Fig 1.



These are unofficial numbers as fleets change weekly and is shown as a demonstration signaling the 787 impact on East Asia's growing market. The air space race is on in the East Asia region and is making a significant world market impact with its orders confirmed for Boeing 787 aircraft.


The obvious observation is that the region's population with its ideal business/vacation appeal is driving an immense market for air travel and has only just begun. The above information only addresses the current order book and delivered seats for each perspective area of aviation. The Boeing effort has made a substantial beach head in this market.

Friday, September 16, 2016

The A-380 is Dying because It Tried To Kill The 747

The A-380 doesn't have any new significant orders in several years. In fact Singapore Air just canceled the lease on its first in service A-380 from ten years ago. The market is about to have a dumping of older A-380's from Airlines that have changed its business model. Emirates the leading customer in the world for JUMBO's, has no market to slough off its older A-380's. In deed it appears the death of the Jumbo is the prognosis. With no additional airports to go has put a ceiling on the aircraft's orders. It also has successfully ended 747 passenger frames from the market place.

It is a quixotic gesture when tilting at wind(s) mill(ing) about. The A-380 is showing its death defying ground loops with no help on the way.  



Wednesday, September 14, 2016

The 787 Has Reached Lean Production Numbers

An obscure topic in the corporate manufacturing is Lean production. It indicates efficiency, inventory management, and optimal investment within its Works-In-Progress Inventory. It also has far reaching implication for Boeing's over-all strategy of reducing backlog and upping cash flow, which in turn gives Boeing a far reaching strategy of giving customers a higher degree of product immediacy within that company’s own planning. The below Chart is a quick and dirty illustration of the Boeing production efficiency is reaching a climax for optimal outcome touching many aspects of Boeing's over-all game planning.


Fig.1: 37 units Works-in-progress (WIP) 8-2016 Data





Fig.2 The 11-30-2015 WIP Report is 45, 787’s

The above two charts show a reduction of Works-in-process 787's by about 21%. The number came down from 45 Dreamliners found in the November 2015 report of only having the current 37 Dreamliners in the same status. Several assumptions can be made from this decrease with production floor units.

1. Factoring the WIP reduction production floor churning, indicates more a efficient production line where Boeing does not need additional space caused by slow production. As the production rate per month increases the WIP numbers decrease.

2. It also indicates rising cash position as it delivers more 787 each month.

3. Additionally, an intrinsic value comes from customer satisfaction while opening Boeing up for more sales.

4. Finally, there is a reduction of production cost for materials, space and labor expended, which meets the optimal Just-In Time model for efficiency.

A final optimal number is derived by Boeing as it reaches 14 units per month with its work force, plant, and inventory. Boeing's always improving theme will squeeze the WIP number below thirty-five a month giving it optimal flexibility and response to the market growth. It is a distinct advantage over Airbus' production start-up for its own A-350's. They are still working the kinks out as Boeing grabs more sales in the upcoming months when its backlog dips below 700, 787 this month.  


Saturday, September 10, 2016

Reading the 757 Tween The Lines

Boeing has yet to announce a 757 replacement in 2016 as many has suggest will come. It remains a big question for which Boeing has indicated it has time to consider. Now it seems it will say something by years end. With that a meaning is derived from this hint. Boeing prefers to work out all details about a "Tweener" aircraft first rather than build it first and then modify it later. This becomes reading between Boeing's lines when it sounds plausible. In other words the Boeing corporation new attack formula on aviation's market is getting it right on paper first, and then acting second.

It has been over ten years since the original 757 ceased production and Boeing has had plenty of time and resource ciphering the proposal. The "things change" factor is the ghost which continues to chase new airplanes that is not unlike tagging a rainbow. The 787, A-321, and other types confuse the picture of what passengers and airlines want. Boeing could have built a Tweener five years ago but airplane wars was in the middle of a big battle with the 787 and A350. Then the 777X assault began having a topping of Max-bits to boot.

The 737-9 is an unmitigated market pause suggesting Boeing needs more than a A-321 rival, it needed fulfillment with a "game changing" expectation instead, as customers have begun to expect from Boeing everything Boeing is "Game Changing". Once again back to the 757 replacement.

Now comes a tid bit, at the end of 2016 when "Boeing will know what it will do with a new class of airplane". A "Make it" rather than "break it" mentality. It should announce something the competition can't do at this time or into the next ten years. Build something special and they will come. Boeing has the parts bin, technology and design mechanism to do this, but it doesn't have the capital or risk managed for such a venture. Data will address the winds of risk before it will proceed, since it has so much on the production and R&D table at this time. Boeing should provide an answer by stating a solution having a five year time line this December.